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This thesis examines the recent growth in pay inequality in Britain that can be traced to 
change at the top of the distribution. It takes a broad perspective on the subject that draws on 
insights generated across multiple branches of social science, and tests these insights against 
comparative data. It argues ultimately that top-tier growth in British pay inequality is 
strongly connected to rising demand for the skills of upper- and middle-managers created by 
the reshaping of production systems in British organizations. On the way to this conclusion, 
the thesis addresses three main research questions:
1. What lies behind the apparent ‘top pay’ bias in pay inequality growth in Britain since 
the 1990s?
The thesis tests multiple explanations for the distributional bias observed in Britain in 
comparative perspective. It concludes that rising pay inequality at the top in Britain is 
connected to an apparent increase in relative demand for certain types of manager that is 
specific to that country.
2. Have organizational governance factors contributed to the rise in pay inequality at the 
top?
It is tested whether the apparent rise in relative demand for managers in Britain is in fact a 
byproduct of shifting patterns of organizational governance. The empirical analysis finds 
little evidence that governance factors have contributed greatly to the rise in pay inequality at 
the top.
3. Have changes in production systems contributed to the apparent rise in relative 
demand for managers in Britain?
The thesis tests the idea that recent changes in the typical approach to production have made 
certain types of manager relatively more valuable to British organizations. It finds firm 
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A large body of research has confirmed that British levels of broad-based pay inequality -  
meaning the degree of inequality as measured across the entire distribution of pay in the 
labour market -  rose substantially between the late-1970s and the mid-1990s (see, for 
example, Schmitt 1995; Gosling, Machin et al. 1996; Leslie and Pu 1996; Machin 1996; 
Machin 1997; Machin 1998). However, recent contributions to the literature have questioned 
whether this trend has continued since the middle of the last decade, and in some cases have 
wondered whether it has in fact been replaced by a trend towards rising pay inequality only at 
the top of the labour market (Dickens and Manning 2002; Goos and Manning 2003; Guy 
2005). As this issue has yet to be directly investigated, questions remain as to what the exact 
form of this new trend might be, and -  if its existence if confirmed -  what might lie behind it.
A trend of this kind would be worthy of analysis because it would suggest that the British 
labour market continued to fragment among winners and losers during the years of steady and 
consistent economic growth that followed the economically volatile years of the 1980s and 
the recession of the early-1990s. In the period between the Second World War and the oil 
shocks of the 1970s, consistent economic growth in Britain (and most developed economies) 
was associated with a trend towards greater equality in labour market outcomes (Atkinson 
1999a). It is perhaps unsurprising that the years of upheaval in the British economy and 
labour market in the late-1970s and 1980s -  which featured deindustrialization, rapidly rising 
unemployment, and significant industrial conflict -  were marked by rising pay inequality. 
However, it would mark a qualitative break with the past if it were confirmed that the return 
of consistent growth has also been associated with rising pay inequality. Such a finding 
would provide further evidence that the British labour market has changed in fundamental 
ways in the period since the end of the 1970s.
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While there is a sizeable body of existing anecdotal evidence in the area of rising pay 
inequality biased towards the top of the labour market -  see, for example the ongoing media 
coverage of ‘fat cat’ executive pay deals -  there is something of a dearth o f analysis based on 
data and sound measurement. Furthermore, the question of social and economic inequality is 
once again becoming a major issue in British public policy debate, partly because of the rising 
profile of the global super-wealthy in Britain (e.g., Roman Abramovich, Lakshmi Mittal, and 
so on), but partly because of a growing public perception that Britain more broadly is 
continuing to become a more stratified society. Although debates of this kind tend to focus 
on inequality in wealth, income, or even life chances, the fact that wealth and income are 
largely founded in earnings for the large majority of the population (Atkinson 1999a) means 
that the investigation of rising pay inequality is of great relevance to them. For this reason, 
detailed study of possible rising pay inequality at the top could contribute not only to the 
general understanding of the recent evolution of the British labour market and employment 
relations, but also to wider socio-economic enquiry and public debate about the direction in 
which the country is developing.
Given the potential broad relevance of the issue, therefore, this thesis takes up the challenge 
of investigating in detail the subject of changes in pay inequality at the top of the labour 
market. In outline, the thesis attempts first of all to identify any such trend in the British data 
for the period between the late-1970s and 2001/2002, defining ‘top-tier pay inequality’ as 
those aspects of pay inequality that relate to the top ten percent of the overall distribution. 
Having done so, it proceeds to explore a number of possible approaches to the explanation of 
this trend. The thesis looks at the issue of explanation from a number of angles. Initially, it 
tests hypotheses derived from the literature on past changes in broad-based pay inequality, 
but, finding these not to be relevant to the new form of trend, puts these aside in favour o f 
alternatives sourced from across the spectrum of socio-economic enquiry.
The industrial relations tradition, with its ecumenical and pragmatic approach to empirical 
research, provides an ideal environment within which to pursue a wide-ranging research 
agenda of this kind. Thus, the thesis builds on the foundation of the existing body of relevant 
labour economics research on pay inequality trends, not least by emulating its use of large- 
scale quantitative data sets and methods of econometric analysis. Nonetheless, it is also 
intended to draw on other research traditions and theory where appropriate in order to attempt
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imaginatively to address the key questions that arise. In particular, I draw on a number of 
findings from the literature on comparative capitalism in order to inform my analyses.
The empirical phenomenon of pay structures (and change therein) is of interest to researchers 
in multiple disciplines of the social sciences -  with each discipline interrogating and 
interpreting the data on this issue for its own distinct purposes. Essentially, however, it is 
possible to discern two primary perspectives in the research literature on pay inequality: that 
of economics, and that of political science. The first of these understands pay differentials 
primarily as price signals that enable the matching of supply and demand in the labour 
market, directing labour to its most productive use (Okun 1975). Through this lens, pay 
inequality appears as a technical factor whose analysis can inform studies of labour market 
operation, of economic efficiency, of firm behaviour, and so on. In contrast, the second 
perspective -  that of political science -  tends to view pay differentials in the light of the 
question, ‘who gets what, when, how?’ (Lasswell 1936). As a consequence, pay inequality is 
understood as being more than the outcome of technical processes of market operation, as it is 
simultaneously the product of and an influence upon the hurly-burly of political competition 
in a society (Pontusson, Rueda et al. 2002).
The approach I take in the thesis, then, is one of applying and integrating different bodies of 
knowledge in order to guide my research and to generate hypotheses, while deploying an 
empirical strategy based on econometric analysis. All the same, the differing motivations and 
goals of the chapters mean that the exact form of the empirical analysis varies considerably 
from one chapter to another. Chapter two is intended to lay the foundation for the remainder 
of the thesis by establishing the facts in relation to British top-tier pay inequality in recent 
years, assessing existing explanations for rising pay inequality, and identifying plausible 
alternative directions of research. Chapters three and four respectively build upon this base 
by exploring plausible ‘non-market’ and ‘market’ explanations of the observed rise in British 
top-tier pay inequality, with the former examining the impact of corporate or organizational 
governance factors, and the latter looking at the influence of the role of managers in the 
organization of production.
The thesis is intended as an initial enquiry into the subject of top-tier pay inequality in Britain, 
which addresses certain questions but also raises others. It is my aim to provide a firm basis 
of fact about what form these trends have taken, and to assess a number of plausible
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explanations for them. But, while I believe my conclusions to be robust, I understand them to 
be an opening contribution to a debate rather than the last word on the subject.
In organizing the thesis, I have adopted a three-paper format in which the chapters build upon 
one another and are closely interlinked. In this way, I hope to provide a strong element of 
continuity to my argument, while benefiting from the ability that this structure affords me to 
investigate a small number of key questions in great detail. The following section of the 
introduction provides a brief overview of the remainder of the thesis, with an emphasis on the 
key research questions and my manner of addressing them.
Overview
The second chapter opens the empirically focused element of this thesis. It comprises a 
comparative assessment of the evidence in relation to the question of top-tier pay inequality 
growth in Britain since the late-1970s. It addresses two principal research questions. First, 
the chapter aims to identify a ‘top pay’ bias in pay inequality growth in Britain and to 
understand the ways in which it might be novel and/or specific to Britain. It does so by 
examining top pay developments in Britain in the light of preceding trends and of trends in 
comparable countries, namely France and Germany. Second, it begins this thesis’s analysis of 
factors that underlie the growth of British top-tier pay inequality, asking whether this is a 
continuation of previous trends or rather something new. Initially, the chapter tests the 
relevance of prevailing explanations for rising pay inequality, but eventually discards these in 
favour of an alternative explanatory framework centred on ‘jobs’. This alternative approach 
reveals that the rise in top-tier pay inequality in Britain is closely linked to the fortunes of 
senior managerial jobs, and that Britain appears quite distinctive in this respect. Furthermore, 
the economy-wide nature of the trend in favour of managerial jobs implies that this 
development is closely linked to changes within organizations. In this way, the chapter 
provides a factual foundation for the chapters that follow, and identifies plausible approaches 
to the explanation of top-tier pay inequality growth that they may test.
Chapter three takes up the task of exploring and testing the ‘non-market’ explanation of rising 
pay inequality, that is, the influence of corporate or organizational governance factors. In
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doing so, the chapter draws on a set o f ideas derived from political science. The core idea 
tested in this chapter is that ‘outsider-dominated’ organizations will tend to favour managerial 
interests relative to those of other employees, with the result that top pay will rise relative to 
the rest of the distribution, whereas ‘insider-dominated’ organizations will tend to treat all 
employees -  managerial or not -  on a relatively equal basis, with the result that pay will be be 
more equally distributed. By testing these ideas on comparable, organization-level, time- 
series data for Britain and France, the chapter is able to probe the implications of the 
hypothesis in contexts marked by different top pay inequality trends. On the whole, however, 
the results indicate that, while the evolution of governance arrangements is of some 
significance for top pay outcomes -  especially in Britain -  it is not a major determinant of 
top-tier pay inequality growth.
This finding orients the thesis back towards market explanations of change in the dependent 
variable. Chapter four analyses top-tier pay inequality growth using a market-based 
conceptual framework, and focuses on the fortunes of the occupational group of managers in 
Britain within this framework. Noting the commonplace in the research literature that British 
management in the postwar period was distinctive in comparative terms for its low human 
capital, status, and importance to the conduct of production, the chapter probes developments 
since the 1970s in all of these areas as a means of better understanding why British managers 
appear to be in such high demand now. As a means of interpreting change, the chapter draws 
on insights generated in the fields of economic sociology and industrial relations (the ‘societal 
effects’ approach), integrating these within a supply-and-demand analysis of pay and 
employment outcomes. The findings of the chapter point suggest that the apparent large 
increase in demand for managers in Britain since the 1980s is strongly associated with 
considerable change along the key dimensions of skills production systems, industrial 
relations arrangements, and work organization within the typical British enterprise.
Chapter five offers a brief set of concluding remarks, summarizing the key insights generated 
by the preceding three chapters and outlining the principal argument of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Understanding the Recent Top-Tier Bias of Pay Inequality 
Growth in Britain
Introduction
In the last two decades the subject of pay inequality has attracted considerable academic 
attention in Britain. This interest followed the reversal of a long-term postwar trend towards 
overall pay compression (Schmitt 1995), as a result of which the distribution of pay has 
become ever more inegalitarian. It is widely recognized that this ongoing distributional shift 
has been an ever-present feature of the British labour market since the late-1970s, and has led 
to a substantial restructuring of the rewards for work, with a concomitant impact on overall 
income inequality and social stratification (Atkinson 1999a; 2002).
However, the trend towards greater pay inequality has not been uniform. Rather, there is 
evidence that it underwent a substantial shift in its form in the course of the 1990s, becoming 
to a much greater extent a phenomenon affecting only the top tier of the labour market. Prior 
to this period, between the late-1970s and the mid-1990s, the rise in pay inequality in Britain 
was a broad-based trend that affected the whole of the pay distribution. This is to say that 
while real pay -  no matter whether measured by hourly wages, or weekly or annual earnings -  
rose on average, both tails of the distribution became progressively more elongated, which 
pattern was reflected in steadily rising gaps between the median and the 10th and 90th 
percentiles respectively (Schmitt 1995; Gosling, Machin et al. 1996; Machin 1996; Prasad 
2002).
Of the explanations offered for this trend, two came to prevail. First, it was argued that the 
path of technological and organizational evolution had taken a sharp turn in the course of the 
1970s as a result of the ever-wider introduction of novel information and computing 
technologies (ICT) in the workplace, and that these technologies were complementary with
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highly skilled labour. The consequence of these developments was interpreted as a 
complementarity effect -  widely labelled ‘skill-biased technical change’ (SBTC) -  that raised 
relative demand for skilled labour while reducing relative demand for unskilled labour.
Within this framework, therefore, the rising dispersion of pay reflected the impact of a 
relative demand shift in a context in which the supply of high skills could not adjust quickly 
enough to maintain the previous distributional equilibrium.
The other key explanation concerned the fortunes of labour market institutions perceived to 
buttress the relative pay levels of low-skill workers -  chiefly, the system of collective 
bargaining, the agreement of wage floors in low-paying industries, and features of the welfare 
state affecting the ‘replacement wage’. In Britain, from the late-1970s onwards, these 
institutions underwent significant change in ways that reduced their potential to compress the 
distribution of pay outcomes (Machin 1997; Howell 1999). For example, there occurred a 
steady fall in the prevalence of collective bargaining throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s; 
the Wages Councils that governed wage floors were hollowed out prior to their eventual 
abolition; and the real value of welfare state benefits available to the unemployed was 
progressively reduced. From this perspective, then, the weakening of the array of institutional 
supports for the pay of the low-skilled in particular contributed to the expansion of overall 
pay inequality observed in the British labour market.
Many analysts concluded that SBTC and institutional change were not rival explanations of 
British developments, but had worked in tandem to increase pay inequality across the breadth 
of the distribution, with the former stretching the right tail and the latter working to widen the 
left (Schmitt 1995; Gosling, Machin et al. 1996; Machin 1996). However, while a similar 
trend towards greater pay inequality was observed at the same time in a number of other 
developed countries -  especially the US and Canada -  it was by no means a universal 
phenomenon. For instance, West Germany and France showed little sign of growing pay 
inequality in this period (Katz, Loveman et al. 1995). In comparative perspective, therefore, 
researchers tended to conclude that although SBTC was a development that transcended 
national borders, its pay inequality-raising impact was subdued in countries with strong and 
stable labour market institutions (see, e.g., Freeman and Katz 1995; Blau and Kahn 1996; 
Gottschalk and Joyce 1998; Tachibanaki 1998).
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In recent years, research using newer data has raised questions about the predominant form of 
change in the British distribution of pay. Namely, it has indicated that the broad-based trend 
towards greater pay inequality in Britain fell away in the course of the 1990s -  indeed, some 
research suggests that the outline of the distribution of pay between the 10th and 90th 
percentiles changed little after mid-decade. But, it seems that overall pay inequality has 
continued to rise owing to continuing change in the shape of the top end of the distribution 
(Prasad 2002; Goos and Manning 2003). Only limited evidence for this shift has been 
assembled in the academic arena, although non-academic sources tend to corroborate the story 
(for instance, Towers Perrin 2007; Towers Perrin 2008). As a consequence, the issue of rising 
top-tier pay inequality has yet to be satisfactorily explored and mapped out.
Interestingly, a similar trend has been noted in the US in the same period, and has led to a 
reopening of debate about the factors that underlie rising pay inequality, as the combination of 
SBTC and institutional change does not seem adequate to explain this novel and particular 
form of distributional change (Card and DiNardo 2002; Autor, Levy et al. 2003; Lemieux 
2006; Lemieux 2007). To a large extent, the reassessment has been driven by two 
observations: first, that even as the rate of technological change in production accelerated in 
the US after the turn of the 1990s (especially as regards investment in and implementation of 
information and communication technologies [ICT]), the rate of broad growth of wage 
inequality decelerated almost to nothing; and second, that rises in pay inequality concentrated 
above the top decile of the distribution appear to have little to do with labour market 
institutions such as wage floors and collective bargaining. Evidently, both of these 
observations are valid for Britain as for the US, and invite further analysis of the factors 
driving change in pay inequality in Britain since the mid-1990s.
This chapter is intended as an initial step towards addressing the questions that have been 
raised regarding the form and causes of rising top-tier pay inequality in Britain. In exploring 
these two issues, it addresses two principal research questions. The first of these concerns the 
precise nature of the mooted ‘top pay’ bias in pay inequality growth in Britain since the mid- 
1990s. The paper seeks to identify this and to confirm whether or not the trend possesses 
aspects which are novel and/or specific to Britain. It does so by taking an explicitly 
comparative approach to the analysis of the distribution of pay, examining developments in 
Britain in the light of preceding trends and of contemporaneous developments in comparable 
countries (the countries analysed are France and Germany).
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The second research question relates to the factors contributing to the top pay bias in 
inequality growth. Thus, the chapter investigates what lies behind the ongoing growth of top- 
tier pay inequality, asking whether this is a continuation of previous trends or rather 
something new. To this end it initially tests the extent to which the prevailing explanations 
for rising pay inequality -  i.e., SBTC and change in certain labour market institutions -  can 
account for top-tier growth in pay inequality. However, it also applies a ‘job’ analysis 
framework, derived from the insights of some of the most recent literature on changes in 
British pay inequality, to the data in order to explore plausible alternative explanations for 
change at die top of the pay distribution. To identify the extent to which these explanations 
rest on ‘universal’ or country-specific factors, all of these tests are conducted using not only 
British data, but also against French and German data.
This chapter has three main sections. The first section is intended to set the scene for the 
investigation of the two research questions noted above, and presents the chapter’s literature 
review, its empirical strategy, and a description of the data it uses. First, therefore, it sorts 
through the British and international literature on change in pay inequality to identify the 
relevant debates and theoretical positions, and establishes the current state of knowledge in 
the area. Second, it introduces the chapter’s approach to empirical analysis. Third, it 
describes the scope of the data used in the course of this paper’s analysis, and discusses the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the various data sets. It further makes the case for 
defining ‘pay’ in terms of the price facing employers in the labour market -  or, at least, a 
measure that approximates this -  as both the prevailing explanations for rising pay inequality 
and alternative accounts turn on employer decision making with regard to the profile of the 
workforce and relative pay.
The second main section of the chapter addresses the first key research question sketched 
above. The results it generates indicate that the pattern of top-tier pay inequality growth is 
long-established in Britain, and that there is considerable across-country variation in trends in 
this area. The third main section of the chapter addresses the second research question, i.e., 
that relating to the factors underlying change in pay inequality. It initially tests the usefulness 
of the prevailing explanations of rising pay inequality in accounting for top-tier inequality 
growth. As these analyses conclude that the prevailing explanations are of limited 
applicability, they open the door to consideration of alternative explanations. Here, the
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chapter introduces the ‘job’ analysis approach to analysis of change in the distribution of pay, 
and applies it to the data. This element of the study produces a number of new insights into 
the development of top-tier pay inequality in Britain, in particular that it appears to be 
associated with the relative pay fortunes of a narrow set of senior general and specialist 
managerial job types and their incumbents.
In its conclusions, the chapter teases out the implications of these findings for our 
understanding of rising top-tier pay inequality in Britain, and speculates on plausible paths of 
research that may lead to more definitive explanations of its causes. In doing so, it maps out 
the research agenda of the remainder of the thesis.
Literature review
It is by now a well known fact that pay inequality in Britain rose rapidly and continuously in 
the years between the late-1970s and the early-1990s. Numerous studies report this outcome 
for a number of different measures of pay -  hourly wages, monthly earnings, and annual 
earnings (Schmitt 1995; Gosling, Machin et al. 1996; Leslie and Pu 1996; Machin 1996; 
Machin 1997; Machin 1998). That these studies employ a variety of data sources to obtain 
very similar results suggests that the observation of rising pay inequality is an extremely 
robust one.1
A number of key features of the distributional shift can be distilled from this body of research. 
First, the rise in inequality was not limited to the periphery of the labour market, being as 
apparent among samples of full-time male workers as among samples that include groups 
with a lesser attachment to the labour market (part-time workers, women, etc.) (Gosling, 
Machin et al. 1996). Second, real wages grew steadily during this period even at the very 
bottom of the distribution, in contrast, say, to the contemporaneous experience of low-paid 
workers in the US, who suffered falling real remuneration (Schmitt 1995; Gosling, Machin et 
al. 1996). Third, the rise in inequality affected the whole distribution, with growth in 
disparities occurring on both sides of the median. Thus, for example, Machin (1996) shows
1 The sources used include employer-reported data such as the New Earnings Survey, and surveys of individuals 
and households such as the Family Expenditure Survey and the General Household Survey.
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that between 1977 and 1992 the p50-pl0 percentile ratio rises from approximately 1.45 to 1.8, 
and the p90-p50 percentile ratio rises from 1.65 to 1.9. Lastly, it is stated that the rise in 
inequality was largely unrelated to the ongoing and rapid shift of economic activity from 
manufacturing into services or to the growing rate of labour force participation among women 
(Schmitt 1995). Overall, therefore, the distributional trend between the late-1970s and early- 
1990s can be defined as a broad, continuous shift towards greater inequality.
A glance at the equivalent German and French research literatures is enough to convince an 
observer that the British experience of greatly expanding pay inequality in the 1970s and 
1980s was not universal among large EU states. In Germany, for instance, studies covering 
the period from the late-1970s until unification in 1990 find little change in any aspect of the 
German wage distribution except one: the narrowing of the gap between the lowest paid and 
the median (Abraham and Houseman 1995; Fitzenberger, Hujer et al. 2001). Thus, the p50- 
plO percentile ratio is found to have dropped from around 1.5 to 1.4 in the course of the 1980s 
(p.377, Abraham and Houseman 1995), the reverse of the contemporaneous trend in Britain.
In all other respects -  upper-tail inequality, returns to age, experience, and education, inter­
industry and inter-occupational patterns, and so on -  the structure of pay is seen to remain 
very stable during this period. Moreover, as in Britain, German researchers have exploited 
both employer and household data to examine pay inequality trends, and both varieties of 
survey have generated results that support these conclusions.
Developments in France in this period somewhat resemble those observed in Germany. An 
early analysis of the French experience uses social security records (DADS) for 1967-1990 
(Katz, Loveman et al. 1995). Focusing on the results from the mid-1970s onwards, the 
pattern that emerges is one of a substantially static wage distribution between the 10th and 90th 
percentiles, with mild compression in the early-1980s being followed by an equally mild 
dispersion in the second half of the decade. Most of the variation in the distribution can be 
traced to inequality shifts confined to female workers. Such aspects of the wage structure as 
the returns to education and experience remain stable throughout the 1980s. Mitani’s (1998) 
analysis of a related data set produces results that are consistent with this picture. In addition, 
these findings have been corroborated by Piketty’s (2001) more recent study of the long-term 
evolution of the distribution of pay that draws on a different data set generated from personal 
tax returns.
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This brief comparison of Britain, France, and Germany from the 1970s to the early-1990s 
shows that the British experience of rising broad-based pay inequality was not shared 
elsewhere. Indeed, French and German pay structures remain remarkably static in outline 
during this period. What might lie behind these fundamental differences? As a first step in 
answering this question, I look at the prevailing explanations in the literature for British pay 
inequality trends. Subsequently, I investigate how useful these explanations are when they 
are called to account for patterns of change observed in other countries. The dominant 
accounts of British inequality trends can be bracketed into two groups: those that interpret 
relative wage shifts as the outcome of changes in the interaction of supply and demand for 
different types of human capital, and those that see them as deriving from alterations in the 
form of labour market institutions. The key types of institutions considered by most 
observers to be relevant to the analysis include unions and collective bargaining, and 
minimum wage regulations. It should be noted that the two sets of explanations are neither 
contradictory nor mutually exclusive. Indeed, many commentators conclude that the 
observed trends are the product of both types of influence.
For the first group of explanations, the key underlying assumption is that there took place in 
the 1970s a transition in the pattern of labour demand that relatively favoured more highly 
skilled workers, and that this relative bias towards the highly skilled has remained a constant 
feature of the labour market up to the present (Schmitt 1995; Machin 1998; Card and 
Lemieux 2001; Prasad 2002). As for the cause of such an apparent bias in demand, there 
have been two main candidates: globalization, in the particular sense of rising international 
trade and market integration; and skill-biased technological change (SBTC). The first 
hypothesis presumes that globalization affects the distribution of pay in the developed 
countries by a form of supply shock, although from the perspective of a single developed- 
country labour market it manifests itself as a drop in relative demand for low-skill workers. 
The basic story departs from the following point: as barriers to trade become lower, 
developed-country employers will increasingly locate their production facilities according to 
cost rather than market access. Thus, low-skill workers in the tradable (and labour-intensive) 
sector of developed economies are increasingly exposed to competition from equally skilled 
but cheaper workers based in the developing world, with attendant negative pressure on their 
pay. In conjunction with the integration of markets, advances in communications and 
transport infrastructures further reduce the costs of transnational production and progressively 
expose more and higher-skilled workers to low-wage competition. The outcome, therefore,
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within a single developed-country labour market, is a fall in relative demand for low skills 
that leads to relatively lower wages for these workers and growing wage inequality in the left 
tail of the distribution.
The SBTC account begins from the premise that new -  principally, ICT -  technologies are 
complements in production with high skills. The rapid decline in the real cost of such 
technologies -  as captured by, say, the vertiginous drop in the price of a unit of computing 
power over the last couple of decades -  encourages their rapid and widespread adoption 
among employers, and is the catalyst for an increase in demand for complementary high 
skills. Where skill supply growth is insufficient to match that of demand, the predicted 
outcome is that the price of high skills rises while that of low skills drops, which patterns are 
manifested in increased pay inequality, especially in the top half of the distribution (for 
surveys of the literature, see Chennells and Van Reenen 1999; Acemoglu 2002).
While the early literature on rising pay inequality in the US and Britain gave serious billing to 
both theses (e.g., see Schmitt 1995) and strong arguments were made for the role of increased 
trade on developed-country pay distributions (Wood 1994; Wood 1995), a general consensus 
has developed that the evidence for the impact of globalization on the distribution of pay in 
the developed countries is relatively weak (for surveys, see Burtless 1995; Freeman 1995). In 
large part, this is because of the within-industry nature of inequality growth where it has 
occurred, and the strong contribution of right-tail expansion to the widening of the wage 
distribution. Both observations can be interpreted to undermine the globalization thesis, as on 
the one hand one would expect it to lead to the growth of inter-industry inequality -  between 
the traded and untraded sectors -  and on the other it has little to say about the rise of 
inequality among more highly skilled workers. The SBTC thesis is better placed to account 
for these developments, and so has acquired much wider acceptance as a plausible 
explanation for the apparent shift in relative labour demand.
The first group of explanations for inequality developments in the British labour market, 
therefore, assume a SBTC-led demand bias as the cornerstone of their argument. 
Subsequently, they account for the rapid rise in British pay inequality during the 1980s and its 
deceleration thereafter as regards the impact of variation over time in the rate of growth of 
high skills. Essentially, relatively slow growth in the skills base in the 1980s means that 
demand growth outstrips supply growth, driving up the relative price o f skills, whereas the
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subsequent more rapid supply growth of the 1990s realigns the trajectories of supply and 
demand and produces stable relative prices. In these analyses, ‘skills’ are typically proxied by 
the level of educational qualification, and this story is buttressed by evidence that the returns 
to education rose rapidly in the first period before stabilizing in the second (Schmitt 1995; 
Machin 1998; McIntosh 2005).
The second class of explanation -  ‘institutions’ -  largely focuses on the twin impacts o f the 
decline of trade unionism and the phasing out and subsequent refoundation of minimum wage 
regulations. The collapse of union strength in Britain in the face of the legal reforms of the 
Thatcher and Major governments, economic turmoil in many heavily unionized industries, 
and high unemployment was without equal in the developed world. Membership density 
dropped from approximately 55% in the late-1970s to less than 30% by the turn of the 
century, and collective bargaining coverage sank from 70% to 35% during the same period 
(Visser 2005). Given that unions are known to exert an egalitarian influence on wage 
structures (Freeman 1980; Metcalf 2001), it is not surprising that several studies have 
concluded that the contraction of the union sphere contributed to rising pay inequality 
(Schmitt 1995; Machin 1997; Gosling and Lemieux 2001). In the area of minimum wage 
regulations, from 1979 onwards Conservative governments weakened and eventually 
abolished the system of Wages Councils that set minimum rates in a number of low-wage 
industries. These moves have been found to have contributed to rising pay inequality in the 
lower reaches of the distribution (Machin 1997; Gosling and Lemieux 2001). In contrast, the 
adoption of the National Minimum Wage in 1999 was found to have raised the wage floor of 
the labour market and mildly reduced lower-tail inequality following its implementation 
(Dickens and Manning 2002).
Of the two institutional factors, union decline is generally perceived to be the more important 
for the explanation of overall inequality developments, as it directly affected a greater share of 
workers than either the old or new forms of minimum wage setting. For example, Machin 
estimates that, had union recognition remained at its 1983 level, the rise of wage inequality 
would have been approximately 40% less over the 1983-1991 period than was in fact 
observed (Machin 1997). He concludes that, while the downgrading of the wages councils 
had a positive and significant impact on wage inequality, its impact was of a lesser order. 
Overall, though, the view of the literature seems to be that institutional change and SBTC
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contributed in more-or-less equal measure to the broad and rapid rise in British pay inequality 
that took place between the late-1970s and the start of the 1990s.
Before assessing the usefulness of the British explanations in relation to the trends observed 
in France and Germany, it is perhaps worth diverting our path briefly to consider the 
evolution of the international comparative literature on pay inequality. While the experience 
o f rising pay inequality in the Anglophone world in the 1980s -  and particularly in the US -  
led to the production of a very large literature on the subject (for surveys, see Levy and 
Mumane 1992; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997), this experience was not strongly felt 
elsewhere in the developed world, and so analyses on the subject initially remained thin on 
the ground. Having posited a skill-biased demand shift as the primary driver of rising 
inequality in their own countries, Anglophone country researchers faced a puzzle when 
looking at developments beyond their own borders. Elsewhere, pay inequality did not appear 
to be rising as rapidly (or at all), yet the SBTC and globalization theses were universal in 
aspect, and so surely should have traction in all developed countries. After all, trade was 
rising in GDP across the developed world, and it would be reasonable to assume that general- 
purpose technologies like ICT diffuse quickly across borders, with the result that employers in 
all developed countries face similar menus of technological options. Thus, if the theses were 
to be valid anywhere, they must be valid everywhere. However, continental Europe and 
Japan tended to show little sign of significantly greater pay inequality (Freeman and Katz 
1995; Blau and Kahn 1996; Tachibanaki 1998).
Mirroring the explanations that predominate in accounting for the British experience, two 
accounts emerged that could reconcile the observation of an absence of change in pay 
inequality with the posited existence of a global underlying shift in labour demand towards 
the highly skilled. First, in countries exhibiting little inequality growth it could be possible 
that the supply of highly skilled workers had expanded in line with demand. Second, 
political-institutional features of these labour markets -  minimum wages, collective contracts, 
etc. -  may have compressed pay relative to a competitive counterfactual outcome at the cost 
of higher unemployment. Consequently, the universal demand shift towards high skills could 
be tempered at the national level by supply shifts and a certain set of labour market 
institutions. This interpretation of the evidence became so commonplace in the comparative 
literature that it acquired titles such as the ‘transatlantic consensus’ (Atkinson 1999b) or the 
‘unified theory’ (Blau and Kahn 2002).
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The empirical assessment of the evolution of the distribution of pay in France and Germany 
has taken place within the context of this overarching interpretation. However, the evidence 
that SBTC factors can account for developments in these countries is not overwhelming. For
tliexample, analysts of German developments find that, over the last two decades of the 20 
century, the growth of the relative supply of high skills is rather similar to the rates observed 
in the US and Britain, and so would not appear much better able better to soak up demand- 
side pressure (Abraham and Houseman 1995; Prasad 2000). In the French case, the difficulty 
of gaining access to adequate education-level data makes it hard even to assess the rate of 
growth in the supply of general skills, forcing interested researchers to fall back on somewhat 
fragile inference (Katz, Loveman et al. 1995; Mitani 1998). Consequently, it remains to be 
shown whether differences in skill supply growth rates (against a common background of an 
increasing bias in labour demand towards high skills owing to SBTC) can explain observed 
variation in the evolution of pay inequality.
In the matter of the relevant institutions, more robust evidence is available. Both Germany 
and France have had denser and more durable systems of collective wage setting and 
minimum wage enforcement than Britain, and it is generally to these that analysts point when 
accounting for the absence of any notable change in the distribution of pay in these countries 
in the 1970s and 1980s (Abraham and Houseman 1995; Katz, Loveman et al. 1995; Mitani 
1998; Prasad 2000). This argument is usually reinforced with reference to the higher rates of 
unemployment observed in Germany and France than in the international benchmark of the 
US, which are claimed as the byproduct of choosing a different point on the inequality- 
employment trade-off curve.2 All the same, this argument has not gone unchallenged, as 
some recent research on the subject has forcefully questioned the existence of a clear, 
institutionally mediated trade-off between employment and the degree of pay inequality 
(Atkinson 1999b; Freeman and Schettkat 2001; Howell 2002; Schettkat 2003).
On the whole, though, the prevailing explanations of rising British pay inequality in the late- 
1970s and 1980s (i.e., SBTC and the weakening of labour market institutions) can be applied 
at least partially to the development of the French and German distributions of pay prior to the
2 Britain’s unemployment performance in the 1980s was no better than that of France and certainly weaker than 
that o f West Germany at the same time that it experienced high rates of pay inequality growth across the 
distribution and they did not. This observation is not straightforwardly consistent with the hypothesis that 
countries must choose between rising pay inequality or rising unemployment.
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early-1990s. Given that both of these countries experienced little growth in pay inequality 
during this period, the prevailing explanations would require that the growth in the relative 
supply of skilled labour grew more rapidly than in Britain, and/or that labour market 
institutions remained unchanged or even became more influential in the field of pay setting. 
While the evidence for the latter development is strong -  i.e., that French and German 
collective bargaining, minimum wage, and welfare state institutions weathered the 1970s and 
1980s rather better than their British equivalents -  the evidence that skill supply growth 
differed substantially across countries is less clear-cut. As a result, it may be argued that 
while the ‘unified theory’ approach to explaining different national trajectories of change of 
pay inequality may not be fully complete, it can plausibly account for much across-country 
difference in developments in this area. On balance, then, it is reasonable to conclude that 
SBTC and the relevant labour market institutions hold the key to patterns of change (or stasis) 
in the distribution of pay in Britain in the decade and a half prior to 1990, and that this 
conclusion holds up when subjected to comparative scrutiny in the form of simultaneous 
analyses of developments in France and Germany.
If this is the conclusion that emerges from the literature relating to the 1970s and 1980s, the 
question arises as to its relevance to more recent developments. Research conducted using 
British data series that stretch up to the end of the 1990s and beyond has indicated that the 
pattern of change in the distribution of pay changed character rather sharply in the early- to 
mid-1990s. Analyses of this kind show that the by-then-well-established broad-based (i.e., 
whole-distribution) trend towards greater pay inequality fell away at this point, as the rate of 
inequality growth in the portion of the distribution lying between the 10th and 90th percentiles 
decelerated considerably (Machin 1998; Prasad 2002; Goos and Manning 2003). At the same 
time, however, there is limited evidence that pay inequality continued to increase at the very 
top of the distribution, i.e., at and above the 90th percentile (Prasad 2002; Goos and Manning 
2003). This finding is particularly striking given the relatively static nature of the rest of the 
distribution. Certainly, taken collectively, these findings suggest that the evolution of the 
British distribution of pay entered a new phase at some point in the mid-1990s, and that the 
development most worthy of exploration is the apparent top pay bias in change in the 
distribution.
No clear explanation for this shift in Britain can be found in the literature. Regarding the left 
tail of the distribution, there is no doubt that institutional factors have had some impact.
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Certainly, the introduction of the National Minimum Wage in 1999 acted to neutralize or 
reverse the preceding trend towards rising pay inequality, as it was found to have raised the 
wages of the bottom 6-7% of workers up to the new wage floor, and to have reduced 
inequality in the left tail of the distribution by a small but significant amount (Dickens and 
Manning 2002). In addition, the long decline of union membership and collective bargaining 
coverage slowed or even ceased in the late-1990s (Visser 2005), which development may 
plausibly have helped to prevent further growth in pay inequality. However, it is unclear 
whether institutional factors had much to do with the change in the shape of the distribution of 
pay above the median in 1990s Britain, principally because their greatest influence upon pay 
setting is usually understood to be exerted at the bottom of the distribution. In this area, the 
literature provides very little in the way of explanation, either of the reduction of pay 
inequality growth between the median and 90th percentile or of its expansion above the 90th 
percentile.
A similar problem confronts researchers working on pay inequality trends in the US. Like 
Britain, the US experienced a period of broad-based and rapid growth in pay inequality 
between the 1970s and the early-1990s, which has been superseded by a period in which 
overall pay inequality has continued to rise largely because of shifts at the top of the 
distribution (Autor, Katz et al. 2005; Lemieux 2006). In a sense, however, the debate about 
this shift in the US is one step ahead of that occurring in Britain. There, a number of 
authoritative studies have tested the ability of the formerly prevailing SBTC and institutional 
change hypotheses to explain the new evolution of the distribution of pay, and have generally 
found them to be unable to do so to any effective extent (Card and DiNardo 2002; Howell 
2002; Lemieux 2006). As in Britain, though, alternative paths of theoretical reasoning about 
the factors underlying the new top pay bias remain very much at an early stage of 
development. Among these, perhaps the most promising possible explanations are the 
liberating impact of de-unionization on top pay, the increased prevalence of pay for 
performance, and changes in the relative demand for the types of tasks performed by workers 
in high-paying occupations (Lemieux 2007).3
Comparing the British experience of top pay bias with developments in similar countries, the 
evidence that this kind of trend has emerged in France and Germany is less clear. And, in any
3 Chapters three and four of this thesis address questions that relate to the first and third o f these possible 
explanations.
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case, the relevant analyses limit themselves to the description of change rather than 
attempting its explanation. In Germany, there is even a degree of ambiguity about the form of 
recent patterns of change. For example, Prasad (2000) looks at GSOEP household survey 
data for the period 1984-1997 and concludes that results for the early- and mid-1990s indicate 
that nothing changed after the 1980s -  hence his phrase, ‘the unbearable stability of the 
German wage structure’. However, the most recent assessments of developments since 
unification argue that in the early-1990s a trend developed towards greater inequality, which 
has continued into the new millennium. Thus, Gemandt and Pfeiffer (2006), working with 
GSOEP data, state that wage inequality began an upward march in 1994, affecting all types of 
workers, with its impact largely confined to the lower half of the distribution. For his part, 
Kohn (2006) examines the large-sample IAB social security records data set for the period 
1992-2001 and finds that not only has left-tail inequality risen, but also wage dispersion has 
increased above the median, although perhaps to a lesser degree. Consequently, the existing 
research finds little evidence of any top pay bias in the evolution of the German distribution 
of pay.
In France, it appears from the literature that the evolution of the distribution of pay in the 
1990s does not differ substantially from the trends of the 1970s and 1980s, i.e., little change is 
observed. For instance, Piketty (2001) uses a long data series, derived from tax returns, to 
generate a picture of wage inequality trends among all types of worker during the period 
1950-1998. His results are consistent with those of the 1970s and 1980s, and suggest that the 
p90-p50 ratio, at least, is even more stable in the 1990s than before. In contrast to other 
studies, Roux (2001), looking at DADS data for 1976-1998, finds a steady rise in the 
interquartile ratio of monthly earnings that begins in the early-1980s and runs up until the end 
of the series. However, this rise in pay inequality is almost entirely confined to the group of 
part-time workers, whose share of employment rises strongly during this period. The 
distribution of full-time monthly earnings -  for men and women -  tracks the largely stable 
path described by Piketty and others (Piketty 2001; Romans and Seroussi 2003; Ortega 2004). 
All the same, research in the 1990s focused on intra-organizational pay differentials suggested 
that inequality was on the rise in this dimension, as employers were increasingly treating 
managerial ‘cadres’ and other employees rather differently when making pay-setting 
decisions (Ponssard 2001; Barreau and Brochard 2003; Godechot and Fleury 2005). These 
findings open the door to the possibility that a form of top-tier pay inequality growth has 
taken hold, even if it has not yet been seen to feed through into broad labour market statistics.
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In summarizing the literature discussed above, a number of key points are apparent. First, 
although overall pay inequality has been rising in Britain since the late-1970s, we may 
distinguish between a first period (lasting approximately from the late-1970s to the early- 
1990s) in which inequality increased across the distribution, and a second period (early-1990s 
into the new millennium) in which inequality only rose significantly at the very top of the 
distribution. Second, although in the first period Britain’s experience of a broad-based rise in 
pay inequality contrasts with France and Germany’s experience of relatively little change in 
the distribution of pay, it is arguable that the evolution of all three countries’ distributions of 
pay during that time can be substantially explained with reference to SBTC and the fortunes 
of certain labour market institutions. Third, it seems less likely that SBTC and institutional 
factors can adequately explain the top-tier rise in inequality observed in Britain in the second 
period, not least because there is firm evidence from the US that they cannot explain a parallel 
trend there. Fourth and finally, looking closer to home, it is not clear that the top-tier rise in 
inequality observed in Britain in the second period has any parallel in France and Germany, 
which at least raises the possibility that parochial factors are at work. With these conclusions 
in mind, I now advance to discuss the scope and approach of the chapter’s empirical analyses.
Empirical strategy and research questions
Collectively, the conclusions and open questions identified by my review of the literature 
outline a research agenda for this chapter. First, while a turn towards a top-tier bias in pay 
inequality growth has been noted for Britain, it remains at the moment only incompletely 
defined and poorly understood. Second, it is clear from the literature that there has as yet 
occurred little testing of explanations of such a top-tier bias, not least because the 
explanations themselves remain incompletely theorized. This chapter, therefore, seeks to cast 
light on both of these issues in relation to the experience of Britain, taking account of the 
historical evolution of its own distribution of pay, and placing it in comparative context by 
parallel study of developments in the similar countries of France and Germany.
The research design adopted by the chapter is, as noted above, comparative across time and 
across countries. Its use of econometric methods of analysis of large-scale (economy-wide), 
long time-series pay data for Britain, France, and Germany permits the identification of the
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broad trends in question and their precise definitions. The inclusion of comparator countries 
in the analysis enables the testing of whether recent British trends constitute a general or 
parochial phenomenon, and thereby deciding which kind of explanation is most appropriate.4 
The choice of comparator countries is determined by both their similarities and their 
differences. Britain, France, and Germany are all mid-sized economies at similar levels of 
development, and are located spatially and geopolitically in Europe. Thus, it is to be expected 
that all three countries are subject to the same set of ‘universal’ influences, such as technology 
or trade shocks. But, they differ substantially as regards labour market characteristics and 
institutional structures, and so one would anticipate that they would filter the impact of such 
influences in different ways. Indeed, the fact that they followed different trajectories in the 
1970s and 1980s in the evolution of their respective distributions of pay -  Britain experienced 
a considerable rise in inequality, while France and Germany exhibited less or no such change 
-  is consistent with this notion. Consequently, variation in more recent or as yet unexplored 
aspects (e.g., the top tier) of the evolution of these countries’ distributions of pay may usefully 
aid identification of the underlying factors at work.
The research agenda of the chapter is intended as much as an exploratory and descriptive 
journey as an explanatory analysis. This is because the core subject matter -  the evolution of 
pay in Britain at and above the top decile relative to the rest of the distribution between the 
late-1970s and the early-2000s -  has yet to be closely studied. Consequently, part of the role 
of this chapter within the broader thesis is to establish descriptive facts about top pay 
phenomena as a foundation for the more focused and explanation-oriented chapters that 
follow.
With these aims in mind, the chapter is organized around two poles of enquiry. First, it seeks 
to establish the nature of the mooted shift towards a top pay bias in pay inequality growth in 
Britain. In doing so, it sifts the evidence for such a shift actually having taken place in the 
1990s, and explores the extent to which it may constitute a novel development in Britain. 
Further, it poses the question of whether any such trend is specific to Britain, or whether 
evidence can be found of similar patterns of change in the similar countries of France and 
Germany. By addressing all of these questions, it is intended that the chapter establish a firm 
platform of descriptive fact on which to base the remainder of the thesis.
4 The prevailing explanations for the broad-based growth in British pay inequality in the 1980s were a mix of 
universal (SBTC) and country-specific (institutional change) varieties.
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The chapter’s second pole of enquiry concentrates on sorting through a set of possible 
explanations for the top pay bias in inequality growth. Following the literature review, it 
begins by taking the prevailing explanations for the broad-based growth in pay inequality 
observed in the 1970s and 1980s -  i.e., general-skill SBTC and change in the form of labour 
market institutions -  and testing for their contribution to the pay inequality growth observed 
in the 1990s at the top of British the labour market. As it is found that these factors are of low 
explanatory value when applied to the top-tier form of pay inequality growth that has become 
more prominent in recent years, the chapter then introduces an alternative approach to 
analysis. This other approach -  labelled ‘job analysis’ -  draws on the thinking and findings 
of a number of researchers in the US and UK who have themselves noted the increased 
prominence of top-tier pay inequality growth in their countries in recent years (e.g., Autor, 
Levy et al. 2003; Goos and Manning 2003; Lemieux 2007).
These researchers have argued that the pay trend at the top of the labour market is, like the 
broad-based growth in inequality that preceded it, consistent with an underlying shift in 
demand towards the types of individuals whose relative pay is affected by the trend.
However, they have further contended that a trend of this variety, which is highly focused on 
a minority element of the labour market, requires an explanation that is itself capable of 
differentiating between the individuals whose pay behaves in line with the trend and those 
whose pay does not. They have proposed, therefore, to analyse change in the distribution of 
pay from the perspective of ‘jobs’ -  which are operationally defined by the employee groups 
produced by the intersection of highly disaggregated occupation and industry classifications. 
The intention of this approach is to search for evidence of demand shifts for particular skills 
or characteristics that attach to particular occupations (or career ladders) and/or industrial 
contexts (which may imply that employer characteristics are important to the ultimate 
explanation). While not offering a complete explanation for top-tier growth in pay inequality, 
this analysis permits the identification of proximate causes and the generation of likely 
hypotheses about the nature of the underlying causes of change. Like the first analytical stage 
of this chapter, therefore, the job analysis is designed to expand the basis of fact surrounding 
the issue of (British) top-tier pay inequality growth, and to steer and underpin the more 
narrowly focused analyses presented in Chapters 3 and 4.
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Data description
Both of the chapter’s poles of enquiry draw on a common group of data sets. This group is 
composed of pay microdata for Britain (i.e., the UK minus Northern Ireland), France, and 
West Germany/the western Lander of the unified Germany (hereafter, ‘Germany’) for the last 
quarter or so of the 20th century, although it focuses its analytical efforts on the period since 
1990. In the cases of Britain and France, I refer to two surveys for each country, one 
collected by employers and another conducted at the household level. For Britain, these are 
respectively the New Earnings Survey (NES) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS), and for 
France the Declaration Annuelle des Donnees Sociales (DADS) and the Enquete Emploi 
(EE).
Regarding Germany, I use household data only -  the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(GSOEP). However, there are strong reasons to believe that this data set provides a 
representative picture of pay inequality developments in the country. GSOEP household 
microdata have been analysed elsewhere in combination with employer-collected data (both 
the microdata of the LAB social security records data set, and tabular data of the Survey of 
Compensation in Industry and Trade published by the Federal Statistical Office), and the two 
different sources of data have been found to produce very similar results (pp.373-383, 
Abraham and Houseman 1995). In addition, studies of pay inequality that use one type of 
data corroborate the results of parallel studies that use the other type in any given period of 
overlap (Abraham and Houseman 1995; Fitzenberger, Hujer et al. 2001; Gemandt and 
Pfeiffer 2006; Kohn 2006). I limit my analysis of German data to the former West Germany 
for two reasons: to maintain coherent sample dimensions either side of the 1990 watershed of 
unification; and to maintain the comparability of the country cases, which would be 
compromised by introducing into the picture what is, in the shape of the former East 
Germany, in effect a transition economy.
While five surveys used are not identical in design, they all possess a set of key features that 
enable the following analyses to be conducted in a similar manner for different countries.
First, they provide cross-sectional samples of individuals which are representative of the 
relevant populations during the survey period -  national adult population, workers in 
employment, etc. Second, they all collect sufficiently detailed data on earnings and hours 
during the survey period to support the accurate calculation of a measure of effective hourly
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remuneration (for at least a number of the years in question). Lastly, all of the surveys consist 
of long time series, permitting the description and analyses of trends in wages, employment 
composition, etc.5
As regards measurement issues, there are numerous ways of defining pay (and, therefore, pay 
inequality), each with its own implications for interpretation. For the purposes of empirical 
research, therefore, there is no single ‘best’ definition of a measure of pay. Rather, it is 
appropriate to use different measures to address different questions, for instance when these 
questions may implicitly or explicitly take the perspectives of different labour market actors. 
The remainder of this section of the chapter describes three key choices that must be made in 
relation to measurement in order to underpin my analysis of trends in pay inequality. These 
choices are as follows: the time period over which pay rates are to be calculated; the 
appropriate definition of ‘pay’; and the definition of the relevant sample for my analyses. The 
existing literature on pay inequality is rather poor guide to the matching of approaches to 
measurement to given research questions, as it almost exclusively consists of analyses of 
trends among gross hourly wages, no matter the exact focus of the paper.6 Puzzlingly, 
contributions to this literature rarely carry an explanation of why they make use of this 
measure rather than alternatives. Regarding its approach to measuring pay (and its 
distribution), this chapter in some respects follows the conventions found in the literature 
(e.g., by focusing on hourly amounts), but in others breaks from them (e.g., by concentrating 
on a measure of ‘compensation costs’ rather than on gross earnings alone).
A first step towards the definition of the appropriate measure of pay for the question at hand 
relates to the issue of the time period over which labour and its remuneration are recorded. 
This is important because the decisions of whether and how much to work, or how much and 
what sort of labour to buy, are ultimately decisions about resources that are finite in time. For 
instance, pay may be delivered in return for the number of hours worked in a week or month, 
as has traditionally been the case with blue-collar workers, or it may be delivered in the form 
of an annual salary whose amount is divorced from any exact specification of the hours to be 
worked, as has traditionally been the lot of white-collar and professional workers. As pay is a
5 The appendix to this chapter contains a detailed description of each of the data sets used.
6 Thus, studies of the impact of demand shifts on the labour market (cf. Blau and Kahn 1996; Johnson 1997; 
Acemoglu 2003) and studies of the political or societal implications of changes in pay inequality (cf. Atkinson 
1999a; Pontusson, Rueda et al. 2002) alike make exclusive use of gross hourly wages in their analysis of pay 
inequality.
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rate over time, examination of the distribution of pay across the economy implies the need for 
standardization of the time basis of pay across groups of workers paid on a variety of 
schedules. Although there is no single ‘best’ approach to standardization -  the period over 
which standardization should be effected depends on the questions being addressed -  this 
chapter standardizes wherever possible on the basis of pay per hour worked. This is because 
hourly pay is a more precisely defined measure than, say, weekly or monthly pay (e.g., one 
worker’s ‘week’ may be longer than another’s), and the ranking of pay outcomes that 
underlies the analysis of the distribution of pay encourages the use of the most precise 
measure of pay available.
When calculating hourly pay, a distinction must be made between contractual hours and the 
number of hours actually worked, as the latter quantity is often greater than the former. Use 
of contractual hours in the calculation of hourly pay, therefore, would risk the overestimation 
of the actual rate of pay for an unknown proportion of workers in a given sample. For this 
reason, this chapter uses data on hours worked for the calculation of hourly pay. All the 
surveys used in the empirical portion of this paper contain reliable data on hours worked, with 
the exception of the French data sets in the years prior to 1994, for which it is only possible to 
calculate pay rates on a daily basis.
For the definition of ‘pay’, a second key issue relates to the perspective of the labour market 
actor in question. This is owing to the impact of government policies of taxation and 
redistribution on the employment relationship, which ensure that the price of labour 
confronted by the employer is not equal to the price of labour received by the employee.
For instance, ‘pay’ may refer to die earnings taken home by a worker at the end of each week, 
month, or year, net of income taxes, employer and employee social security contributions, and 
so on. Alternatively, it may refer to the costs incurred by the employer in order to engage a 
given type of labour for a given period of time. These costs would include taxes and social 
security contributions notionally paid by the employer and employee, plus fringe benefits and 
other non-pecuniary compensation. A third possible definition is that of gross earnings or 
wages, which comprise taxes and social security contributions paid by the employee, but 
exclude employer payments of this kind and benefits.
Each of these alternatives can be thought of as ‘pay’, and their differing distributions are of 
interest to particular types of study. For example, the net pay measure captures the
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consumption wage, or the ‘supply price’ of labour -  so called because it reflects the effective 
rate of compensation received by the worker in return for their time and/or effort, which 
forms the basis of the individual’s labour supply decisions. Consequently, the analysis of net 
pay inequality is informative in relation to study of the distribution of consumption or the 
question of social stratification. Labour costs form the price schedule facing employers under 
a given labour market equilibrium, and so form the starting point for employer decision 
making about (change in) such issues as employment composition, quantities, and so on. 
Therefore, the distribution of labour costs is of particular relevance to studies of patterns of 
labour demand and employer behaviour.
Gross earnings or wages, while often the default datum recorded in surveys of pay, and 
typically the measure of pay on which casual discussion of the labour market centres, 
ultimately do not directly steer the decision making of either party to the employment 
relationship. Furthermore, gross earnings are a particularly poor measure for use in 
international comparative and/or longitudinal analyses. This is because the point at which a 
measure of this type falls in the gap between net earnings and labour costs is influenced by 
the structures and notional apportionment of direct taxation, social security contributions, and 
benefits/social insurance charges. Thus, effectively, the nature of a nation or region’s 
government and welfare arrangements, or change in those arrangements, strongly influences 
the ‘meaning’ of a measure of gross earnings for the study of pay inequality in that locality.
In the countries of interest to this paper, for example, there is a great deal of variation in the 
relative importance in total labour costs of net earnings, income tax, and employee and 
employer social security contributions. Table 1 presents OECD data on the composition of 
labour cost for the UK, France, and Germany in 2002. It can be seen that gross earnings are a 
reasonable proxy for labour costs across the range of the UK labour market, as employer 
social security contributions are of limited scale (8% of labour costs) and are relatively non­
progressive. In Germany, there is a greater disconnect between gross earnings and labour 
costs than in the UK, as employer social security contributions constitute 17% of labour costs 
(and are rather more progressive in form). France differs from the UK to an even greater 
extent, as employer social security contributions dwarf income tax and employee 
contributions to make up nearly a third of labour costs. In addition, French employer-paid 
social charges on employment are relatively more progressive again than those in the UK or 
Germany, and thus vary to a large extent from one end of the pay distribution to the other. As
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a consequence of these differences, comparison of gross earnings across these countries is a 
rather difficult exercise: it is not necessarily a case of comparing apples with apples.
Bearing these observations in mind, and given that the explanations of change in pay 
inequality that are tested in this chapter are primarily concerned with the impact of demand 
shifts -  that is, employer decision making -  on the distribution of rewards in the labour 
market, this paper focuses as much as possible on pay defined as the price of labour facing the 
employer, i.e., labour costs. All the same, there are practical limitations on the extent to 
which this price can be calculated. For the most part, these constraints derive from the fact 
that the data sets used can only capture the cash element of compensation, and so exclude 
consideration of non-cash compensation, e.g., private pensions, share-based compensation, 
car allowances, etc. On this point, to the extent that such non-pecuniary compensation tends 
to be rising (non-linearly) in the cash wage (Pierce 2001), wage-based measures will 
underestimate overall compensation inequality, and in particular the fortunes of the most 
highly paid. In light of this fact, the inequality and top-pay results reported in this paper 
should be treated as conservative estimates. Similarly, if the typical mix of cash to non-cash 
compensation varies systematically across countries -  say, in response to incentives created 
by the tax system -  then this feature will bias comparisons of pay structures made among 
these countries. Evidence on executive compensation -  such large pay packages are likely to 
reflect national tax conditions, etc. -  suggests that French firms deliver a greater proportion of 
total direct compensation in the form of long-term incentives (e.g., options and shares) than 
their UK and German equivalents (p.41, Hay Group 2004). While this result does not 
consider the impact of indirect compensation (e.g., benefits such as pensions, life insurance, 
car allowances, etc.), it at least indicates that French results regarding cash compensation 
inequality will understate total compensation inequality to a greater degree than will those for 
the other two countries.
Practical constraints notwithstanding, I use a similar technique in all three countries to create 
an imputed measure of total cash compensation costs, i.e., total labour costs excluding private 
pension, insurance, etc., payments (or, gross earnings plus employer social security 
contributions). I contend that this metric is more appropriate than gross wages for the testing 
of hypotheses that turn on employer decision making (e.g., SBTC), as it takes account of any 
progressivity of employer payroll tax systems, and is sensitive to changes in the structure of 
employer payroll contributions over time. Certainly, it does not constitute a perfect measure
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of the relative prices for different types of labour that face employers, as it does not capture 
the element of labour costs made up of private pension or insurance payments, payments in 
kind, training subsidies, and so on. However, as many employees receive no such ‘extra’ 
forms of remuneration, the distribution of cash compensation costs will approximate much 
more closely to that of total labour costs than will the distribution of gross wages.
Despite the application of a common method, it should be stated that the pay measures 
employed are not perfectly comparable across countries, or even across surveys within the 
same country, for the reason that they use different sampling techniques and slightly differing 
definitions of hours and earnings.7 However, all surveys use methods of data definition and 
collection that are consistent across time. Hence, any differences among the surveys can be 
treated as fixed effects that do not change over time, and can ultimately be factored out of 
analyses of trends and of change of the variety that feature in this chapter.
The third key choice to be made in relation to measurement concerns the definition of the 
sample for the analysis. Because the NES and DADS samples relate only to employees, the 
broadest common population across the three countries for which I can draw inferences is that 
composed of all employees in employment at the time of the survey. As a consequence, I 
exclude self-employed workers from my results. Evidently, the decision to exclude the self- 
employed would have implications for the comparative analysis of change in the distribution 
of employees’ earnings if the relationship between the distributions of employment and self- 
employment earnings were significantly different across countries, and if there were 
significant variation in the profile of self-employment across countries and across time.
Regarding the first of these issues, there is little evidence of systematic variation across 
countries in the relationship between the distributions of employment and self-employment 
earnings. In all three countries, the distribution of self-employment earnings is more
7 The NES provides sufficient information to calculate the preferred form o f wage measure; that is, total earnings 
in the reference week (including pro rata shares of compensation which is delivered on an irregular basis, such as 
annual bonuses) and total hours worked in the reference week. DADS is similar in scope, reporting information 
on total days/hours worked and total net cash remuneration during a given year (or less, if  the job exists only for 
a portion of the year). In contrast, the LFS and EE ask the individual to report earnings received at the most 
recent pay date, and combine this information with data on usual total hours worked per pay period to produce 
their hourly wage measures. In the same way, the GSOEP wage measure used does not account for the impact 
of elements of compensation such as 13th or 14th month bonuses. As a result, the LFS, EE, and GSOEP pay 
measures tend to underreport earnings for a given individual. As irregular elements of compensation are likely 
to rise with the wage rate, these data sources yield perhaps more conservative estimates of the level and rate of 
change of pay inequality than the NES and DADS.
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dispersed than that of employment earnings, and the self-employed are overrepresented in 
both the left- and right-hand tails of the distribution of all labour income (Blanchflower 2000; 
Torrini 2006). Further, Torrini (2006) studies European Community Household Panel data 
for 2001 to find that in all three countries the p90-p50 ratio for self-employment earnings is 
about a third greater than that for employment earnings, and that in Britain and France the 
pl0-p50 ratios are arrayed such that inequality is about a third less among the self-employed. 
This pattern of consistency across countries is only broken by the observation that in 
Germany the pl0-p50 ratio is about a third greater among the self-employed than among the 
employed. However, the impact of this difference appears limited, as a study of the evolution 
of the distribution of all labour income in Germany in the 1990s finds no connection between 
the rise in the rate of self-employment and change in the distribution of earnings (Gemandt 
and Pfeiffer 2006).
On the second point, Table 2 presents the evolution of self-employment in the three countries 
over the period 1970-2000. It can be seen that there is no common trend among the countries. 
Britain’s self-employment rate expands greatly in the 1980s, but shows a pattern of steady 
decline in the 1990s; France evinces a trend of steady diminution in the rate of self- 
employment over the whole period; and Germany’s rate dips mildly in the 1980s and rises -  
equally mildly -  in the 1990s. In all three locations, the degree of change in self-employment 
is rather less in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Looking across countries, the self-employment 
rates are more similar at the end of the period than at the beginning. On the whole, therefore, 
the degree of difference in (change in) self-employment across countries is quantitatively 
minor, especially in the period after 1990, which constitutes the main focus of this paper. 
Coupling this observation with the finding that there appears to be little difference across 
countries as regards the relationship between the distributions of employment and self- 
employment earnings, it is reasonable to conclude that the exclusion of the self-employed 
from the field of the analysis will not systematically bias the results obtained for employees. 
Indeed, given the consistent preponderance of employment over self-employment in all three 
countries, it follows that the results obtained for pay inequality among employees may stand 
as a solid proxy for distributional developments among all types of workers.
Having presented the data to be used and my approach to measurement of the key variable, I 
now proceed to the analysis. The next part of the chapter addresses the first of my research 
questions, seeking to identify and describe in detail the mooted turn towards a ‘top pay’ bias
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in the evolution of the British distribution of pay. Moreover, it attempts to establish the extent 
to which this apparent trend represents a novel development in the British labour market, and, 
through comparison with France and Germany, the extent to which it is (or is not) a parochial 
phenomenon.
Exploring the ‘top pay’ bias in British pay inequality growth
My initial concern in this section of the chapter is to look for evidence that will confirm the 
existence of the emergence of a ‘top pay’ bias in Britain in the course of the 1990s. In order 
to do this, I study the evolution of the distribution of pay using percentile ratios, which enable 
the tracking of the relative distance separating the median from other points in the 
distribution. I present these ratios in their log form, as this represents a useful approximation 
of the percentage differential between the median and each other point of interest in the 
distribution. Unlike most analyses of pay inequality, I calculate these ratios not only for the 
90th and 10th percentile (or the upper and lower quartiles), but also for the 95th and 99th 
percentiles.8 This is because my reading of the literature has led me to believe that the 
greatest degree of change in the British distribution of pay from the early-1990s onwards has 
occurred in its upper reaches, and I wish to understand which parts of the top tail of the 
distribution are affected.
The evolution of the log percentile ratios for the sample of all employees in Britain, France, 
and Germany is presented for the period 1976-2001 in Table 3.9 I show the ratios for my 
preferred measure of pay -  hourly compensation cost -  and for gross hourly wages, as it may 
be seen that the two measures evolve almost in parallel, and the longer time series of the gross 
wage data enables a longer-term perspective than would be possible using only the 
compensation cost data. From the British results, it is apparent that overall pay inequality -  
however measured -  has grown in that country throughout the period in question. It is 
reassuring that my gross wage results between the 90th and 10th percentiles are largely
8 As will be seen in my comparison of Britain with France and Germany, I can only calculate the 99th percentile 
in a robust manner for France and Britain. Unfortunately, the relatively small size of the German data sample 
(3,000-5,000 observations in each period rather than the 100,000+ in the British and French data sets) does not 
permit this statistic to be calculated with confidence, as it is too sensitive to the impact of outliers.
9 This is the complete period for which NES data are available.
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consistent with the findings of existing studies that use this definition of pay: they show a 
rapid growth in pay inequality above and below the median between the late-1970s and the 
early-1990s, and a slowing of the rate of this growth during the 1990s. The finding that 
inequality growth was more rapid above than below the median in the 1980s is consistent 
with the findings of other NES-based studies, but to some extent contradicts the results of 
analyses based on the GHS and FES (e.g., Schmitt 1995; Gosling, Machin et al. 1996). 
However, this discrepancy is very likely to be due to the NES’s documented lesser 
effectiveness than the household surveys in accurately capturing the evolution of the lower 
end of the pay distribution.10
For the purposes of this chapter, though, the most important British results in the table are 
those relating to the 95th and 99th percentiles. Both of these points of the distribution have 
moved considerably further away from the median than the 90* percentile, with the rate of 
change apparently rising in position in the distribution. Thus, looking at gross wages, the 
p99-p50 ratio rises by approximately 50% over the quarter-century in question, while the p90- 
p50 ratio increases by 30% or so. For the period in which the data series overlap, it appears 
that top-tier inequality of compensation cost has grown even more rapidly than that of gross 
wages. Unlike the ratios relating to the 10th and 90th percentiles, these statistics show no sign 
of growing more slowly in the 1990s. If anything, their rate of growth accelerates during this 
period relative to the 1970s and 1980s.
A helpful way of summarizing the evolution of the distribution of pay between two points in 
time is to plot the annualized rate of growth of pay at each percentile of the relevant 
distribution. In a plot of this kind, a flat line signifies equal rates of growth at every point in 
the distribution, with the result that rising average real wages would be accompanied by an 
unchanged pay structure. Deviations from a flat line signify differential rates of growth, and, 
thereby, change in the shape of the distribution. Figure 1 presents hourly compensation cost 
plots of this type for Britain, France, and Germany in the period between 1984 and 2001/2.11 
The figure consists of three plots in total: one for the whole period, and one for each of the 
sub-periods 1984-1992 and 1992-2001/2. The choice of 1992 as the intermediate point in the
10 Please see the data set descriptions in the appendix to this chapter for detailed explanation of this point.
11 Note that the period ends in 2001 for Britain and France, and in 2002 for Germany. This minor difference is 
due to the fact that it is not possible to calculate the compensation cost variable for Germany in 2001. The dates 
1984 and 2001/2 are chosen because they enclose the maximum duration for which data are simultaneously 
available in all locations (and therefore permit accurate comparison across countries).
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series is intended to probe the above finding that the rate of change in the British distribution 
of pay fell in the early-1990s.
Illustrating the trends apparent in Table 3, the first element of Figure 1 clearly shows the bias 
of pay growth in Britain towards better-paid employees, there being a positive correlation 
between percentile rank and the rate of growth over the whole period. This relationship is 
topped by a noteworthy ‘spike’ in the growth rate above the top decile. The plots for the two 
sub-periods confirm that the growth spike above the 90th percentile and the positive bias 
towards the upper end of the distribution are durable features of the overall British growth 
pattern, although this latter trend is less pronounced in the heart of the distribution -  i.e., 
between the 10th and 90th percentiles -  after 1992. Further, these spikes are of similar orders 
of magnitude in both periods.
As a cross check on the NES-derived results for Britain shown in Table 3 and Figure 1, Figure 
2 compares gross wage growth across the distribution for the NES and the LFS over the 
period in which the two pay data series overlap (1994-2001). The differences between these 
surveys are considerable as regards sampling and data collection techniques, and variable 
construction. Nevertheless, they both indicate the existence of sizeable growth spike during 
this period at the top of the distribution. While they are less consistent in the picture they 
paint lower down the distribution -  particularly in its lower half -  it is likely that these can be 
traced to their respective limitations in capturing the pay of lower-paid employees.12 At the 
top of the distribution, though, there are no such concerns about the surveys, and the LFS 
results reinforce the conclusion that there has been a bias in relative pay growth towards the 
top tier of the distribution.
Taking stock of the findings in relation to Britain, four intermediate conclusions can be stated. 
First, the data examined here are consistent with the established literature on the evolution of 
British pay inequality in that they show a considerable rise in overall inequality in Britain 
since the late-1970s. Second, the results strongly support the notion that the pattern of overall 
pay inequality growth shifted in the early-1990s, with broad-based inequality growth (i.e., 
between the 10th and 90th percentiles) slowing, and top-tier inequality growth (i.e., that driven
12 It is known, for example, that the NES is not fully representative of part-time and short-tenure employees, both 
of which types feature strongly among the less-well paid (Stuttard 2002). Regarding the LFS, the degree of 
measurement error stemming from the self-reported nature of that survey’s pay and hours data is likely to be 
greater among the same groups of employees.
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tViby pay at and above the 90 percentile) continuing to expand at a barely reduced rate. Third, 
it seems that the top-tier growth spike in British pay is as longstanding as the overall rise in 
pay inequality, that is, pay growth has been relatively much higher above the 90th percentile 
since the late-1970s. Thus, the top-tier bias in pay inequality growth is not a recent 
phenomenon -  rather, it became more prominent in the 1990s as the distribution of pay below 
the 90th percentile began to crystallize. Fourth, given the different order of magnitude of 
relative pay growth above the 90th percentile, it seems possible that there have been two 
separate processes of change at work in the British distribution of pay since the 1970s: one 
relating to the broad-based expansion of pay inequality between the 10th and 90th percentiles 
that started to peter out in the course of the 1990s; and another relating to top-tier inequality 
growth that was still in full force at the end of the data series examined here. That these two 
trends appear to differ in form raises the possibility at least that they are driven by different 
underlying factors. With these observations in mind, I now turn to the French and German 
data to investigate the extent to which the top-tier bias in pay inequality growth is a trend 
specific to Britain.
Looking at the French data presented in Table 3, it is reassuring that the gross earnings13 
results are consistent with those noted in the literature: the 1980s witnessed little change in 
the degree of inequality between median and the 90th percentile of the distribution of pay, and 
a steady compression of the differential between the median and the 10th percentile. The 
results indicate that gross earnings above the 90th percentile had a different relationship again 
to the median, with the gap first compressing (up to the early-1990s), and then expanding 
again. However, what is more interesting is that the compensation cost results appear rather 
different, and perhaps more redolent of the British experience.14 Thus, while the distribution 
of gross earnings has tended towards stability or compression over the longer term,15 the 
distribution of compensation costs provides evidence of rising overall inequality, and in 
particular a pronounced top-tier growth spike in relative pay above the 90th percentile. It 
appears, therefore, that the top pay bias observed in Britain is not a purely parochial affair.
13 Data on hours worked are not available for France before 1994, hence the French results in Table 3 a re . 
calculated based on daily earnings for full-time workers in the private sector.
14 There is a much looser correspondence between the gross earnings and compensation cost statistics in France 
than in Britain because in France employer social security contributions typically constitute a larger share of 
compensation cost and have a more progressive structure. In addition, the degree of progressivity of these 
contributions has changed substantially over time -  rates for more highly paid employees have risen consistently 
since the early-1980s, and rates for the low-paid were reduced rapidly during the 1990s.
15 As a point of interest, the distribution of net (after-tax) earnings remains remarkably unchanged throughout the 
duration 1976-2001.
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This impression is reinforced by the French results presented in Figure 1, which indicate that 
the relative growth spike at the top of the distribution in that country emerged at some point in 
the early-1990s, and that, while noticeable, is of a lesser degree o f magnitude than its British 
equivalent.
In order to validate these results for France, however, a number of issues must be confronted 
with regard to the underlying DADS data. This survey presents a set o f questions that derive 
from three sources: the absence of information on working hours in the key DADS series 
prior to 1994; the resultant need to restrict the reporting of the full DADS daily pay series 
(1976-2001) to full-time workers; and the omission of the bulk of the public sector from the 
DADS sample (amounting to approximately 25% of employment). The DADS results 
featured in Figure 3 address the first two of these points through comparison of the pattern of 
change of pay inequality indicated by the daily pay variable with the pattern generated by an 
hourly pay variable for the period in which they can both be constructed (1994-2001). Here, 
the plots indicate that, for full-time workers in the extended private sector,16 the relative 
growth patterns of hourly and daily compensation cost resemble one another very closely.
The sole major difference among the series is that the rate of hourly cost growth is higher than 
that of daily costs, which is consistent with an across-the-board reduction in working hours 
among full-time workers. It has been shown elsewhere that the Jospin government’s 
implementation of the 35-hour week, which was phased in across the economy between 1998 
and 2002, had an impact of this kind (Lhommeau and Remy 2005).
Comparing Figure 3’s plots of the evolution of hourly compensation cost in the DADS series 
among full-time employees on the one hand and part-time employees on the other within the 
bounds of the DADS sample, it appears that the full-time series may overstate the degree of 
distributional change relative to that for both types of workers. However, when it is 
considered that the median of the full-time sub-sample -  comprising only 70% of the total 
sample by 2001 -  will sit well above the median of the broader sample, the shapes of the two 
plots resemble one another quite closely. Indeed, the only key divergence is the much less 
pronounced nature of the growth spike at the top of the distribution in the wider sample.
16 That is, the private sector plus the ‘grandes entreprises’, or government-controlled large firms operating in the 
market sector (e.g. GDF, EDF, SNCF).
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This interpretation is reinforced by the evidence presented in Figure 4, which is derived from 
Enquete Emploi (EE) data for the same interval as examined in Figure 3. This survey, being 
representative of all workers in all sectors, permits the comparison of distributional patterns of 
change between the limited DADS sample and the sample o f all workers. It further 
disaggregates these results by working-time status (full-time versus full-time plus part-time). 
While the EE reports lower rates of growth in hourly compensation cost between 1994-2001 
(note that -  unlike the others -  these results are not annualized), the general bias of growth 
towards the top of the distribution is apparent, and the different measures derived from 
differing samples all move very closely together, apart from in the topmost 5% of the 
distribution. The divergence here between the EE and DADS results is due to the smaller 
annual sample sizes available in EE, which has the effect of making the very top and bottom 
tails of the distribution much more sensitive to the impact of outliers (in particular, those 
which are artefacts of measurement error).
Considered jointly, the evidence of Figures 3 and 4 indicates that the relative growth patterns 
of daily and hourly compensation cost across the DADS and EE samples resemble one 
another closely during this period. This in turn suggests that the longer DADS full-time daily 
compensation cost series employed in Table 3 and Figure 1 is a reasonable proxy for its 
unknown hourly equivalent for all workers in France, and therefore that the conclusions 
reached above about the evolution of the French distribution of compensation costs are robust.
The German results presented in Table 3 and Figure 1 are less extensive than those for France 
and Britain, the relevant data series not beginning until 1984, and the relatively small sample 
size of the survey not permitting the robust calculation of the 99th percentile of the 
distribution. However, the overall picture that they present of changes between the 10th and 
90th percentiles of the distribution -  of pay compression in the 1980s, followed by the 
expansion of inequality in the 1990s, especially below the median -  is reassuringly consistent
17with the story that emerges from the literature. It may be noted that the distributions of 
wages and compensation costs do not evolve in as different a manner as in France, but are not 
as closely linked over time as in Britain. This is because the incidence of employer social 
security contributions became slightly more progressive during the 1980s, but then became
17 The lower-tail result o f growing inequality in the 1990s is likely to be exaggerated in relative terms by the 
methodological differences among the surveys -  the French and British surveys tend to undersample those in the 
lowest-paid and most precarious jobs; and the GSOEP’s self-declared earnings variable is more susceptible to 
measurement error, which is magnified in the case of this type of job.
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slightly less progressive again in the 1990s (OECD 2004b). Whether gross wages or 
compensation costs are considered, however, there is little evidence of any top-tier growth 
spike in any period in Germany (at least, up to the 95th percentile). Instead, what notable 
change has occurred can be traced to the lower tail of the distribution in the 1990s. These 
findings are consistent with the conclusions of other studies of the evolution of the German 
pay distribution which have used employer-collected data (e.g., Abraham and Houseman 
1995; Kohn 2006). Fundamentally, therefore -  and in contrast to Britain and France -  no 
evidence can be found of a top-tier bias in the development of the German distribution of pay, 
even in recent years.
Summarizing these results, then, it appears that the top pay bias in the evolution of Britain’s 
distribution of pay is real and substantial, and has deep roots, having its origins in the late- 
1970s. That this trend continued almost unabated throughout the length of the data series 
examined here, while broad-based pay inequality waxed and waned, suggests that two 
separate dynamics of change have perhaps been at work. In comparative perspective, neither 
France nor Germany has experienced such prolonged or sizeable change at the tops of then- 
respective distributions of pay. Indeed, Germany has shown little sign of any growth bias 
towards top pay at any point in the years studied. France, in contrast, appears to have 
developed its own top pay bias in the course of the 1990s, but it is of a relatively lesser 
magnitude than the one found in Britain, and can only be observed in the distribution of 
compensation costs (rather than gross wages or earnings). These comparative results indicate 
that whatever factor is (or factors are) driving the British top pay trend is unlikely to be a 
purely British phenomenon, as a form of this trend may also be seen in France. However, we 
may conclude either that the impact of this factor is damped by other variables in Germany 
and France, or that it is magnified by circumstances that are particular to Britain. Having 
addressed the first research question of this chapter, I now advance to the second, 
investigating what lies behind the pattern of growth of British top-tier pay inequality that has 
been established above.
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Analysis of factors underlying top-tier growth in pay inequality in Britain
This section of the chapter is composed of three elements. In the first two of these, I test for 
the contribution of the prevailing explanations of pay inequality growth -  general-skill SBTC 
and change in labour market institutions -  to the phenomenon of top-tier inequality growth. 
The third element presents the results of my job analysis of change in relative pay at the top of 
the labour market.
SBTC and general skills
The first of the prevailing explanations for pay inequality growth is the general-skill version 
of the SBTC hypothesis. The origins of this explanation for rising pay inequality can be 
traced back to a number of influential studies of the growth in broad-based pay inequality 
observed in the US and UK from the 1970s onwards (e.g., Johnson 1997; Machin 1998). 
Studies like these noted the puzzle of the simultaneous rises in those countries of the relative 
supply of highly educated labour and the relative compensation of this type of labour. 
Examining the issue through the lens of a supply-and-demand model, these studies for the 
most part inferred that, for both relative supply and wages to have risen at the same time for 
more highly educated labour, there must have occurred an underlying shift in relative demand 
towards the skill characteristics of this type of labour. It was generally concluded that the 
most plausible explanation of such a ‘universal’ shift in relative labour demand was the 
increasing adoption by employers across the developed world of rapidly improving 
information and communication technologies [ICT], which were proving to be 
complementary with high levels of general skills.
Perhaps partly because of ease of measurement and data availability, but mostly because the 
data supports the contention, the literature on SBTC and pay inequality defines ‘skills’ almost 
exclusively in relation to general skills -  that is, levels of achievement within the general 
education system. One inference we may draw from this framework, therefore, is that across- 
country differences in pay inequality trends must be linked to some extent to different patterns 
of evolution across countries of the relative supply of general skills. As the evidence found in 
relation to the first set of research questions of this chapter showed that Britain’s experience 
of a significant and longstanding top pay bias in inequality growth has not been fully
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replicated in France and Germany, this implies that, if SBTC is a contributor to the growth of 
top-tier pay inequality, there must be significant differences across countries as regards the 
evolution of their relative supplies of general skills, and high general skills in particular.
In this analysis, therefore, I test the SBTC hypothesis’s twin assumptions of similarity of 
change in relative labour demand and difference of change in relative labour supply across 
countries. I do so by applying a simple supply-and-demand model for different educational 
groups to the data. This approach enables me first to look at change in relative skill supply 
patterns -  as defined by the standard of education levels -  and then at the implied shifts in 
demand that would reconcile these patterns with observed changes in the distribution of pay. 
To the extent that I find similarity across countries relating to change in labour demand and 
difference relating to change in labour supply, I will be able to confirm the contribution of 
SBTC to the observed differences in the evolution of top-tier pay inequality across countries.
I conduct my analysis on data relating to the decade or so after the turn of the 1990s, because 
it is the period in which the top-tier growth in pay inequality is most marked.
The period for which comparable data on education levels and pay are available for all three 
countries runs from 1993-2002. However, it is possible to track education trends alone on a 
longer-term basis. Table 4 reports estimates of the distribution of each country’s adult 
population, aged 16-65 inclusive, among six broadly comparable education groups for the 
years 1984, 1993, and 2002. These groups are chiefly modelled on UNESCO’s International 
Standard Classification of Education 1997 (ISCED),18 corresponding to the achievement of 
qualifications at each of ISCED categories 1-5, plus a category for those holding no 
qualifications. Regarding the population share of the highest skill group (‘degrees or higher’), 
Britain exhibits the highest growth between 1984 and 2002 (approximately 175% versus 
100% for France and Germany). However, as this measure grows most rapidly in Britain in 
the first half of this period, both France and Germany exhibit higher levels of growth than 
Britain in the second period (approximately 50% in both versus Britain’s 37%). If we assume 
that relative labour demand for high general skills has shifted at a similar rate in all countries, 
these results might suggest that Britain’s relatively prominent top-tier bias in pay inequality 
growth in the 1990s and early-2000s is linked to a relatively lower rate of educational 
upgrading than that observed in France and Germany. However, they would also raise the
18 See http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced 1997.htm for details.
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question of whether this measure had any connection to top-tier pay inequality growth, as 
Britain experienced different trends in the 1980s and 1990s as regards the growth of high 
general skills, yet also experienced a fairly constant shift towards higher top-tier pay 
inequality in both decades.
In order to probe this question fully, I conduct a more systematic analysis of change in the 
relative supply of general skills and in pay inequality, calculating their implications for 
change in relative demand. Assuming that the labour market approximates to a simple 
supply-and-demand model, changes in the relative prices of general skills -  that is, of 
educational qualification categories -  can be interpreted as a function of the relative supply 
movements of these labour types and shifts in the skill demand bias of employers. In order to 
concentrate on the relative fortunes of the top tier of the labour market, I analyse shifts in 
supply, pay, and demand through a relative measure that compares the experience of those 
with the highest level of qualifications with that of all other education groups. I present the 
results of this analysis in Table 5.
The relative supply measure is calculated as the annualized percentage change in the supply 
ratio of the two groups in question. These statistics are computed for each country from two 
different samples: one representative of the population between the ages of 16 and 65, 
representing potential labour supply; and another representative of the active population 
between the same ages, which is perhaps a better estimate of the supply of labour available to 
employers in the short term. Comparing across countries, these results confirm the initial 
impression of steady educational upgrading in all three locations. However, while the 
magnitude of the annualized supply shift is very similar in Britain and France, Germany 
experiences a more rapid rate of relative skill supply growth. The shift in the important 
degree/no degree relative supply ratio runs at about one percentage point higher per annum in 
Germany when considering the results for the active population. Surveying these results as a 
whole, all three countries undergo steady educational upgrading between the early-1990s and 
early-2000s, but in Germany this process is more rapid than elsewhere.
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Turning to the question of pay, I calculate a measure which captures the annualized 
percentage change in the relative hourly compensation cost of the two education groups of 
interest. I do this by running simple human capital regressions on individual-level pay data 
for each annual cross section of the data for each country. The regressions are of the form
ln(JF) = a + P£ + 5^+ £
where W represents the individual’s gross hourly compensation cost, E  is the dummy variable 
(or set of dummy variables) capturing the differential between the educational groups in 
question, and X  is a set of control variables comprising sex, potential experience, and tenure 
with the current employer. The compensation cost shift measure is calculated as the 
difference between the respective values of (3, the coefficient on the educational dummy 
variable, at the start and finish of each time period reported. Once annualized, this represents 
the yearly shift in the average hourly compensation cost of the better-paid educational group 
relative to that of the lesser-paid group, expressed as a percentage of the lesser average, and 
controlling for the factors listed above.
The results for relative pay in part follow a pattern similar to that for relative supply. In 
Britain and France this measure is virtually static for the degree/no degree groups, whereas in 
Germany it attains the rate of -0.4% per annum. Thus, in line with the expectations of the 
model, higher rates of relative supply shift are accompanied by lower rates of relative 
compensation cost growth.
To round out this section, I combine the supply and pay shift results to derive an estimate of 
relative demand movements during this time. I construct this implied demand shift measure 
as
AD = AS + o(AW)
where AD refers to the annualized relative demand shift between the two educational groups 
during the period in question, AS and AW denote the corresponding supply and pay shifts, 
and a  represents the elasticity of substitution between the two groups. I assume a value of 1.5 
for ct, which is in accordance with empirical estimates of its value (Johnson 1997; Machin 
1998). For the degree/no degree groups, the familiar pattern emerges that Britain and France
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experience very similar rates of change -  at least, when considering the active population 
estimate -  while in Germany the rate is a half percent per annum higher. Relative supply and 
demand shifts for high/lower skills, therefore, appear to by more or less in balance in the first 
two countries during the period in question. In Germany, however, the supply shift outstrips 
the demand shift by a clear half percent per annum.
Collectively, these results indicate that relative demand shifted in all three countries towards 
high general skills (or education) during the period in question. Moreover, this shift has been 
of a broadly similar magnitude in all locations. However, they also suggest that the relative 
supply of high general skills has shifted more or less in alignment with the shift in demand. 
This is especially true of Britain and France, although the relatively higher rate of educational 
upgrading that occurred in Germany may have contributed to the relative lack of change in the 
country’s compensation cost distribution above the 60th percentile during this period. What is 
not visible in these results, though, is evidence of clear differences between countries as 
regards the evolution of their relative supplies of general skills, and high general skills in 
particular. It is highly unlikely, as a result, that technological change biased towards high 
general skills is a key factor underlying Britain’s (and, to a lesser extent, France’s) trend 
towards increasing top-tier pay inequality. Having arrived at this conclusion, I now turn to 
consider the second of the prevailing explanations of rises in pay inequality.
Labour market institutions and upper-tail pay inequality
The research literature on the broad-based increase in British levels of pay inequality from the 
1970s in the early-1990s has tended to conclude that changes in key labour market institutions 
relating to pay setting had contributed to the observed rise in inequality. The key institutions 
are chiefly defined as those of collective pay setting (i.e., unions and collective bargaining) 
and minimum wage mechanisms. Typically, it has been surmised that the progressive 
weakening of these classes of institutions in this period contributed to the broad rise in pay 
inequality in Britain, just as their relatively unchanged strength in France and Germany in the 
same period contributed to the lower degree of change in the distributions of pay in those 
countries. However, given that the direct influence of these institutions on pay is felt largely 
in the lower tail of the distribution, the question arises as to how they might be relevant to the 
study of change in pay inequality at the top of the distribution. Certainly, this is true of 
minimum wage mechanisms, which by definition only affect the lowest paid. And, as the
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great majority of highly paid employees do not participate in any collective pay agreement -  
no matter the country in question -  it also seems true of institutions of collective pay setting 
(Boumois and Livian 1997).
All the same, while there may be no direct influence of collective pay setting institutions on 
top pay, some research makes the case that there may be an indirect relationship in this area 
(DiNardo, Hallock et al. 2000; Tzioumis 2005). Essentially, these studies use organization- 
level data to show that -  ceteris paribus -  the presence of unions and collective pay setting 
institutions has an inhibiting effect on top pay within the organization. Furthermore, the 
stronger these institutions’ presence within the organization, the greater is the inhibiting 
effect. One can make sense of this finding by interpreting it through a model that assumes 
that employers have a fixed compensation budget -  in the short term at least -  and that 
relatively more pay for one group of employees implies relatively less pay for another. 
Consequently, if, as has been argued since Hicks (1932), unions and institutions of collective 
pay setting tend to raise pay levels for those they directly cover above the market equilibrium 
that would obtain in their absence, this would mean that higher collectively bargained pay for 
directly covered employees would mean lower pay for those not covered, including highly 
skilled and managerial employees. Conversely, this model would also imply that, were the 
collective pay setting institutions weakened, there would be room for relatively greater pay 
growth at die top.
A model of this kind is consistent with Dunlop’s argument that unions work on the principle 
of maximizing their members’ share of the pay bill (Dunlop 1944). In addition, the idea that 
such a model captures a significant feature of the reality of employer behaviour is reinforced 
by the anecdotal evidence gathered by experienced compensation consultants working in the 
UK. These individuals have noted (in private conversation) that pay budgets in organizations 
are typically quite ‘hard’. This is to say that the finance function sets the pay budget at the 
start of each year, and it is not usually revised in the course of the year. Instead, managers 
must work within this overall constraint, which means that relative pay decisions are 
effectively of a zero-sum nature: if one individual or group is to receive a relatively high pay 
increase, another individual or group must receive a relatively low increase.19 Anecdotal
19 While this sketch is broadly representative of company practice, there is non-negligible variation by industry 
type and organizational size. Large companies and companies operating in relatively low margin or labour­
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experience suggests that this is particularly true of companies in which collective bargaining 
takes place. The impression that ‘hard’ budgets are a reality in as far as pay is typically 
managed is supported by academic research on the subject (Brown, Marginson et al. 2001). 
Overall, therefore, the evidence supports the notion that institutions of collective pay setting 
may indeed have an indirect impact on top pay, with the fortunes of one being negatively 
related to the fortunes of the other.
Turning to the data to test this proposition, Table 6 presents basic information on its evolution 
in Britain, France, and Germany, as measured by the familiar variables of union membership 
density and collective contract coverage. Between the early-1980s and early-2000s, it can be 
seen that Britain experienced rapid declines along both dimensions. While both France and 
Germany experienced declines in union density, with the proportionate decline being 
particularly high in France, both countries underwent little change or slight growth in 
bargaining coverage rates. It is noticeable that the country that experienced the greatest and 
most persistent rise in top-tier pay inequality -  Britain -  is also the one whose institutions of 
collective pay setting have been weakened to the greatest degree. Similarly, France has 
recently experienced a measure of this type of rising inequality, and its institutions have been 
weakened to the next greatest extent. Finally, Germany, which has seen little or no rise in 
top-tier pay inequality in this period, has seen the least degree of institutional retrenchment of 
the countries examined.
Interpreting these results using the model described above, therefore, the correlations in the 
data support the hypothesis that institutional change has a hand in the issue of rising top tier 
pay inequality. All the same, these remain relatively loose correlations, and it may be argued 
that the model underpinning this conclusion is open to contention. Furthermore, while the 
weakening of collective pay setting institutions might be understood as a ‘pull’ factor on top 
pay (i.e., this process might create space into which top pay might expand), one would expect 
that profit-maximizing organizations at least would require a simultaneous ‘push’ factor on 
top pay (such as SBTC) to encourage them to raise top pay in relative terms and thereby move 
into the space created by the ‘pull’ factor. Consequently, the indirect influence on top pay of 
change in institutions of collective pay setting is best understood as an enabling device, but 
not as a proximate cause of rising top tier pay inequality.
intensive industries are much more likely to manage pay in this way than smaller companies or those with high 
profit margins or high capital intensity.
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‘Jobs’ and change in the distribution of pay
The above analyses lead to the conclusion that the prevailing explanations of rising pay 
inequality, developed in response to the observation of rising broad-based pay inequality, 
cannot also explain the rise in top tier pay inequality noted in particular in Britain. This 
element of the chapter, therefore, looks for an alternative explanation of change by subjecting 
the data to a ‘job’ analysis.
To recap, the key observation yet to be explained is that compensation costs have grown 
markedly more quickly above the top decile than at other points in the distribution in Britain 
over the quarter-century ending in 2001. This bias in growth rates toward the top is repeated 
above the top decile, with, for instance, the 99th percentile growing much more rapidly than 
the 90th. To give an idea of the relative magnitudes of change, between the late-1970s and 
early-2000s the 99th percentile has consistently grown twice as quickly as the 50th percentile, 
and half as quickly again as the 90th percentile. These, then, are highly localized trends within 
the broad labour market, which may only be accounted for through equally specific 
explanations.
Perhaps the most plausible foundation for such an explanation is that these changes have been 
driven by some form of relative shift in the pattern of labour demand. However, this chapter 
has already remarked that the predominant version of this type of explanation, the general- 
skill version SBTC hypothesis, does not adequately account for the top-tier rise in pay 
inequality. This is because the most common understanding of skills within the SBTC 
framework is ill-suited at a conceptual level to capture the kind of highly focused change 
embodied by top-tier pay inequality growth. Thus, the general-skill version SBTC hypothesis 
conceives of and operationalizes skills in terms of educational groups -  ‘less than high-school 
degree’, ‘high-school degree’, ‘college degree’, and so on, in its classic US formulation. This 
is because educational groups are thought to capture the broad differences in skills that 
correspond to the boundary between old, skill-neutral technologies and the new, skill-biased 
ones. For example -  this argument goes -  let us take the case of computers, which are a kind 
of archetype of the new workplace technologies of the last two or three decades. They are a 
useful tool for the analysis of information, hence their introduction will bias labour demand
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towards analytical and interpretative skills of the kind taught at university, and therefore 
towards the repositories of those skills, university graduates (Krueger 1993). This approach 
to defining skill is helpful when one is trying to explain price shifts across the breadth of the 
pay distribution, but is less relevant to the present case, where the relative price shift is 
confined to the top ten percent or so of employees, as there is less variation in education 
within this group than is found across the whole working population. This particularly true 
when we consider that now in the developed economies a comparatively large share of 
workers holds first or advanced university degrees (e.g., 18% of the British labour force in 
2002, according to the LFS), which share exceeds the size of the group of top earners in 
which this section is interested.
Of course, this is not to argue that the kinds of price shifts visible at the tops of the British and 
French labour markets are not due to an underlying shift in relative demand of the kind 
imagined within the general-skill version of the SBTC hypothesis. Nevertheless, the concept 
of skill and its operationalization require some degree of rethinking if a version of the broader 
shift-in-relative-demand hypothesis is to be put to the test to explain developments at the top 
of the pay distribution. First of all, the narrowness of the group of workers involved in this 
price shift implies that any plausible definition of ‘skill’ should itself be narrow. This means 
moving beyond the level of detail generated by broad educational groups. Second, while 
there is no doubt that top earners have amassed considerable human capital, they are likely to 
be some way into their careers and therefore to have built up a large proportion of this capital 
in the period after leaving the general education system. Measures of skill based on 
educational attainment are as a consequence likely to capture only a small share of a high- 
earning individual’s actual stock of human capital. The same argument applies to skill 
measures based on age or years of experience, as these are independent of the learning 
experience associated with a given career.
What is required is a measure that recognizes that high earners are typically individuals with a 
number of years’ experience in a particular line of work. For instance, executives form a 
group of highly paid employees, and they are normally individuals with 20 or more years’ 
experience in their particular line of work (general management, finance, marketing, HR, 
etc.). Their human capital, therefore, is more or less functionally or occupationally specific.
A similar argument can be made about other groups of highly paid employees, such as senior 
professionals (lawyers and accountants in particular), financiers, and so on. Taking this into
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account, it would appear that the value of these varieties of human capital might best be 
captured by a measure that captures the intersection of job content and experience in that 
particular field. That employers themselves think of the value of highly paid employees in 
these terms can be seen in the format of job advertisements for senior positions, which often 
state that candidates must have a certain number of years’ experience in a given type of role if 
they are to be considered.
These observations suggest that the critical human capital variable for highly paid work will 
be linked to experience in a particular line of work rather than to general educational 
attainment. In other words, the most valuable forms of human capital are specific to 
particular jobs or occupations. For the purposes of operationalizing this variable, then, we 
must find a variable that captures both job content (in terms of tasks, specialized knowledge, 
and/or competencies) and experience in that area. One such candidate emerges from Goos 
and Manning’s (2003) study of ‘work polarization’ in Britain. In the course of this research, 
they propose the ‘job’ -  defined by the intersection of occupation and industry classifications 
-  as a unit of analysis of various labour market phenomena, wage inequality included. By 
virtue of the ways in which occupational and industry classifications are constructed, this 
approach captures both the key dimensions set out above. Thus, ‘job content’ is defined by 
the two conceptual dimensions that typically underlie occupational classifications: the task 
composition of work in the job; and the skill requirements for the competent performance of 
the job, with ‘skill requirements’ being limned in terms of ‘skill level’, which in early career 
is linked to the length of study or training necessary to perform the job, and in later career by 
the appropriate ‘skill specialization’, or acquired specific knowledge underpinning the job. 
The use of an industry classification adds another level of detail to this notion of skill 
specialization by focusing it on a particular productive activity, which is important for many 
fields of work.
The initial results of application of this mixed occupational-industry variable to analysis of 
the increase in pay inequality in Britain in the period between 1975 and 1995 are very 
encouraging. Goos and Manning (2003) find that much of this increase can be accounted for 
by quantity (employment) and price (wage) shifts that operate at the level of the job. Thus, it 
is less a case of rising within-group inequality than of increasing inequality between groups 
defined by jobs. This finding runs counter to the conventional wisdom that rising pay 
inequality -  in Britain and the US, at least -  is strongly characterized by growth in within-
51
group inequality, with groups typically being defined along the standard Mincerian 
dimensions of age, experience, and educational achievement. However, as Goos and 
Manning suggest, this consensus may simply be a product of the structuring of analysis 
around the ‘wrong’ groups, as the more detailed groups demarked by jobs capture 
distributional changes far more effectively than broad categories such as education and 
experience (pp.21-22, Goos and Manning 2003). Because of its fine-grained nature, this 
approach recommends itself for the exploration of top-tier pay inequality trends. In this 
element of my analysis, therefore, I apply this job-level framework to the data in order to 
understand more clearly the evolution of top tier pay inequality in Britain between the late- 
1970s and the early-2000s, and also to place this evolution in comparative context by 
investigation of developments in France and Germany.
In accordance with the above conceptual discussion of ‘skills’, I employ a basic definition of 
a ‘job’ that assigns individuals to groups identified by the intersection of occupational and 
industrial classifications. This definition may be interpreted as collating individuals who hold 
similar qualifications and perform similar tasks in similar organizations. I use NES, DADS, 
and GSOEP data and concentrate on the ten years following 1992, as this is the period for 
which the most closely comparable data series are available across the three countries, and the 
period in which international difference in top-tier pay inequality trends is most pronounced.
I standardize the occupational and industrial classifications across the three data sets, 
choosing to work with the 1988 ILO International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO-88) and the 1993 Nomenclature statistique des Activites economiques dans la 
Communaute Europeenne (NACE revision 1). The former is available at the 2-digit level for 
France and Germany, and the 3-digit level for Britain. The latter is deployed at the section 
level, yielding 13 categories, and is only available for Britain and France. As will be seen, 
though, the absence of industry data for Germany is not catastrophic because of the low 
importance of the industry dimension relative to occupation in the explanation of change.
The method of the analysis is relatively straightforward. To begin, I assign individuals in 
each yearly cross section of a country’s data series to ‘job’ cells (i.e., the cells formed by the 
intersection of the occupation and industry classifications). I then calculate the median 
compensation cost and employment share of each cell in each year, and express these 
statistics as proportions of their respective values in the initial year of the series.
Subsequently, I take the initial year’s individual distribution of compensation costs and apply
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the cell-level multipliers (i.e., compensation cost and/or the employment share weight) to this 
distribution for each year of the series. This method produces a counterfactual individual- 
level distribution of compensation costs for each year in the series, which (where both 
multipliers are used) reflects the distribution that would have resulted had every individual’s 
compensation cost evolved at the same rate at the median of the occupational-industry cell to 
which their job belongs, with this distribution being weighted to reflect changes in the 
occupational-industry composition of employment. Inequality statistics of the kind used 
above (percentile ratios) can then be computed for this counterfactual distribution in each 
year, and compared to the corresponding statistics derived from the actual distribution of 
compensation costs in that year.
I present two sets of results from this process. First, I calculate the counterfactual distribution 
series applying only the cell-level employment share multiplier, which shows how the initial 
year’s individual-level distribution would have varied had relative prices remained fixed 
while the employment share of each cell followed its historical evolution. Second, I repeat 
the exercise, but apply the cell-level compensation cost multiplier as well, resulting in a 
counterfactual distributional series that varies by both the employment share of jobs and shifts 
in the relative price structure of jobs. Consequently, I am able to probe whether changes over 
time in the shape of the top of the actual distribution of compensation costs are due to high 
relative employment growth among top jobs (or occupation-industry cells), to price shifts 
between jobs, or to other factors.
I present the outcomes of this analysis through the evolution of the percentile ratios that 
summarize the actual (historical) and counterfactual distributions. The relative shifts of the 
two distributions can be effectively captured by plotting these statistics graphically. Figures 5 
and 6 are presented as examples of this type of plot. As it would be unwieldy to present all 
the results in graphical form, I instead summarize them in Table 7. For each inequality 
statistic (percentile ratio), the table displays the extent of its change over the period from 1992 
to 2001 inclusive, and the proportions of this change explained by each of the counterfactual 
series (variation by job quantities only, and variation by both job quantities and job median 
prices).
The first stage of the analysis defines jobs purely by 2-digit occupation. This simple form is 
inspired by Goos and Manning’s (2003) discovery that the bulk of the explanatory power of
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the job approach stems from the occupational dimension. The British results presented here 
are consistent with this finding, as occupational quantity changes alone can account for
th thvirtually all of the change in the distribution in this period between the 90 and 10 
percentiles. Above the 90th percentile -  the zone of the distribution in which this chapter is 
most interested -  this definition is less successful in accounting for change than it is below it. 
However, it still captures approximately a third of the rise in top tier (i.e., above the top 
decile) pay inequality. A second stage of the analysis defines jobs through the interaction of 
the 2-digit occupation and 1-digit industry classifications. This approach is on the whole 
more effective than the occupation-only job definition in explaining top-tier inequality shifts, 
capturing fully one half of the change over time. These results indicate that while the industry 
dimension adds little explanatory power to the analysis of change below the 90th percentile, it 
is more relevant to trends above this level in the distribution. However, the evidence suggests 
that even in this part of the distribution the industry dimension remains subordinate in 
explanatory terms to the occupational dimension. This impression is reinforced by the results 
of the interaction of 3-digit occupation with the industry variable.20 At this level of detail, 
job-level quantity and price shifts can explain more than two thirds of the rise in top-tier pay 
inequality in Britain, leaving little room for more disaggregated definitions of industry to 
contribute to the analysis.
Turning to the other countries, it is apparent that the job framework is less relevant to the 
explanation of distributional change in those locations, although there is variation in its 
applicability across countries. Certainly, it appears less able to explain change in the pattern 
of top-tier compensation cost inequality trends in Germany than in Britain, although the 
absence of an industry variable might reduce its ability to account for pay inequality 
outcomes. Consequently, there is only a first stage of analysis of the German data, which 
defines jobs by 2-digit occupation. The results indicate an ‘over-explanation’ of change when 
only changes in relative job quantities are considered, and an ‘under-explanation’ when both 
relative job quantities and prices are analysed. This pattern suggests that shifts in inequality 
at the top of the German pay distribution are not closely correlated with either definition of 
‘job’. Still, there is comparatively little change in this area to be explained. Indeed, the four 
point rise in the 95-50 percentile ratio between 1992 and 2002 implies that there is more 
inequality growth at the top than is in fact the case: the rise in inequality during this period
20 This level of detail is permitted by the British data only.
54
th thbetween the 60 and 95 percentiles is essentially zero. This is to say that the apparent rise in 
inequality at the top embodied in the 95-50 percentile ratio is in fact driven by rising 
inequality below the 60th percentile, rather than by rising inequality above the 90th percentile, 
as observed in Britain and France.
In contrast to Germany, the job framework appears at least partially relevant in France, where 
the nature of top-tier inequality growth somewhat resembles its British counterpart. While the 
first-stage analysis using the occupation-only definition of jobs does not explain much of the 
growth of top-tier pay inequality, the second-stage analysis using occupation and industry 
appears more relevant. Here, it explains approximately 20% of the rise in pay inequality 
above the top decile. This finding suggests a key difference with Britain, though, for it 
appears that in France the industry dimension is more important than occupation when 
accounting for change at the very top (99th percentile).
Summarizing across countries, therefore, the job framework captures a significant portion of 
the recent rapid growth in top-tier pay inequality in Britain, a moderate share of the less 
striking rise in this metric in France, and has little to say about Germany, where in any case 
there is little top-decile change to analyse. Interestingly, whereas the occupational dimension 
of the most detailed definition of ‘jobs’ (i.e., of occupational-industry cells at a substantial 
level of disaggregation) predominates as regards explanatory power in Britain, it is the 
industry dimension that is most informative regarding relative shifts at the very top of the 
French pay distribution. These patterns invite further investigation. On the inference that 
these relative price shifts denote underlying imbalances between the forces of supply and 
demand, it would appear that demand growth is outstripping supply growth for the types of 
skills attaching to certain jobs that cluster in the upper reaches of the French and British pay 
distributions. Which jobs are these, however, and what skills do they require? Further, is it 
the case that similar skill sets are in (outsize) demand in both countries, or are there country- 
specific patterns? Lastly, why is there no comparable top-tier inequality growth trend in 
Germany?
In order to address these questions, I build on the preceding analysis by examining the 
relationship in each country between a job’s median initial compensation cost and the 
proportionate change in its overall share of the total (national) compensation cost bill during 
the course of the 1992-2001 period. For the purposes of the graphs presented, I define ‘job’
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by 2-digit ISCO occupation alone. Where the above job analysis is shown to capture a large 
share of distributional change, this indicates that the change is largely characterized by 
between-job price and quantity movements. In these cases, jobs whose compensation cost bill 
shares change by significant amounts are likely to be those that are stretching or compressing 
the overall distribution. In relation to shifts in top-tier inequality, therefore, I wish to identify 
relatively highly paid jobs that exhibit relatively high or low rates of cost bill share growth.
For Britain, the principal driver of rising top-decile inequality appears to be the ISCO 
category of ‘corporate managers’, that is, managers in medium and large organizations (ISCO 
12; see Figure 7). The compensation cost bill share of this group rises more than three times 
as quickly as any other job, and it is the second highest-paid job at the start of the period. 
Aside from this group, only a handful of professional, associate professional and technical, 
and service and sales jobs experience any growth in their cost bill share. In addition, all other 
cost bill share shifts, positive or negative, are small by comparison. Figure 8, in which the 
plotted points are scaled by the employment share of the job in the initial period, shows that 
the ISCO 12 group is a relatively large one. Consequently, the outsize growth rate of its cost 
bill share is likely to have a significant impact on the overall shape of the upper tail of the pay 
distribution.
By exploiting the availability of 3-digit occupational data for Britain, it can be shown that the 
2-digit pattern is almost entirely driven by ISCO group 123, ‘specialist managers’ in areas 
such as finance, marketing, and IT, although ISCO group 121, ‘directors and chief 
executives’, also contributes. As there is no reason to suspect that the supply of these types of 
workers/skills has been substantially inhibited in the period observed, one may infer that the 
continuing rise in top-tier pay inequality in Britain since the early-1990s has been due to a 
shift in relative labour demand. This shift appears to have been focused upon particular, high- 
level managerial skills, and is reflected in relatively expanded employment and relatively 
higher pay for the group of employees in possession of these.21 While there is evidence that 
the types of jobs in question are to some extent concentrated in the business services and 
financial services industries, this is true at all points in the period examined. Where the
21 An immediate question arises about the potential impact of ‘title inflation’ where change in the pay 
distribution is linked back to managerial occupations. However, this is an issue that I explore in depth in the 
empirical methods section of the fourth chapter of this thesis, and I find that the design o f the collection of 
occupational data militates against the influence of title inflation, and that LFS results show no evidence that title 
inflation has driven these observed trends. Consequently, I am confident that there has occurred a real growth in 
demand for managerial skills, which is reflected in rising relative employment and pay for this employee group.
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contribution of industry type to the pattern of change is considered, as in the preceding 
analysis, it is found to be of a smaller magnitude than that of the occupational dimension. 
Consequently, it may be concluded that the rise in pay inequality that has taken place at the 
summit of the British pay distribution is not linked to the relative economic fortunes of 
particular industries (e.g., financial services). Moreover, the kinds of jobs that lie at the heart 
of the pattern of change in pay inequality appear to be distributed fairly evenly across
organizations of all sizes, implying that the relative pay shift is not merely a case of rent
/
sharing by, say, large listed firms. These considerations support the assertion that the top-tier 
pay inequality bias is linked to a shift in relative labour demand across the British economy 
towards particular managerial skills.
No similar pattern can be observed in the other two countries examined (see Figures 9-12). In 
Germany, while the ISCO 12 group experiences one of the highest rates of cost share growth, 
it is by no means an outlier, and is outstripped by the ISCO 21 group (engineering and science 
professionals). The absence of outlying observations is consistent with the twin findings that 
Germany exhibits little sign of rising top-tier inequality and that between-job shifts explain 
very little of what distributional change that occurred. In France, the cost share of the ISCO 
12 group actually declines slightly over the period in question. Instead, the occupations with 
the fastest-growing cost shares number engineering and science professionals and associate 
professionals, and various broking and trading groups. As in Germany, however, the range of 
cost share growth rates is relatively compressed, and no occupation is truly an outlier. This 
statement is consistent with the previous finding that the occupational dimension of the job 
analysis accounts for a considerably lesser share of rising inequality in France than in Britain. 
When the definition of ‘job’ is extended to include the industry dimension, it becomes 
apparent that the jobs with the fastest growing cost shares cluster for the most part in business 
services, and perhaps to a lesser extent in transport and communication and retail and 
wholesale commerce. All the same, there is little or no evidence in France or Germany that 
would support the inference of an across-industry shift in relative demand towards certain 
managerial skill sets.
The following section summarizes the findings of the chapter and speculates in particular on 
the implications of this last set of conclusions. Further, it uses this discussion as the means of 
introducing the remaining two empirically focused chapters of the thesis.
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Conclusions
This chapter is intended to shed light on the apparent bias towards top pay in the growth of 
British pay inequality that was noted in the 1990s. In exploring this issue, it has addressed 
two principal research questions. First, it has sought to clarify the form of this apparent bias, 
and explored the extent to which a trend of this variety is novel or particular to Britain. 
Second, it has tested a number of frameworks that might explain why such a trend should 
occur, including the prevailing explanations in the literature for broad-based pay inequality 
growth -  i.e., SBTC and change in labour market institutions -  and the relevant alternative of 
‘job’ analysis. This closing section summarizes the chapter’s findings in relation to these 
questions, speculates on their broader significance, and frames the way forward for the 
remainder of the thesis.
In relation to the evolution of the British distribution of pay, the key finding of the chapter is 
that the top pay bias in British inequality growth in the 1990s and 2000s that is hinted at in the 
literature is a clear fact and of non-negligible magnitude. Furthermore, it represents the 
continuation of a longstanding trend which began in the late-1970s, at the time that overall 
pay inequality began to rise in the British labour market. However, it only became noticeable 
as a trend after the broad-based form of pay inequality growth subsided during the early- 
1990s. That the broad-based and top-tier trends in pay inequality growth have been 
characterized by different orders of magnitude (much more rapid with regard to top pay) and 
patterns of timing (the broad-based trend slowed substantially in the 1990s while the top-tier 
version continued unabated) at least raises the possibility that they are linked to different sets 
of underlying causes. In comparison with similar countries’ experiences, the British trend is 
not typical. Indeed, there is no common trend with regard to top pay across countries. France 
developed a top-tier pay inequality bias of its own in the 1990s, although of a lower relative 
magnitude than its British equivalent, and it could only be perceived in relation to the 
distribution of compensation costs (a proxy for labour cost, or the price facing the employer) 
rather than for gross or net earnings. Germany, in contrast, has demonstrated no clear bias of 
this kind, the degree of change over time in its pay distribution being rather limited. These 
comparative findings suggest that, while the causes of rising top-tier pay inequality are 
unlikely to be parochially British, they are substantially modified by country-specific
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mediating factors. Following this conclusion, Chapters three and four of this thesis explore 
the impact of particular mediating factors of this kind on top-tier pay inequality.
Examination of the prevailing explanations of the broad-based growth in pay inequality that 
occurred in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s suggests that they are less applicable as 
explanations of the phenomenon of top-tier pay inequality growth. In short, SBTC -  at least, 
the version that defines skills through general education levels -  cannot explain differences in 
top-tier pay inequality developments in the three countries, as the three countries examined 
resemble one another strikingly as regards the relative evolution of skill supply and implied 
demand for the highly educated. Similarly, change in the labour market institutions of 
minimum wage mechanisms and collective pay setting does not convincingly account for top- 
tier inequality trends. This is first of all tme because these types of institutions do not directly 
impinge on top pay in any location considered. However, it is also the case that, while all 
three countries have experienced institutional change that could have enabled the upward 
transfer of rents within the pay distribution (i.e., weakening of institutions), lower-tail 
inequality has grown least in recent years in Britain. That the largest growth in top-tier 
inequality has occurred where the apparent scope for rent transfer from bottom to top is 
lowest suggests that there is little mechanical connection between the bottom and top of the 
pay distribution, and that the evolution of these institutions therefore has limited indirect 
influence also on patterns of change in top pay relativities.
The job analysis framework provides a different and informative perspective on the relevant 
changes in top-tier pay inequality. In Britain, it appears that top-tier pay inequality growth is 
closely linked to particular occupations or jobs. To a lesser extent, this is also true of France. 
However, in Britain, the top pay bias is neither an industry-specific phenomenon (i.e., it is not 
just a financial services or other sectoral effect), nor is it linked to organizational size (i.e., it 
is not just a case of rent sharing by large firms). Instead, because top-tier relative pay growth 
in Britain is driven by increases in both the relative employment share and relative pay of 
particular jobs, the evidence supports the inference that there has occurred a consistent shift in 
relative labour demand towards the managerial skills and characteristics associated with the 
incumbents of senior general and specialist managerial roles. Furthermore, the economy- 
wide nature of the trend implies that it is closely linked to changes within organizations, e.g., 
the restructuring of productions systems, in response to some stimulus. That this same
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stimulus appears to have had some impact on the French distribution of pay suggests that this 
stimulus is not unique to Britain, but is of a more general aspect.
Perhaps the key finding of this analysis, therefore, is that a growing share of total British 
earnings is accounted for by (the incumbents of) certain types of managerial jobs. Broadly 
speaking, there are two principal potential explanations for this distributional outcome: a 
market one and non-market one. Under market assumptions, we can infer an increase in 
relative demand for the individuals employed in the jobs in question. Certainly, there is little 
reason to suspect that there has occurred a dwindling of supply or bottlenecks, as the general 
education system has over time turned out progressively greater numbers of individuals with 
high general skills, and the quantitative growth of management functions has presumably 
created wider opportunities for the acquisition of specific skills. If the assumption holds that 
the observed pay outcomes are determined in a more-or-less competitive market context (as 
concluded by, say, Ogden and Watson 2004; Tzioumis 2005), it follows that organizations 
must have been willing to pay relatively more for the skills and abilities of the individuals in 
question. As economic models of the firm imply that employers will only pay more for skills 
if it is in their interest, some underlying change must have occurred to make these individuals 
and their skillsets relatively more productive or more critical to the organizational bottom 
line.
The most persuasive account of an underlying change of this variety is a variation on or 
refinement of the SBTC thesis, which argues that new ICT technologies and associated 
organizational changes have rendered managerial and analytical skills much more valuable to 
employers (Bresnahan 1999; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson et al. 2002). This approach argues 
against the common assumption in the SBTC literature that the complementarity between 
technology and skills functions at the level of the individual (i.e., a worker receives a new 
desktop PC, which improves his or her productivity -  see Kruger (1993) for the classic 
example) in favour of a perspective that envisions this complementarity as an organization- 
level phenomenon. Thus, new technology’s influence on relative labour demand flows not 
from the direct use of computers by this or that group of employees, but from the subtle ways 
in which the information gathering and processing capacities of a wired organization act as a 
multiplier on the performance impact of managerial and professional skills (especially 
interpersonal, creative, and leadership skills). This performance multiplier effect is greater 
the more senior the position or individual in an organization (i.e., it is linked to the strategic
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impact of the decisions made by the relative individual), which suggests that employers will 
be willing to pay increasingly more for these increasingly important skills, as they may 
ultimately make or break the fortunes of the whole organization. Furthermore, Bresnahan 
asserts that the impact of this complementarity will be greatest in the context of white-collar 
bureaucracies, as these are (parts of) organizations whose business literally takes the form of 
data and its interpretation. Interestingly, then, this hypothetical framework appears to predict 
the kind of rapid top-tier pay inequality growth observed in Britain and -  to a lesser extent -  
in France.
In contrast, non-market explanations of change in the distribution of pay (or other material 
benefits) tend to focus on power or control (for a classic argument of this type, see March 
1962). For instance, it might be expected that the group of employees that controls 
organizational decision making is able to direct resources towards itself either directly or 
indirectly, say, by reshaping the organization and its activities in such a way that it benefits 
from the new circumstances. A current and widespread argument of this type is that relating 
to ‘financialization’ -  a process through which owners and managers are thought to have 
redirected economic activity to prioritize finance over production, augmenting their own 
returns along the way (Krippner 2005). Effectively, the precondition for such a change is the 
acquisition of more-or-less unrestricted organizational control, or of the reins of corporate 
governance. As this is conceived as a zero-sum game, other stakeholders, e.g., non- 
managerial employees, etc., lose in the process.
Following these two sketches of plausible explanations for top-tier pay inequality growth, the 
next two chapters address them in turn. Chapter three, therefore, looks at the possible 
contribution of corporate governance factors to recent growth in top-tier pay inequality in 
Britain and France, and Chapter four examines changes in the role of managers in British 
organizations over the last several decades and looks for evidence of change that might 
support Bresnahan’s hypothesis.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Detailed descriptions of data sets
The key data set for Britain is the NES. This is an annual survey of the earnings of employees 
in employment in Great Britain, which was conducted every April from the late-1960s until 
recently (it has now been superseded by another survey, the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings). It is completed by employers from payroll records, and therefore provides highly 
accurate data on hours and earnings, occupation, and industry. The survey remained largely 
unchanged from 1975 onwards, yielding a useable data series which stretches from this date 
through to the last year publicly available, 2001. The sample frame consists of all individuals 
whose national insurance number ends with ‘14’, which would in the event of a 100% 
response rate produce a random sample of 1% of all employees in employment. In reality, the 
response rate is closer to 50%. Individuals falling within the sampling frame are located by 
means of their tax records, with the survey materials then being forwarded to their employers. 
While this method of identification is efficient, it leads to under-sampling problems because 
at any given time many employees do not have a current tax record, owing either to low 
earnings (insufficient to pay tax or national insurance) or to a recent change of employer (in 
which case the questionnaire is sent to the wrong employer). As a consequence, part-time and 
very-low paid employees are under-represented in the data, as are individuals who regularly 
change employers, e.g., those working in seasonal or precarious jobs. From the perspective of 
the analyst of wages, such under-sampling is of greatest concern when studying the fortunes 
of the less-well paid, although it also has a conditioning effect on the overall shape of the 
estimated distribution.
Given the limitations of the NES, I supplement it with data drawn from the LFS, a quarterly 
household survey that has reported information on earnings and hours since 1993. I construct 
an annualized data set stretching from this date to 2004. This data set has a balance of 
attributes different to that of the NES. On the one hand, the LFS’s annualized samples -  with 
the assistance of weights that render estimates representative of the target population and 
account for differential rates of non-response -  approximate to ones randomly drawn from the 
general population, so avoiding questions of selection bias. On the other hand, though, the
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resultant samples are smaller than their NES equivalents (leading to lower statistical 
precision), and the self-reported nature of the hours and earnings data produces a less accurate 
measure of hourly wages. It should be noted, though, that the LFS earnings and wage 
measures are not based merely on respondents’ assertions, as the data collection process asks 
respondents to produce salary slips, etc., wherever possible in order to corroborate self- 
declared pay figures. In addition, previous studies that have jointly analysed the NES and the 
LFS have found that they produce very similar results with regard to both the cross-sectional 
profile of pay inequality and changes in pay inequality over time (e.g., Dickens and Manning 
2002; Goos and Manning 2003). Therefore, the NES and LFS complement one another well, 
as the strengths of one survey compensate for the weaknesses of the other, and permit the 
cross-referencing of results over the period from 1993 to 2001.
For France, the primary source of data is the DADS (for a detailed description, see Roux 
2001). Like the NES, it is constructed from employer annual payroll records, which must by 
law be reported to the government for administrative purposes. Consequently, it also 
provides accurate information on hours, earnings, and employer and job characteristics for the 
period 1976-2001. However, unlike the NES, the target population includes only the private 
sector, the national industries (the ‘grandes entreprises’). This group accounts for 
approximately 75% of all employment in each year, but DADS results must be supplemented 
with those derived from the EE in order to understand developments in the public sector. 
While the administrative data set covers all individuals in employment in the specified sectors 
any given year -  and is therefore vast -  the information retained by INSEE (the national 
statistical office) for research purposes relates only to individuals bom in the October of an 
' even-numbered year, producing a more tractable (but still extensive and representative) data 
source. Still, the structure of these data is sufficiently different from the NES to make direct 
comparison difficult, as the unit of observation is the individual-job match -  thus, a given 
individual may appear several times per year, once for each job they hold during that year. In 
order to facilitate comparison, I constmct a ‘pseudo-NES’ sample from each DADS cross- 
section, capturing a snapshot of employment (individual-job observations) in the second week 
of April in each year. This procedure generates a representative data set of similar 
dimensions to the NES. Owing to the employers’ obligation to report the underlying data to 
the government for administrative purposes, the DADS does not suffer from any systematic 
sampling problems (in the manner of the NES).
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As in the case of Britain, I am able to compensate for the weaknesses of the primary data set 
by referring to a nationally representative survey of households -  here, the EE. This is an 
annual survey which enables analysis of all employment (i.e., public sector included) and 
carries information on key variables not present in the DADS (notably, levels of education). 
Like LFS, EE provides data for only a portion of the period of interest, its initial year of 
collection being 1984. Further, it only began to collect representative earnings data in 1990. 
Thus, results may be cross-referenced between the two surveys during the period 1990-2001.
The German data set -  the GSOEP -  is also a household survey that allows for the derivation 
of representative samples of individuals in employment. While it, like the NES and LFS, has 
a panel dimension, I treat it here as a series of annual cross-sections. Begun in 1984, the early 
years of the survey relate solely to the former FRG, although its scope was rapidly extended 
to the new Lander following unification in 1990. For the sake of continuity over time, I 
construct a data set that is representative of the population of employees in employment in the 
former FRG/westem Lander during the period 1984-2002. Like the LFS and EE, the hours 
and earnings data are self-reported, and estimates may be weighted to ensure their 
representativeness and to control for non-response bias. Much more so than the LFS or EE, 
however, the small overall sample size of the survey presents issues with regard to the 
attainable degree of statistical precision, especially when dealing with small subsamples such 
as groups of very high earners.
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Tables
Table 1: Labour cost composition, 2002
% o f total labour costs
Country Income tax Employee s.s.c. Employer s.s.c. Gross earnings
United Kingdom 14 7 8 92
France 9 9 29 71
Germany 17 17 17 83
Note: figures are representative for single individuals without children at the income level 
production worker
Note: the first three columns may not sum to the fourth due to rounding 
Note: (Table 1.3, OECD 2003)
of the average
Table 2: Trends in self-employment, 1970-2000
Self-employment rate by year in non-agricultural sector (%)
Country 1970 1978 1990 1998 2000
United Kingdom 6.7 6.8 14.2 12.5 11.7
France 12.5 10.7 9.3 8.2 7.9
Germany 10.3 8.3 8.5 9.9 9.6
Note: (Based on OECD data presented in Table 1, Torrini 2005)
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Table 3: Pay percentile ratios, 1976-2002
Country/year p99-p50




1976 1.20 0.80 0.57 0.50
1984 1.29 0.86 0.65 0.53
1992 1.41 0.95 0.73 0.57




1976 - - - -
1984 1.27 0.87 0.66 0.57
1992 1.44 0.98 0.75 0.60
2001 1.60 1.05 0.80 0.63
France
(gross earnings)
1976 1.51 0.88 0.59 0.49
1984 1.47 0.85 0.54 0.43
1992 1.44 0.84 0.54 0.45




1976 1.37 0.78 0.52 0.49
1984 1.40 0.80 0.51 0.43
1992 1.43 0.83 0.53 0.45
2001 1.52 0.87 0.53 0.56
Western Germany 
(gross wages)
1976 - - - -
1984 - 0.73 0.54 0.81
1992 - 0.67 0.50 0.61




1976 - - - -
1984 - 0.72 0.53 0.81
1992 . - 0.65 0.49 0.61
2002 “ 0.70 0.53 0.73
Note: gross hourly wages and compensation cost for all workers in Britain and Germany; daily gross earnings 
and compensation cost for full-time private-sector workers in France 
Note: NES, DADS, and GSOEP data
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Table 4: Adult population by education group, 1984-2002
















































1984 5.4 5.7 9.3 22.2 1A 50.0
1992 6.9 7.2 12.0 24.0 10.8 38.6
2002 10.9 10.9 15.1 24.9 11.3 26.8

























1992 10.7 5.3 56.1 7.6 15.4 5.0
2002 16.5 5.0 59.0 6.2 11.0 2.3
Note: LFS, Enquete emploi, and GSOEP data
Table 5: Relative supply and demand by education group, 1993-2002
Annualized relative changes (%)
Country/education groups________ Adult population, aged 16-65______Active population, aged 16-65
Britain
Degree/No degree
Supply shift 3.88 4.09
Compensation cost shift -0.06 -0.06
Implied demand shift 3.79 4.00
Degree/No qualifications
Supply shift 5.75 6.65
Compensation cost shift -0.71 -0.71
Implied demand shift 4.69 5.59
France
Degree/No degree
Supply shift 4.28 4.10
Compensation cost shift -0.03 -0.03
Implied demand shift 4.23 4.05
Degree/No qualifications
Supply shift 7.39 7.42
Compensation cost shift 0.59 0.59
Implied demand shift 8.26 8.30
W estern Germany
Degree/No degree
Supply shift 4.95 5.14
Compensation cost shift -0.40 -0.40
Implied demand shift 4.36 4.55
Degree/No qualifications
Supply shift 13.37 13.22
Compensation cost shift -0.50 -0.50
Implied demand shift 12.62 12.46
Note: wage shift values are calculated for all full-time employees in each country 
Note: GSOEP estimates omit tenure variable from human capital equations 
Note: LFS, Enquete emploi, and GSOEP data
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Table 6: Collective pay-setting institutions, 1980-2003
Country/years
Variables (% o f working population)













Source: (Table 4, Visser 2005)
Note: * all Germany
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Table 7: Job analysis, 1992-2002
Period/country p99-p50 p95-p50 p90-p50 p50-p!0
Job defined by 2-digit occupation
Britain
Log point change in inequality measure 16 7 5 3
Proportion explained - quantities only 0.20 0.45 0.97 1.02
Proportion explained - quantities and prices 0.31 0.33 0.76 1.79
France
Log point change in inequality measure 9 4 1 10
Proportion explained - quantities only -0.05 0.52 4.59 0.16
Proportion explained - quantities and prices -0.11 -0.29 0.86 0.16
W estern Germ any (1993-2002)
Log point change in inequality measure - 4 2 10
Proportion explained - quantities only - 1.36 1.54 -0.13
Proportion explained - quantities and prices " -0.50 -0.59 0.24
Job defined by 2-digit occupation/1-digit 
industry
Britain
Log point change in inequality measure 16 7 5 3
Proportion explained - quantities only 0.36 0.76 1.40 0.68
Proportion explained - quantities and prices 0.51 0.56 0.93 0.89
France
Log point change in inequality measure 9 4 1 10
Proportion explained - quantities only 0.12 0.58 5.05 0.18
Proportion explained - quantities and prices 0.09 0.22 3.26 0.24
Job defined by 3-digit occupation/1-digit 
industry
Britain
Log point change in inequality measure 16 7 5 3
Proportion explained - quantities only 0.46 0.92 1.59 0.65
Proportion explained - quantities and prices 0.70 0.66 1.12 1.14
Note: gross hourly wages and compensation cost for all workers in Britain and Germany; daily gross earnings 
and compensation cost for full-time private-sector workers in France 
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Annualized change in labour cost across distribution 
in Britain, France, and Germany, 1984-1992
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Note: French data are daily compensation cost for full-time employees only; British and German data are hourly 
compensation costs for all employees 
Note: NES, DADS, and GSOEP data
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Figure 2
Annualized change in gross wages by survey 
across distribution in Britain, 1994-2001
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Figure 3
Annualized change in differing pay measures 
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Change in hourly labour cost across distribution in France, 1994-2001
Note: Enquete emploi data
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Figure 5
Real and counterfactual labour cost 
%ile ratios in Britain, 1992-2001
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initial period pay levels in Britain, 1992-2001
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Note: point size is related to the employment share of the job in the initial period
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Chapter 3
Organizational Governance, Patterns of Labour Demand, and 
Their Relation to Top-Tier Pay Inequality
Introduction
The preceding chapter showed that between the late-1970s and the early-2000s there was a 
substantial top pay bias in the evolution of the British distribution of pay, with the highest 
rates of inequality growth consistently occurring above the top decile of the distribution. By 
means of a job analysis of the evolution of the distribution of pay, the chapter found that this 
pattern of change was strongly linked to the relative fortunes of senior general and specialist 
managerial roles. Applying a supply-and-demand model, it was concluded that there has 
occurred a consistent shift in relative labour demand towards the skills and characteristics 
necessary to fill roles of this type. In considering this result, I floated two possible types of 
explanation for this apparent shift in relative demand: a market explanation and a non-market 
alternative. This chapter is intended to assess the case that the plausible non-market factor 
identified -  corporate or organizational governance22 -  may have contributed to the observed 
top-tier pay inequality trend in Britain.
In the understanding of this chapter, organizations are micropolitical units governed by ruling 
coalitions of actors, with each ‘actor’ being composed of a relatively homogeneous and 
organized group of individuals (March 1962). Because the organization as a whole -  as 
opposed to its constituent parts -  is the ultimate source of economic surplus, this surplus must 
be distributed somehow among the actors who contribute to the organization. If we assume 
that this process of distribution is not precisely effected by the market, the composition of the
22 While the approach is typically labelled ‘corporate governance’, and therefore seems only to apply to listed 
private-sector companies, its ideas are applicable to all types of organizations, including privately held 
businesses, public sector organizations, and organizations in the non-profit sector. The organizational actors 
identified in this chapter -  owners, managers, and workers -  are not confined to the corporate sector, and 
organizational politics is not its preserve, either. For these reasons, I prefer to use the label ‘organizational 
governance’.
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organization’s ruling coalition has implications for who benefits (most) from the overall 
surplus produced by the organization. This is because members of the mling coalition that 
prevails in the political competition for the surplus can obtain a relatively high share of the 
spoils, either directly by simply allocating a greater share of the surplus to themselves, or 
indirectly by steering the organization in ways that direct greater share of surplus to them. 
Since individual employees -  even those at the top of the distribution -  do not set their own 
pay levels, it is unlikely that political competition through the organizational governance 
mechanism could affect the distribution of pay directly (by simple self-dealing). Instead, if 
organizational governance factors are to impinge upon the distribution of pay, it must be 
through the more subtle indirect channel (in the shorter term by capturing rents, and in the 
longer term by controlling strategic decision making and thereby steering the organization in 
ways that disproportionately benefit certain constituents).
Stated briefly, the argument that links organizational governance to questions of the 
distribution of pay supposes that the organizational governance mechanism functions as a 
device to aggregate the array of interests of the different organizational stakeholders. The 
outcomes of this process of interest aggregation -  or the organizational governance regime -  
influences the shape of organization-level decisions over what production to undertake and 
how. Evidently, some of these decisions relate to the types and quantities of labour to employ 
as an input to production, and the terms on which they are employed. As decisions of this 
type underpin the profile of relative labour demand at the level of the single organization, they 
contribute to the overall pattern of relative labour demand in the market and thereby influence 
the observed distribution of pay. Following this causal chain back to its source, a challenge 
facing this chapter is to classify the various types of organizational governance regime and to 
specify their likely respective impacts on the distribution of (top) pay.
There are two distinct types of organizational governance models in the literature. The first 
conceives of organizational politics in bipartite terms, that is, as being contested by owners 
and managers. The second perceives that there are more than two actors in the game, and 
portrays organizational politics as an arena in which multiple parties or stakeholders interact. 
Given that this chapter is ultimately concerned with questions of pay, it opts to use a 
stakeholder model of organizational governance, as this enables the consideration of 
distributional outcomes for all employees, whether managerial or non-managerial. In 
addition, this approach permits consideration of Chapter two’s finding that senior managers
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represent a key influence on top-tier pay inequality growth in Britain. Evidence that owners 
have enjoyed relatively high profits in recent decades (De Jong 1995; Ryan 1996), alongside 
the findings of the preceding chapter in relation to the fortunes of managers in Britain, 
suggests that the relative fortunes of owners and managers have risen together, and may be 
linked to their combination in organizational coalitions.
The chapter addresses two main research questions. To begin with, as it has already been 
noted that Britain and France have experienced different top-tier pay inequality developments 
in recent years, the chapter asks whether these countries also differ in terms of the population 
ecology of and degree of change in organizational governance arrangements. It arrives at 
answers by applying its chosen organizational governance framework to closely comparable 
British and French establishment-level panel data for the period 1998-2004. Following this 
descriptive element of the analysis, the chapter turns to its second research question, testing 
whether organizational governance factors are connected to the growth of top-tier pay 
inequality by examining the two sets of variables in tandem in the two countries.
Regarding research design, the chapter’s key choices include the use of both British and 
French data, the application to the data of Aguilera and Jackson’s (2003) organizational 
governance model rather than one of the others available, and the decision to probe the 
connection between governance and pay outcomes by means of an econometric model 
focused on relative labour demand. Data on two countries are used for two reasons. First, it 
provides a broader and more robust basis than a single country’s data on which to assess the 
degree to which the chosen organizational governance framework is informative and useful. 
Second, the ability to compare across-country difference in organizational governance trends 
alongside difference in pay inequality trends enables more accurate identification of the 
potential link between organizational governance arrangements and patterns of top-tier 
growth in pay inequality. I opt to define organizational governance based on Aguilera and 
Jackson’s framework because of its tripartite structure (owners, managers, and employees), 
which captures the distinctions needed for this analysis, and because of its precise 
specification through variables that can readily be operationalized and tested. While a 
number of other models share the first attribute (e.g., Dore’s model contrasting the 
‘community’ and ‘property’ views of the firm (Dore 2000)) and are conceptually very similar 
to the one used here, they tend to be too general in form to be operationalized in a manner that 
will support econometric modelling. My decision to test for the impact of organizational
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governance regimes on the distribution of pay by means of a labour demand model is 
determined by the argument, noted above, that labour demand is the channel through which 
the former factor will influence the latter. In addition, the model functions at the level of the 
organization so as to reflect my understanding of the link between organizational governance 
and labour demand as an intra-organizational process.
Structurally, the chapter begins by setting out the theoretical case for the influence of 
governance factors on pay inequality, and top tier inequality in particular, drawing on the 
literature on organizational governance along the way. The next section of the chapter sets 
out the empirical strategy of the paper -  i.e., how it employs the chosen organizational 
governance framework, what hypotheses are generated, how it tests for the influence of this 
variable on organization-level labour demand patterns, and the implications of this influence 
for pay inequality outcomes. Following this presentation, I introduce the data sets used -  the 
British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) and the French enquete relations 
professionnelles et negotiations d'entreprise (REPONSE) -  and discuss the operationalization 
of key variables used in the analysis.
I present results on the population ecology of organizational governance arrangements in the 
two countries, the relationship between governance and relative labour demand outcomes, and 
contribution of this relationship to the patterns of top-tier pay inequality growth observed in 
Britain and France. To anticipate the findings of the chapter, it appears that there are 
significant differences across countries in the distribution of types of arrangements. In 
addition, there is some evidence that in both Britain and France a shift has taken place such 
that an increasing share of organizations are controlled by coalitions of owners and senior 
managers. Considering the relationship between organizational governance arrangements and 
patterns of organizational labour demand, it appears that while there is some impact of the one 
factor on the other in Britain, there is little connection between them in France. All the same, 
the results for the British case tend to support the hypothesis that coalitions comprised of 
owners and managers (class coalitions) are more likely to bias labour demand towards 
managers than coalitions comprised of managers and workers (insider coalitions); and that 
insider coalitions in turn are more likely than class coalitions to bias labour demand towards 
non-managerial occupational groups. The capacity of these labour demand biases to explain 
rising top-tier inequality is found to be rather limited, however, even in Britain. As a result, 
the paper concludes that organizational governance issues can explain rather little of the
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recent increases in top-tier pay inequality observed in Britain and France, and that other 
factors must be explored if we are to understand these trends. This conclusion sets the stage 
for the third empirical study of this thesis, which relates to the development of the managerial 
function in British organizations in recent decades.
Theoretical issues and literature review
This chapter explores the possibility that a ‘non-market’ or political factor -  organizational 
governance -  may have contributed to the rise in top-tier pay inequality observed in Britain 
and, to a lesser extent, in France. In short, the rationale for this hypothetical relationship 
begins from the assumption that organizations are both sources of socialized surplus and loci 
o f political competition among more-or-less organized actors for that surplus. This notion of 
political competition over material interests is well captured by thinking about the issue of 
organizational governance. Hence, we might reasonably hypothesize that an actor’s relative 
dominance in the arena of organizational governance arrangements might be associated with 
its relative success in obtaining its share of the surplus produced by the organization. If  we 
consider recipients of top pay, or managers, to constitute an identifiable actor, it follows that 
relative material success for this group will take the form of relatively high growth in 
remuneration. Evidence in support of this hypothesis would therefore need to show that in 
organizations in which recipients of top pay are influential in organizational governance 
arrangements, they also appear to be in relatively high demand by the organization. In this 
section of the chapter, I draw on the literature to set out the hypothetical basis for this 
relationship.
The term ‘corporate governance’ is usually used to refer to the systems by which companies 
are directed and controlled. In the words of the OECD (p. 11, 2004a), corporate governance 
‘involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders 
and other stakeholders... [and] also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined.’ This definition implicitly distinguishes between the goals of the firm or 
organization as a whole, and the goals or preferences of the groups that compose it. Because 
the preferences of these groups are not necessarily in alignment, it has been observed that the
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institution of the firm is a form of ‘political conflict system’ (March 1962). According to this 
characterization, political conflict systems possess two key features. First, they are composed 
of identifiable ‘elementary units’, that is, collective actors or more or less organized groups of 
individuals. And second, these actors possess conflicting preferences -  or perceived interests 
-  with regard to the allocation of resources within the system as a whole. Thus, for example, 
owners typically wish to prioritize profits, whereas employees’ attention is more likely to be 
focused on the wage bill. If we assume that each of these actors seeks to maximize its own 
share of the collective surplus created by the organization, organizational governance can be 
thought of as the mechanism through which the claims of the various actors are reconciled.
No single actor can impose its terms on the others, as all are in some way necessary to the 
continued existence of the organization as a whole. Consequently, in the political game of 
organizational governance, the relatively most successful actors will be those that form a 
dominant coalition (March 1962; Jacoby 2004).
From this perspective, organizational governance arrangements will play a role in determining 
the distribution of the material surplus generated by the organization. However, in a market 
context, the returns to the various actors who participate in the individual firm are primarily 
influenced by market prices derived outside the firm. Thus, for instance, the relative returns 
to employees (i.e., wage rates) and owners (i.e., interest) in a given organization are strongly 
guided by the prices prevailing in the labour and capital markets. As a consequence, 
therefore, the role of political competition -  or organizational governance arrangements -  in 
influencing the distribution of organizational surplus will be a subtle one, rather than a simple 
case of self-dealing. I see two possible mechanisms through which organizational governance 
issues may affect distributional outcomes. First, some organizations generate rents of some 
sort that represent a pool of surplus that may be distributed over and above the returns 
demanded by the market. As this pool is not subject to market discipline, it is open to 
political processes of competition to determine how it will be shared out. Hence, members of 
a dominant organizational coalition will be well placed to direct these rents towards 
themselves. Second, membership of a ruling organizational coalition offers the opportunity to 
steer the process of organization-level strategic decision making in ways that promote one’s 
own interests in the organization, that is, increase the share of the overall value added that 
accrues to a given actor. For example, there is evidence that unions are best able to ensure 
durably relatively high returns for their members in situations in which they participate in the 
strategic decision making process of an organization (Jacoby 2001). Similarly, a number of
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studies have observed that the distributional impact of new technology in an organization is 
not deterministic, but is glided by the nature of the dominant political coalition that oversees 
its introduction (e.g., Barley 1988; Pinsonneault and Kraemer 1997).
As regards the understanding of organizational governance arrangements, there are two 
principal approaches to be found in the literature. The first type limits itself to the 
consideration of principals (owners/financiers) and their agents (managers), with the 
assumption that the role of the organizational governance system is to ensure the latter 
maximize the return of the former. This approach is commonly adopted, for example, by 
contributions to the financial economics literature. It is particularly well suited to the analysis 
of obstacles to profit maximization and of the principal-agent problem that faces external, 
arms-length owners such as investors in listed companies in the US and Britain (e.g., Allen 
1993; Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2006). The alternative type of understanding is the 
‘stakeholder’ approach, which considers the broad constellation of actors and power relations 
that impact upon the exercise of control in firms, and the distribution of risk and return among 
these actors that emerges from this. This approach is typically encountered in academic fields 
such as industrial relations, political science, or economic sociology, and is most useful when 
considering international differences among organizational governance arrangements, as there 
is often considerable variety in terms of the players in the game and their relative importance 
from one country to another (e.g., Blair and Roe 1999; O'Sullivan 2000; Jacoby 2001; 
Grandori 2004; Hopner 2005; Jackson 2005).
The contrasting approaches between the financial economics focus on owners and managers 
and the broad consideration of any and all actors associated with the firm may be thought of 
as two poles of a conceptual continuum. However, neither pole is perfectly adapted to the 
analysis proposed by this chapter; the former because it excludes employees -  and therefore 
pay -  from the picture; and the latter because its complexity and emphasis on descriptive 
detail does not support the robust empirical testing of propositions that relate organizational 
governance arrangements to other factors. As a result, the most appropriate definition of 
organizational governance for this chapter falls into the middle ground between these poles, 
and considers the relationship among three actors or stakeholders -  capital, management, and 
labour. This approach captures the bulk of distributional competition within the organization, 
as all of these actors make significant investments in it, i.e., financial or human capital, 
whereas more peripheral stakeholders such as suppliers and local communities have less at
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stake (Gospel and Pendleton 2005). Moreover, it makes a clear distinction between managers 
and other types of employee that permits exploration of the finding that, in Britain, top-tier 
pay inequality growth has largely been driven by senior managerial jobs.
The role of managers in an organization is a complex one, as, in many ways, employees of 
this type simultaneously play the roles of ‘employee’ and ‘employer’. This is to say that they 
not only exchange their labour in return for remuneration, but also make decisions regarding 
organizational strategy, the organization of production, and the employment terms of other 
(i.e., the majority of) employees. In some respects, therefore, the occupants of senior roles 
share interests with other types of employee (e.g., they both have an interest in continuing 
employment), whereas in others they may hold interests that are antagonistic with those of 
other employees (e.g., they may be rewarded on the basis of organizational performance, 
which under some circumstances can be improved by reorganization that entails job loss for 
others). Typologies of organizational governance, therefore, which specify ‘owners’, 
‘managers’, and ‘employees’ as actors participating in the game, enable the exploration of 
such tensions.
A simple model of the ways in which these three actors might interact in the arena of 
organizational governance can be found in Dore’s contrasting of the German or Japanese view 
of the enterprise as a community with the British or American view of it principally as private 
property (Dore 2000). This framework perceives that the structural relations among the three 
actors are the same under both approaches: managers sit atop workers within the 
organizational hierarchy, and shareholders sit separately from these two groups, outside the 
boundaries of the organization. However, what is different across countries is that in the 
Japanese/German paradigm managers and non-managerial workers are allied in the sphere of 
organizational governance, whereas in the British/American case managers are allied with 
shareholders. In the first instance, managers and workers perceive that their shared interests 
as employees should guide their choice of coalition partner in the organizational governance 
arena, while in the second managers perceive their interests to lie in being the agents to the 
owners’ principals, and align themselves accordingly. For Dore, this model serves as the 
basis for the explanation of systematic differences between the typical approaches adopted by 
British/American and Japanese/German firms in relation to such issues as the character of the 
employment relationship, work organization, human capital development, and so on. At root,
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though, these differences in outcomes can be traced back to differences in organizational 
governance arrangements.
In the same vein, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) and Jackson (2005) adopt a tripartite approach 
to understanding organizational governance arrangements, but formalize the model by 
defining the three actors through measurable key variables and mapping their patterns of 
interrelation onto distinct organizational coalition types, each of which has its own 
consequences for organizational behaviour and outcomes. Ultimately, their multivariate actor 
typologies can be collapsed into three different configurations of (interest) coalition at the 
level of the organization. First, an organization may be controlled by a class coalition, with 
capital and management joining to oppose labour. Second, the controlling coalition may be of 
insider-outsider format (or insider for short), with labour and management on the one side 
opposing capital on the other. These coalition types respectively correspond to Dore’s 
company law and enterprise-as-community models noted above. In addition, they identify the 
possibility that a third type of coalition may exist, in which labour and capital join to 
scrutinize and potentially oppose management. They label this third type an accountability 
coalition. This approach to defining and measuring organizational governance arrangements 
opens the door to their empirical identification and analysis using quantitative techniques.
If managers are members of the dominant organizational coalition in both the insider and 
class coalition scenarios, the question remains as to how differences in organizational 
governance arrangements might feed through into relative managerial pay, as they appear well 
placed to advance their interests under both sets of circumstances. A plausible answer to this 
question revolves around the principal-agent problem inherent in the relationship between 
external owners and managers (Prendergast 1999). Ultimately, external owners’ interests in a 
firm are limited to maximizing their financial return given a certain level of risk, as they are 
able to manage their overall risk exposure at the level of the portfolio. In contrast, managers, 
as employees, cannot diversify away from organization-specific risk. All else the same, 
therefore, owners will typically prefer that an organization pursue a riskier strategy than will 
managers. Furthermore, owners are not a daily presence in the life of managers, whereas non- 
managerial workers are. Making and implementing decisions that are in owners’ interests, but 
which arouse opposition from workers, is therefore potentially much more taxing and difficult 
than vice versa.
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Where external owners are not party to the ruling organizational coalition, these points are 
irrelevant, as managers and non-managerial workers will tend to guide strategic decisions in 
ways that reflect the risk preference emerging from their shared status as employees. Where 
owners wish to ally with managers and to ensure that managers pursue their interests, 
however, they must ensure that incentives are available to managers on sufficient scale to 
overcome their naturally greater risk aversion and to compensate for the increased difficulty 
of their jobs. In addition, the greater difficulty of implementing strategies that reflect owners’ 
interests may require a more encompassing managerial hierarchy, that is, more managers. 
Drawing these lines of reasoning together, they suggest that managerial pay -  and perhaps 
even the apparent demand for managers as indicated by the managerial share of the pay bill -  
will behave differently in class coalition-ruled organizations relative to insider coalition-ruled 
ones, commanding a premium that builds as the class coalition becomes entrenched over time. 
These conclusions apply not only to the senior executives responsible for strategic issues, but 
also to managers further down the hierarchy who are responsible for implementing decisions 
made at the top. Indeed, it may be argued that, for a class coalition to function effectively, all 
managers above first-level supervisors must receive some degree of relatively higher 
compensation than they would in an equivalent insider-coalition organization.
This reasoning suggests that there will be clear differences between the ways in which class- 
coalition organizations and insider-coalition organizations approach management pay -  i.e., 
principally, all else the same, it will be higher in the former context than in the latter. 
However, the clear distinction across groups (coalition types) does not preclude that there 
could also be within-group variation in the strength of the effect of the coalition type on 
management pay. Certainly, it is possible to imagine that where owners are more powerful or 
activist, they will pursue their interests within the organization with greater intensity. One 
outcome of more engaged ownership, therefore, is that managers will face greater 
organization-specific risk and more difficult working conditions, which will in turn 
necessitate rising remuneration in order to incentivize them to pursue the owners’ interests.
If organizational governance factors have contributed to the growth of top-tier pay inequality 
in Britain noted in the preceding chapter, this would imply that conditions have become more 
amenable to class coalitions, or at least that owners have assumed a more powerful position in 
relation to the other actors in organizations. A body of research suggests that a process of this 
kind may have been at work in Britain during the period in which top earnings have grown in
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relative value (i.e., since the late-1970s). At the aggregate level, for example, it is notable that 
the rise of the shareholder value movement -  which asserts the primacy of equity holder 
interests in corporate decision making -  in the UK coincided with a rise in the share of 
national income received by capital (Ryan 1996). Across countries at the firm level, it is 
found that labour receives a comparatively low share of surplus in UK and that firms pay out 
more in dividends in UK than Germany (De Jong 1995). As German firms are often 
portrayed as approximating more to the insider coalition model of organizational governance 
arrangements rather than to the class coalition model (Donnelly, Gamble et al. 2000; Jurgens, 
Naumann et al. 2000; Ziegler 2000), this indicates that the UK may harbour a relatively high 
share of class coalition firms in international terms. As a correlate to this fact, it is reported 
that in the UK the CEO-manufacturing worker pay ratio is much higher (25:1) than in 
Germany (13:1) or France (16:1), and that this ratio doubled between the mid-1980s and mid- 
1990s (Gospel and Pendleton 2005). If Britain does indeed possess a comparatively high 
share of class coalition firms, these statistics would support the argument that class coalitions 
are associated with higher relative managerial pay.
In summary, a clear argument can be made to support the assertion that organizational 
governance factors can influence top pay, and in particular the pay of senior managers. First 
of all, it can plausibly be asserted that, owing to the nature of political competition for 
resources within organizations, governance arrangements have a degree of influence of the 
distribution of returns among organizational constituents. A tripartite model -  encompassing 
owners, managers, and employees -  captures the bulk of this distributional conflict within the 
organization, and also recognizes the special status of managers within the organization, a 
point of great relevance for this chapter. Essentially, these three actors typically combine in 
two different ways -  either managers and employees ally with one another to form an insider 
coalition, or managers and owners ally with one another to form a class coalition. This 
distinction between insider and class coalitions is of crucial importance to management pay, 
as owners must ensure that managers are relatively better remunerated in a class coalition 
context in order to overcome the principal-agent problems inherent in the alliance. As a 
consequence, it might be expected that class coalitions will have a positive impact on relative 
managerial pay when compared to that prevailing under insider coalitions. A body of 
interrelated evidence indicates that class coalitions are well represented in the population of 
British organizations, and that owners may even have increased their level o f influence and 
activism within these coalitions in recent decades. The following section of the chapter builds
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on this argument to lay the foundations of an empirical test for the impact of organizational 
governance factors on relative top-tier pay outcomes.
Empirical strategy and hypotheses
The empirical content of the paper comprises two elements: first, the definition and 
classification of the organizational governance regimes observed in the data; and second, 
measuring the impact of these regimes upon organization-level labour demand patterns, and 
linking this back to the question of across-country differences in pay inequality trends. In the 
first case (governance regimes), I follow two paths. On the one hand, I operationalize 
Aguilera and Jackson’s (2003) model of variation in organizational governance structures, as 
it defines the tripartite framework (owners, managers, employees) identified above as most 
applicable to this chapter in measurable terms. I label the application of this framework to the 
data as my ‘structural’ approach to the classification of organizations’ governance 
arrangements, on account of its focus on the structure of stakeholder relationships. On the 
other hand, I draw on the literature to identify key variables that relate to processes of 
stakeholder interaction within the organization. I refer to this means of classifying 
governance as my ‘behavioural’ approach, given its focus on the ways in which the three key 
stakeholder groups treat one another. I use a dual approach to classifying governance regimes 
because the limitations of the data -  which I will discuss in more detail below -  mean that 
neither framework can be operationalized perfectly, and I believe I obtain more robust results 
by using the two approaches as cross-checks on one another.
I choose to approach the question of changing pay inequality by looking at labour demand
patterns. My principal reason for doing so is that the theoretical framework set out above
posits that organizational governance relates to the division of the surplus generated by the
organization as a whole. From the perspective of managers, this relates to the share of value
added that finds its way into their share of the wage bill. As relative wage bill share can be
interpreted as an indicator of relative demand, it seems natural to model the impact of
governance factors on pay inequality through the lens of labour demand. In order to quantify
the labour demand effect of these governance metrics, I use a model that applies to the data an
organization-level cost function in which the only variable inputs are different types (skill
90
groups) of labour. This method has two key advantages. First, it enables me directly to 
identify the impact of different organizational governance regimes on the profile of labour 
demand at the level of the organization, and thereby to make an informed judgment of their 
impact on pay inequality outcomes. Second, the modelling strategy has already been proven 
for the purposes of investigating labour demand patterns using (earlier versions of) the WERS 
and REPONSE data sets, as Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) engaged a similar approach in 
their study of the effect of organizational innovation on organization-level labour demand 
patterns.23
The starting point for the analysis is the assumption that organizations can be characterized by 
governance regimes, that is, as being controlled by either a class coalition or an insider 
coalition. Aguilera and Jackson’s (2003) framework, which I use as the basis of my structural 
analysis of governance regimes, also notes a third form of coalition -  one between non- 
managerial employees and owners, which they call ‘accountability’ coalitions. However, the 
framework presents this not as a normal state of affairs but as a response to crises such as 
managerial corruption or self-dealing. Because the theory expects this outcome to be both 
rare and unstable, I omit it from the current analysis and focus purely on class and insider 
coalitions.
The structural approach to defining dominant organizational coalitions therefore maps the 
observed relations among the three sets of core stakeholders onto the two possible coalition 
types. The first stakeholder, capital, is defined in the framework as varying along three key 
dimensions: first, its time horizon of investment, that is, whether it takes a financial or a 
strategic interest in the firm; second, the balance between commitment and liquidity in its 
stake, a distinction which echoes the notions of voice and exit; and third, its preference for 
exercise of control via either equity or debt, which captures something of the investor’s 
readiness to trade off risk and return. Broadly speaking, investors with a financial interest in 
the organization, a focus on liquidity, and a preference for equity control are most likely to 
seek to participate in a class coalition with management. This is because this type of investor 
essentially desires to treat the organization as a portfolio investment, and such investors 
manage risk by balancing their portfolio, rather than by controlling risk at the level of the 
individual investment. There follows the strong potential for a clash of interest with labour,
23 Or -  as they label it -  ‘skill-biased organizational change’.
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for labour’s (human-capital) investments are bound up in a single organization, and it cannot 
diversify away its risks. Management, however, whose members usually have the personal 
resources to hedge their own risk to some degree, can be persuaded that a high-risk/high- 
retum approach to running the organization is in its favour if it is rewarded accordingly. To 
the extent that owners are less intrusive or more long-termist in orientation, the likelihood is 
greater that an insider coalition will emerge.
The second organizational stakeholder -  labour, or non-managerial workers -  is also defined 
in the framework as varying according to three factors. These, in turn, are: strength of voice 
within the organization, as implied by firm-level representation rights; the patterns of inter- 
worker solidarity, as captured by the mode of union organization -  class or craft versus 
enterprise; and the relative importance of general and firm-based skill formation as an 
indicator of workers’ degree of attachment to a particular organization. Insider coalitions are 
most likely where labour has significant voice within the organization, where unions are 
present and organized on enterprise lines, and where skill-formation is based on the firm, as in 
this case labour will have made a large firm-specific human capital investment and will have 
the means to defend it. To the extent that labour has either less influence within the 
organization or a lower human capital stake in it, class coalitions become more likely.
The third stakeholder, management, is seen to vary in relation to two factors. First, 
management’s form is related to the variety of knowledge and decision making dominant in 
the organization -  with an approach combining general knowledge and hierarchical decision 
making being counterposed with another which pairs functional knowledge and a consensual 
approach to decision making. Second, management takes on different characteristics 
according to the nature of the managerial labour market as it is experienced at the level of the 
firm: the extent to which firm-level managerial labour markets are closed or open, or 
resemble internal or occupational labour markets. Class coalitions are most likely where 
management is of the general knowledge/hierarchical decision making type and managerial 
labour markets are open, as both features enable the running of an organization as a portfolio 
asset. The first factor, for example, allows the organization to function even where 
management must impose its decisions over the protest of other workers; and the second 
means that managers can effectively further hedge their own exposure to organizational risk, 
as there will always be other high-status jobs to take. To the extent that management is reliant 
on the cooperation of workers or is also making a firm-specific human capital investment,
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management’s interests will more closely coincide with those of labour and an insider 
coalition will be more likely.
By identifying the three stakeholder groups at work within an organization, and by describing 
the variation in the form of each of these in relation to a set of key factors, the framework 
produces a multivariate map that can be applied to the characterization of any given 
organization. However, as the ultimate intention behind the framework is that this 
multivariate map underpins, and can be collapsed down into, a bivariate distinction between 
class and insider coalitions, my approach to modelling must enable me both to capture the 
multivariate diversity among organizations, and then to translate this into bivariate form. In 
order to do this, I use the technique of cluster analysis, which analyses the proximity of 
observations in multivariate space and sequentially clusters them with their most similar 
counterparts. I identify the two coalition types by constraining the clustering process to 
continue to the point that there remain only two distinct groups of observations. With this, I 
am able to construct an indicator variable of structurally defined coalition type that can be 
used in the remainder of the analysis.
In addition to the structurally inspired cluster analysis of coalitions, I identify variables which 
constitute behavioural indicators of stakeholder interaction that suggest the presence of one 
coalition type or the other. I do this for two reasons: first, because the difficulties inherent in 
operationalizing the complex framework used in the structural version of the analysis (see 
discussion of data below for more details) make it wise to cross-check the structural results in 
some way; and second, because the comparability of the two surveys used means that an 
almost identical and appropriate question on inter-stakeholder behaviour appears in both.
This question asks management the degree of worker involvement in the implementation of 
the most important change in the workplace over the preceding few years (five in Britain, 
three in France). Where managers negotiated or consulted with workers over this change, I 
conclude that an insider coalition exists. Where no such negotiation or consultation took 
place, I infer that a class coalition exists. In the case of Britain alone, I supplement this 
derived variable with another, which is based on a question probing the extent to which 
management is accustomed to consult with workers over decision making within the 
workplace. Where management tends not to do so, I interpret this as evidence of the presence 
of a class coalition (and vice versa).
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The product of this behavioural approach -  labelled so in that it focuses on the observed 
behaviour of stakeholders in interaction rather than on their structural attributes -  is, as in the 
case of the structural approach, an indicator variable o f coalition types that can be used in the 
remainder of the analysis. The behavioural approach is inspired by two linked observations. 
The first, noted above in the discussion of the structural approach, is that insider coalitions are 
more likely to be the outcome where workers have voice and where consensual decision 
making is dominant: hence, evidence of the exercise of the former and the existence of the 
latter is to be taken as evidence that an insider coalition is at work. The second derives from 
the wider multi-stakeholder organizational governance literature that negotiation or the 
seeking of consensus between management and labour over strategic planning or 
implementation issues is much more typical of organizations based in the quintessential 
‘insider’ economies of Germany and Japan than of those based in the more classically market- 
orientated Britain or US (Gospel and Pendleton 2003; Jackson 2005).
As both the structural and behavioural approaches to the identification of coalition types are 
applied with the same aim in mind -  i.e., to produce an indicator variable of coalition type -  
the hypotheses about the impact of coalition type on the profile of labour demand are constant 
no matter which of the two variables is used in the performance of the analysis. Following 
the discussion in the preceding section of this chapter, the fundamental proposition to be 
tested is that class coalitions will be associated with relatively higher managerial pay than 
insider coalitions. Consequently, a class coalition will presumably seek to maximize the 
share of local value added that goes to owners and to managers, even where it is able to 
increase total value added (i.e., even if the pie is getting bigger, they will want a greater 
proportionate slice of it). All else the same, this means reducing the non-managerial share of 
the organizational wage bill. Similarly, as in an insider coalition there is not the same clear 
distinction between managers and non-managers as regards the treatment of pay, I expect that 
non-managerial workers will benefit in relative terms from the presence of an insider coalition 
(rather than a class coalition). I explore this idea by measuring the wage bill share of a key 
set of non-managerial workers -  the occupational group which is largest in the organization in 
the first time period recorded by the surveys.
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This basic framework may be translated into the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 — the presence o f a class coalition will be associated with an increase in the 
managerial share o f the wage bill (or employment); and
Hypothesis 2 — the presence o f an insider coalition will be associated with an increase in the 
wage bill (or employment) share o f the largest non-managerial occupational group.
Ultimately, these hypotheses regard the profile of labour demand in the organization. In the 
first case, it is suggested that class coalitions will be associated with apparently rising 
organization-level demand for managerial skills; and in the second, that insider coalitions will 
be associated with apparently relatively equal demand for all skill groups in the organization. 
The first hypothesis, therefore, implies that a preponderance of class coalitions will provide 
the necessary underlying conditions for the kind of top tier-biased shifts in pay inequality 
witnessed to varying degrees in Britain and France in recent years. The second, though, 
indicates that where insider coalitions predominate, there will be little (coalition-related) 
change in the distribution of pay.
In order to provide a point of reference for my discussion of the impact of organizational 
coalitions on organizational patterns of labour demand, I also test the conventional SBTC 
hypothesis on the data. This test -  as per the standard SBTC hypothesis -  assumes that 
technological change in our era is deterministically biased towards the highly skilled, i.e., it is 
by its nature complementary with their skills. If this hypothesis is to hold, technical change 
(relating to capital equipment or the organization of production) at the level of the 
organization should have a visible impact on labour demand patterns at the same level.
Hence, my test concerns whether the mere implementation of technical or organizational 
change in the period preceding the panel is associated with an increase in demand for skilled 
labour of all kinds (and not just the portion of skilled labour in managerial positions), or:
Hypothesis 3 — technical change in the preceding period will be associated with an increase 
in the wage bill (or employment) share o f highly skilled workers in the subsequent period.
If this relationship were confirmed by the data, it would serve as a strong piece of evidence 
that the influence of coalition type on labour demand were minimal, rendered negligible by
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the overriding imperatives of technological change and market pressures. However, if this 
relationship were not visible in the data, it would provide buttressing evidence that the politics 
of implementation were potentially of great importance in the shaping of organizational 
patterns of labour demand.
The empirical test of labour demand effects used in this chapter uses a model that links 
organizational governance regimes and labour demand outcomes at the organization level.
The framework for testing these ideas is an organization-level cost function in which the only 
variable inputs are different types (occupational and skill groups) of labour. From this basis, 
cost share equations can be derived for each group, and these are operationalized in long- 
differenced form to strip out the correlated fixed effects of unobserved heterogeneity such as 
management quality. The resultant wage bill share equations are o f the form
ASfu — PpGCu-i + PpcAlnKit +  PffAlnYn +  a.2 X/w +  7i INDj +  y2 REGk +  Uflt,
where S  denotes the wage bill share of the workforce, with occupational/skill groups defined 
by f  establishments by i, time period by t, industry by j ,  and region by k. GC is a dummy 
variable for governance coalition type (measured in the initial time period). AT is a measure of 
physical capital, and Y of value added, while x is a vector of establishment characteristics.
IND  and REG  are, respectively, industry and region dummy variables. In this form, the 
equation permits a test of the impact of coalition type on the change in an occupational/skill 
group’s share of the workforce in a subsequent time period, which is interpreted as an 
indicator of the evolution of the organization’s labour demand profile. Owing to the absence 
of good information on capital stocks and output in the data sets used here, I assume that these 
can be adequately proxied by industry dummies and data on total employment respectively.
Before proceeding to the results on the analyses, it is necessary to clarify two points in 
relation to the modelling procedure. The first o f these regards the model’s use of a time- 
specific attribute -  i.e., the type of governing coalition in place in the first time period of the 
panel -  to explain change (in labour demand patterns) over the course of the panel. To some 
extent, this is an unconventional use of panel data, as models of this variety are often 
structured such that change occurring during one period of time is seen to explain change 
occurring during a subsequent period of time (i.e., it is posited that change causes change). 
However, I argue that the difference between this and my use of a time-specific attribute to
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explain change is justified by the reasoning underlying the model. As I hypothesize that the 
two types of controlling coalition provide different environments for the determination of 
managerial and non-managerial pay respectively, I expect these to change in systematically 
different ways over time depending on the underlying coalition type, and for this change to be 
reflected in relative labour demand outcomes.
The second point for clarification pertains to the level of observation used in the model. 
Owing to the nature of the surveys I use, this level of observation is that of the establishment. 
However, the model -  being a derivation of a production function -  effectively presupposes 
the use of firm-level data. Evidently, this is not an ideal state of affairs, but I contend that it is 
it is still possible to produce useful results from this set-up. I make this contention for two 
reasons. First, each of the data sets has a significant share of single-establishment firms, for 
which the establishment-level and firm-level perspectives are identical: establishments 
belonging to single-establishment firms represent 39% of the weighted WERS sample and 
47% of the weighted REPONSE sample. This means that for a large share of each sample the 
form of the model is entirely appropriate to the data. Second, while it must be recognized that 
establishment-level outcomes will vary within a multi-establishment firm, the average 
establishment-level outcome within such a firm will be equivalent to the firm-level outcome 
itself. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the establishments in either -  French or 
British -  sample suffer any kind of selection bias vis-a-vis their parent firms. Consequently, 
it follows that, among the establishments belonging to multi-establishment firms, the 
establishment data employed in the analyses will on average be representative of the 
(underlying) unobserved firm-level data -  although it will be less statistically precise. All the 
same, it remains possible to draw robust inferences from model even where it applies to the 
data relating to establishments belonging to multi-establishment firms.
These clarifications close my discussion of my empirical strategy and hypotheses. In the 
subsequent section of the paper, I present the data I use in testing these hypotheses and 
provide detail on the operationalization of the variables that capture labour demand patterns 
(independent variable) and organizational coalition types (explanatory variable). It is to this 
subject that I now turn.
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Data description
The primary data sets used in this analysis are the 1998-2004 two-period panel element of the 
British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) and a comparable version of the 
French Enquete sur les Relations Professionnelles et Negotiations d’Entreprise (REPONSE). 
Both surveys are conducted at the establishment level, and comprise large-scale samples 
which are representative of a population corresponding to a large proportion of all 
establishments in each country (see Table 1). The sample common to the two surveys is 
composed of establishments in the private sector with 20 or more employees in industrial 
sectors NACE D -0 (roughly corresponding to manufacturing and private-sector services). 
There is a high degree of comparability across the surveys as regards the types of questions 
posed and the richness of the resultant data sets.
As the preceding section shows, the key variables for the analysis include the following: 
details of the establishment workforce size and its breakdown by skill group; a set of largely 
structural establishment characteristics; and industry and region dummies. While a number of 
variables explore questions of change in the period 1998-2004, the majority of them relate to 
static, structural establishment characteristics, and are sourced from the first period’s data in 
order to be in alignment with the explanatory variable of coalition type. These characteristics 
are chiefly the control variables, and serve to filter out variation in size, production type, 
market environment, etc.
There are two dependent variables which are used in the course of the analysis: first, a 
measure of the long-differenced change in the log share of establishment employment for the 
skill group in question; and second, a similar variable that records the change in the log wage 
bill share of the group. The skill groups of interest are managers on the one hand, and all 
high-skill workers on the other. These groups are defined at the 1-digit level by the relevant 
national occupational classification -  the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC 
1990/2000) in Britain, and the Professions et Categories Socioprofessionnelles (PCS) in 
France. Owing to the differing structures of the two systems of classification, it is not 
possible to harmonize the skill share variables across countries. All the same, it is possible to 
identify the groups of employees whose work primarily consists of directing and monitoring
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the work of others (managers and cadres), and the groups of employees in which are 
concentrated the highest levels of educational qualifications.
In the British case, the managerial group is defined by SOC major group 1, ‘managers and 
senior officials’, and the high skill group corresponds to SOC major groups 1-3, which 
encompass said managers, ‘professional occupations’, and ‘associate professional and 
technical occupations’. Labour Force Survey (LFS) data show that, in 1998, this definition of 
highly skilled workers includes 14% of the 16% of British employees in employment who 
hold a first degree or higher educational qualification. This statistic can be broken down in 
the following manner: 40% of managers (SOC1), 80% of professionals (SOC2), and 52% of 
associate professional and technical workers (SOC3) hold such a qualification. For France, 
the managerial group is represented by PCS 3, ‘cadres et professions intellectuelles 
superieures’, and the high skill share by the managers in combination with PCS 2, ‘artisans, 
commer5ants et chefs d'entreprise’, and PCS 4, ‘professions intermediaires’. In 1998,
Enquete Emploi (the French equivalent of the LFS) data show that 12% of employees in 
employment held a first degree or higher educational qualification. The high-skill group as 
defined by the PCS classification contains about nearly 10% of these 12% of employees with 
higher educational qualifications. Broken down by the ISCO classification -  which is highly 
comparable to the British SOC classification -  these data show that 31% of managers, 59% of 
professionals, and 10% of associate professional and technical workers hold a first degree or 
higher qualification. In the cases of both Britain and France, therefore, the occupationally- 
derived definition of the group of ‘highly skilled workers’ is an effective proxy for one 
defined directly by observation of highest educational qualifications.
As an indicator of labour demand, changes in employment shares are imperfect. They capture 
only unit quantities and omit information on unit prices, with the consequence that they fail to 
control for changes in the (supply) structure of the labour markets with which the organization 
interacts. For this reason, I calculate a measure of changes in the wage bill shares of skill 
groups and use this to profile labour demand at the level of the establishment. In the absence 
of establishment-level wage data, I compute this variable by weighting establishment 
employment shares by group mean wages calculated for the relevant years at the level of the 
1-digit industry by 1-digit region cell.
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I calculate dependent variables -  changes in wage bill share -  for three different employee 
groups. These three variables correspond to the three different hypotheses presented above. 
The first -  managerial wage bill share -  is used to probe the possible impact of a class 
coalition on the profile of organizational labour demand. The second -  the wage bill share of 
the largest non-managerial occupational group -  is used to test for the possible impact of an 
insider coalition on the profile of labour demand. The third dependent variable -  the wage 
bill share of the group of high-skill workers -  is used to test for the impact of simple SBTC on 
the profile of labour demand at the level of the organization, which serves as a kind of cross­
check for the broader investigation of the possible influence of governing coalition type.
Turning to the governance variables, I first attempt to operationalize the Aguilera and Jackson 
(2003), or structural, approach described above. This model demands a great deal from the 
data set, and in some respects stretches the surveys used here to their limits. Still, I am able to 
find reasonable -  if not perfect -  proxies in most cases in which the surveys do not collect the 
precise information required.
With regard to the capital variables in the Aguilera and Jackson framework, both surveys 
report the basic ownership structure of establishments. Thus, I am able to capture something 
of the dimensions of investment time horizon and relative investor commitment by reference 
to whether an organization is a privately held or publicly quoted company. Here I assume that 
publicly quoted organizations have the more short-term and liquidity-conscious investors, 
whereas the others are more closely held and are likely to have more strategic and committed 
owners. In addition, I use a measure of the emphasis the organization places on the issue of 
production quality as a proxy for the presence of strategically minded owners with a long­
term mindset. This choice is influenced by the widespread argument that such owners are a 
prerequisite of quality-based competitive strategies (Streeck 1997; Hall and Soskice 2001a). 
Unfortunately, neither survey offers any variable that could cast light on the issue of debt or 
equity exercise of control. Consequently, I omit this variable from the model and assume that 
the other two capital variables characterize the ownership profile of the organization 
sufficiently (on the grounds that I expect these different dimensions of capital to co-vary in 
any case, e.g., the ‘insider’ model in capital is thought typically to consist of long investment 
horizons, concentrated ownership, and a preference for debt financing (Gospel and Pendleton 
2003)).
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Regarding the labour element of the framework, I capture worker strength of voice within the 
organization through a variable that records the presence or absence of strong local 
representative institutions: in Britain a strong consultative committee and in France a comite 
d ’etablissement/entreprise. The pattern of inter-worker solidarity is represented through a 
measure of the extent of union density at the level of the establishment. A further 
consideration is the dominant mode of skill acquisition. This issue is assessed through a 
measure of training intensity at the workplace, with high training intensity interpreted as a 
greater commitment to the intra-organizational production of skills.
In the third and final element of the framework, I map differing management orientations by 
means of three variables. First, the decision making culture of the organization is evaluated 
through a dummy variable for the existence of performance-related pay schemes for 
management. In France, this variable is specified more precisely as capturing the absence or 
presence of stock-based compensation for managers on the grounds that this type of pay 
vehicle is most likely to align fully the interests of managers with those of owners (outsiders). 
Further, a metric of the intensity of information sharing by management with non-managerial 
workers (around such issues as investment and staffing plans and organizational performance) 
is used to proxy the degree to which management makes decisions without involving workers. 
Where the information sharing measure is high, it can be assumed that management is 
consensual -  or insider-leaning -  in its approach. It is assumed that variable pay is correlated 
with individualistic, non-consensual decision making. As for the question of the relative 
openness of managerial labour markets, this is proxied (somewhat imperfectly) by the overall 
rate of turnover in the organization.
In my second take on the question of organizational governance, I operationalize the 
behavioural versions of this variable. This process is less complex -  and poses fewer 
challenges -  than did that for their structural equivalents. In both data sets, there exists a 
survey question which probes worker involvement -  during the period immediately preceding 
the survey -  in deciding how workplace change should be implemented. I derive a dummy 
variable from this question and use it as the key behavioural indicator of governance type: 
where worker involvement is high, I treat this as evidence of an insider coalition, and vice 
versa. In the British case -  where the survey asks a wider range of questions on this subject -  
this variable is supplemented by another that records whether management is amenable to 
involving workers in general decision making in the establishment.
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The other groups of variables used in the analysis comprise on the one hand a set of indicators 
of recent organizational and technological change, and on the other the set of establishment 
characteristics used as controls. The change variables are essentially identical for the two 
countries in all but the length of the period preceding the survey to which they relate: three 
years in France and five years in Britain. Both surveys simply ask whether significant 
changes have occurred in the organization of work and whether new technologies have been 
introduced at the establishment. The simple set of control variables encompasses 1-digit 
occupational shares of establishment employment, 1-digit dummies for industry and region, 
and a measure of the change in overall employment at the establishment. In addition to these 
characteristics, the complex set of controls includes dummies for above-average financial 
performance, lagged total establishment employment, enterprise total employment, and 
domestic ownership (as opposed to foreign ownership).
Having begun the implementation my empirical strategy by operationalizing the necessary 
variables from the data provided by the WERS and REPONSE surveys, I next proceed to the 
stages of identifying organizational coalitions and of modelling the impact of these coalitions 
on the organizational profile of labour demand. The section which follows presents the 
results of these stages of the analysis.
Results
This section of the paper presents the results of the two elements of the empirical analysis 
proposed above. First, I define and compare the different distributions of organizational 
governance regimes observed in the data for the two countries. In order to do this, I discuss 
the derivation of the structural governance variables, and the relationships between them and 
their behavioural equivalents. I round out this stage of the analysis by identifying the main 
inter- and intra-country features that emerge in relation to the study of governance regimes or 
types. Second, I turn to the question of measuring the impact of these governance regimes 
upon organization-level labour demand patterns. Having presented results for the regression 
models that perform this test for each country, I close this section of the paper by considering
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the importance of my findings on labour demand patterns for the explanation of recent top-tier 
pay inequality trends observed in Britain and France.
I take my initial step in defining organizational governance types by applying the Aguilera 
and Jackson framework -  i.e., my structural approach to the definition of these types -  to the 
data. As outlined above, my method here is to operationalize the variables describing the key 
features of capital, labour, and management in each organization, and then to feed these 
variables into a cluster analysis in order to classify organizations as cases of either class or 
insider coalitions. However, before proceeding with the cluster analysis, I examine the 
bivariate relations among its constituent variables by producing the relevant correlation matrix 
(Tables 2 and 3). This step serves as a means of sense-checking the input data in the light of 
the overall framework.
Reassuringly, the matrices for both countries indicate that these relations are mostly in the 
expected direction and significant within the three stakeholder groups that make up the 
framework (diagonal lines represents capital variables, vertical lines labour, and horizontal 
lines management). Thus, for example, high local worker solidarity is positively and (mostly) 
significantly correlated with intra-organizational worker voice mechanisms and skill 
production. While it is surprising that, in Britain, PLC status correlates positively and 
significantly with a strong quality focus -  the proxy for committed, strategic ownership -  this 
may be picking up on the fact that non-PLC firms in Britain are also exposed to short-horizon 
financing pressures owing to the transactional, short-term approach of business banks in that 
country. Thus, the assumption -  common in the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ literature -  that the 
alternative to transactional, liquidity-focused capital markets takes the form of long-term, 
relational banking may not always be appropriate. In Britain, therefore, size -  which 
correlates with PLC status -  may be the least-worst means for a firm of insulating itself from 
external financing pressures to enable the pursuit of a quality-focused strategy.
In both countries, the labour-related variables all interrelate as expected. However, the 
managerial variables conform less to predictions, particularly as in both places managerial 
variable pay is positively and significantly associated with information sharing. This suggests 
that the latter variable may not pick up the intended dimension of consensual decision 
making, and may instead capture something akin to the degree to which information flows 
within the organization are confined to the managerial hierarchy, that is, the extent to which
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the hierarchy monopolizes information and decision making relative to the wider workforce. 
Collectively, these results indicate that the operationalization of the Aguilera-Jackson 
variables is successful, as its outcomes conform to the expectations created by the framework.
Having conducted this sense check, I move on to perform the cluster analysis that will 
produce the structurally based classification of organizational governance types. For each 
country, the cluster analysis of the structural governance variables is constrained to stop once 
it arrives at two separate clusters. This rule is intended to translate the multivariate array of 
the structural framework into the bivariate system of coalition outcomes -  i.e., class or 
insider. In both country cases, in any case, it is found that the clusters are most distinct when 
grouped at this level, as indicated by the fact that the standard measure of fit -  the Calinski & 
Harabasz pseudo-F index -  is highest at this level of clustering. The result therefore supports 
the theory’s emphasis that there are two key forms of organizational governance regime.
The output of the cluster analyses shows that while both data sets yield unequally sized 
clusters at this level, they are more equally sized in France than in Britain. However, it 
remains to identify the resultant clusters as either class or insider coalitions. In order to do so, 
for each country’s data I look at the differences between the means (or proportions) across the 
two clusters of the variables used in the cluster analysis (Tables 4 and 5). It is immediately 
apparent that -  for both countries -  there is a cluster that is characterized by a high quality 
focus, higher local worker solidarity and more widespread intra-organizational worker voice 
mechanisms, higher internal skill production, broader information sharing, and lower 
turnover. In the terms of the Aguilera-Jackson framework, therefore, this cluster can be 
identified as being composed of insider-coalition firms. In addition, the differences across the 
clusters are largely significant at relatively high levels, indicating that the conceptual 
distinction between class and insider coalitions is reflected in the real data. Interestingly, 
having apportioned the observations between the two categories, a significant disparity across 
countries is apparent: in Britain, the share of insider-coalition organizations is dwarfed by 
that of class coalitions, as it stands at only 17% of the weighted sample of establishments; yet 
in France the share of insider coalitions stands in the clear majority at a 56%.
A minority of variables does not conform entirely to the expectations of the framework. First, 
it appears in both countries’ data that a liquid and short-term ownership orientation -  as 
proxied by publicly quoted or PLC status -  is more widespread among firms identified by the
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insider coalition indicator than among class-coalition organizations. Second, in France, 
managerial variable pay is more widespread among insider coalitions than among class 
coalitions. The PLC variable result is particularly surprising because the Aguilera-Jackson 
model implies that strategic and committed capital is a condition of insider coalitions. 
However, one possible lens of interpretation for these observations might be Berle and 
Means’s (1932) prediction that the separation of ownership and control in the publicly quoted 
company, and the dispersion of ownership created by the trading of equity on secondary 
markets, reduce owners’ ability to monitor and sanction managers, and thus grant 
management room for manoeuvre to build insider coalitions. In any case, the quirk of this 
result is in the minority, and so I conclude that it is more likely to reflect (known) challenges 
for the operationalization of this variable than some critical failure of the conceptual 
framework for the structurally based classification of governance types.
Having constructed the structural coalition variables, the next step is to perform the cross­
check of comparing them to their behavioural equivalents. One variable of this latter type is 
available for both countries’ data -  an indicator for worker involvement in deciding the 
implementation of workplace change, which I treat as analogous to the structurally derived 
‘insider coalition’ variable. This variable conforms to expectations in that it is negatively and 
significantly correlated with the (structural) class coalition variable, i.e., it is positively 
correlated with insider coalitions (Tables 6 and 7). Further, while the share of organizations 
falling into this behavioural category is smaller than its structural equivalent in both countries, 
the across-country pattern is consistent with that observed in the case of the structurally 
derived governance variable — i.e., that insider coalitions are relatively more common in 
France than in Britain (Table 8). The second behavioural variable for Britain -  which 
indicates cases where management tends not to consult with workers on decisions -  is 
intended as a parallel to the structurally derived ‘class coalition’ indicator. It is aligned by 
sign and significantly associated with the other two governance variables for Britain (Table 
6), which further bolsters the case for the collective robustness of the variables.
Overall, then, while the association between the two types of governance variable (structural 
and behavioural) is not total, it generally conforms to expectations and is for the most part 
strongly statistically significant. Thus, it seems that the two types of variable are largely 
picking up the same dimension of variation among organizations, strengthening the case for 
the use of the conceptual tool of ‘coalitions’. Consequently, I conclude that both the
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structurally and behaviourally based variables identifying class and insider coalitions are 
sufficiently robust to support the next stage of the analysis, that is, the modelling of the 
impact of governance types upon the profile of labour demand. Further, these different 
variables all point to the same set of conclusions as regards the key intra- and inter-country 
features of the distribution of governance types. In sum, it seems that insider coalitions -  
however designated -  constitute a small minority of organizations in Britain, but a rather 
larger share of them in France.
Having explored the distribution of governance types among firms in the two countries, I now 
move forward to assess their impact on the profile of organization-level labour demand. I do 
this by plugging the structural and behavioural governance type variables in turn into the 
regression model set out above. The background to the analysis is presented in Table 4, 
which shows summary statistics for the various indicators of the profile of labour demand 
(i.e., the dependent variable in the model). Essentially, there are two different types of 
indicator -  on the one hand growth in the employment share, and on the other growth in the 
wage bill share -  and these are broken down for a number of different occupational groups of 
employees (managers, skilled workers, and the largest non-managerial group of employees in 
the establishment). The results are weighted in order to be representative of the appropriate 
slice of the overall establishment population.
Looking first at the employment growth statistics, it is apparent that mean growth in 
establishment employment is positive in both countries during the period 1998-2004, although 
it is considerably stronger in France even accounting for the large standard error on the British 
estimate. This result is consistent with LFS and EE data for the same period. However, this 
headline observation conceals a considerable amount of variation by occupational group. For 
example, in both countries the mean managerial share of the workforce shrinks over this 
duration, which is an unexpected result in a time of overall employment growth and technical 
change alleged to strengthen the position of skilled worker groups relative to that of unskilled 
workers. In contrast -  although more reassuringly -  the mean establishment employment 
share of skilled workers (which group encompasses managers, professionals, and technical 
and associate professional workers) rises strongly in France and remains more-or-less steady 
in Britain. This result suggests that demand for professionals and technical/associate 
professionals has perhaps outstripped that for managers. As for the fortunes of the largest 
non-managerial occupational group at the level of the individual organization, the trend is
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strongly negative in Britain and France, although of a lesser magnitude in France. A possible 
contributing factor to this trend, though, is mean reversion: the group that is largest in one 
period drops back relative to others in the next.
Broadly speaking, the wage bill share results for both countries largely conform to the results 
obtained for employment shares, although the magnitudes of change in this dimension are 
generally a little lower. This result suggests that the movement of wages for these groups has 
countered to some (small) extent the shifts in employment quantities. As per the employment 
growth statistics, the one unexpected finding is that the managerial wage bill share appears to 
have diminished in both countries over the period in question. Certainly, this result appears 
puzzling in the light of the finding of the preceding chapter that in recent years managers have 
done rather well in Britain and France -  in terms of both employment and relative wage 
growth.
However, there are two factors that can account for a discrepancy of this form. First, the two 
chapters rely on different occupational classifications: whereas the preceding chapter can 
identify occupation at the 2- or 3-digit ISCO or SOC level, the data used in this paper is 
limited to 1-digit occupational information. In addition, the PCS classification used for 
France in this paper maps imperfectly onto the ISCO-type classifications used elsewhere. As 
a result, the data analysed in this chapter tend to strip out some of the detail -  relating, say, to 
the varying fortunes of different types of managers -  that the preceding chapter was able to 
probe.
Second, the data sets used in this paper consist of considerably smaller sample sizes than 
those found in the NES, DADS, LFS, and EE. Consequently, there is an attendant greater risk 
of error owing to outliers, etc., with WERS and REPONSE (especially in the case of the 
British data). Indeed, while it is impossible to compute weighted medians of the data, study 
of the unweighted data (the means of which do not differ greatly from those of the weighted 
data) indicates that median managerial employment and wage bill share growth is slightly 
positive for both Britain and France. This suggests that labour demand at the level of the 
typical establishment might in fact be biased towards the broad group of managers, once the 
impact of outliers is screened out.
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On the whole, therefore, while direct comparison between the findings generated in the 
current analysis and those of the preceding chapter is somewhat problematic, a joint view of 
the two sets of results suggest the likelihood that lower-status (supervisory and middle) 
managers have been squeezed to some extent in both countries in recent years. This is not 
inconsistent with the organizational governance perspective, as these types of manager are not 
part of the strategic core of the hierarchy that composes the collective actor of ‘management’ 
(i.e., senior managers and executives). Nor is it inconsistent with an SBTC-inflected 
interpretation: high skills are embodied in senior managers, not in supervisors -  hence any 
complementarity with technological progress that might positively influence labour demand 
will apply to the former group but not to the latter.
Having assessed the data underlying the differing forms of the dependent variable, I next 
probe the impact of coalition types on the organizational profile of labour demand. This step 
involves the application of the dependent variables and the coalition variables described 
above to the regression model set out previously. While I test both forms of the dependent 
variable -  employment shares and wage bill shares -  there is little difference between the 
results obtained. As I prefer the wage bill share variable on conceptual grounds -  i.e., that it 
is a better indicator of labour demand than the employment share variable, as it captures 
change in both quantities and prices - 1 present results here only for this form of dependent 
variable.
The resulting wage bill share regression results are reported in Tables 10 and 11 (Britain and 
France respectively). These tables display the coefficients of interest for three different 
groups of models. First, the simplest form of the model regresses the dependent variable on 
only the change in establishment employment and regional and industry dummies. This 
version of the model is intended to probe for general trends in the data prior to consideration 
of the key hypotheses of this chapter. Second is a form of the model that tests this chapter’s 
third hypothesis -  i.e., that patterns of organizational labour demand can be explained by 
simple SBTC factors. Consequently, this model tests for the impact of lagged organizational 
and technological change on the dependent variable. Third, I test hypotheses one and two of 
this chapter using both the structural and behavioural coalition indicators. To provide the 
fullest picture possible, I report regression results for three versions of the dependent variable 
-  changes in managerial, high-skill, and largest non-managerial occupational wage bill shares
108
-  for all three forms of model described here, and applying both simple and complex sets of 
control variables (i.e., the other establishment characteristics of interest).
To begin, the simplest model shows only that in Britain the managerial share of the wage bill 
drops as overall establishment employment rises. This suggests that where establishments 
grow in Britain during this period, they do so through the addition of non-managerial workers, 
at least in the short to medium term. The parallel French results are all insignificant.
The test of hypothesis number three produces some interesting results. Strikingly, the impact 
of organizational change is such that it appears not to support the simple SBTC hypothesis. 
Further, the results are rather different to those derived by Caroli and Van Reenen using 
1990s data (Caroli and Van Reenen 2001). Whereas they found that organizational change 
(specifically, decentralization and delayering) tended to lead to an increase in the wage bill 
share of skilled workers relative to their unskilled counterparts, I am unable to find similar 
evidence. On the contrary, my results for Britain are strongly negative and significant, 
implying that, in the period of my analysis, this type of change is implemented in ways that 
contradict Caroli and Van Reenen’s predictions. None of the relevant French results are 
significant. Nor are any results for the impact of a technological change variable (not shown 
in the table for this reason). For my purposes, these findings tend to reject hypothesis number 
three, and support my contention that organizational and technical change are not essentially 
skill-biased, but that their impact is instead influenced by the context in which they are 
implemented.
Turning to consider hypotheses one and two, it is necessary to focus on the impact of the 
governance variables in the different forms of the model. It is immediately apparent that there 
are no consistent patterns across the two countries in this regard. However, this is not to say 
that evidence in support of the hypotheses is lacking. In relation to the first hypothesis -  that 
class coalitions will see rising relative managerial shares of the wage bill -  the British data 
show support in that the behavioural indicator of class coalitions is positively and 
significantly associated with this outcome. However, this result stands somewhat alone, as 
the structural and other behavioural indicator are both insignificant in this regard. The French 
data also provide no support for this hypothesis. On the contrary, the coefficients on these 
variables for France, while weakly significant, are of the opposite sign to those expected. 
Indeed, the French results suggest that the managerial share of the wage bill is positively
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impacted by insider coalitions and negatively impacted by class coalitions!24 This is a 
puzzling result, being the opposite of the prediction. What, then, to make of this? A possible 
response may be built on the observation that the occupational categories available in the data 
-  in France, cadres, techniciens, employes, and ouvriers -  are much broader than would be 
ideal. In particular, the management category (here, cadres) casts its net rather wider than the 
strategic management team that is the assumed meaning of ‘management’ in the 
organizational governance literature. Thus, the French result that class coalitions are 
associated with shrinking management and core non-managerial workforce shares may simply 
be picking up the shedding of non-strategic middle and supervisory managers as part of 
strategic management’s attempts to rein in the share of wages in total value added. On die 
whole, though, while there is solid evidence from Britain that class coalitions bias the profile 
of organizational labour demand towards managers, the evidence from France is weak and 
even contradictory.
On the subject of the second hypothesis -  that insider coalitions will tend to be associated 
with a rising wage bill share for the largest non-managerial occupational group -  neither the 
British nor the French data offer supportive results. In fact, there is not a single statistically 
significant result for any type of governance type variable in either country -  whether in 
support or denial of the hypothesis. Interestingly, however, the expected result emerges 
strongly in Britain in relation to the group of highly skilled workers, rather than the largest 
non-managerial group specified in the hypothesis. While this is not the predicted result, it can 
perhaps be explained by reference to cross-tabulations which show that the workplaces in 
which this coalition variable is positive have on average a much more highly skilled 
workforce than those in which it is negative. In these cases, therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that the skills of non-managerial workers in general are central to their employers’ 
competitive strategy, which would endow them with greater power to insert their collective 
interests into organizational decision making, e.g., around hiring. Taking this into account, it 
seems that insider coalitions might, at least in Britain, have the predicted positive impact on 
the wage bill share of core non-managerial workers where those workers are sufficiently 
highly skilled to give them real voice within their coalition. This result also suggests that the 
largest occupational group variable is insufficiently sensitive to pick this up this type of
24 It should be noted that, for the structural coalition indicator, a significant result emerges for France only once 
the sample has been restricted to firms in which strategic change of some kind has actually occurred in the 
previous few years.
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influence. All the same, the evidence that insider coalitions skew the profile of organizational 
labour demand towards non-managerial workers is weak, even if it is not non-existent.
On balance, the results generated by the model provide some -  but not overwhelming -  
evidence in support of hypotheses one and two. This outcome indicates that while the 
question of organizational governance types may have some impact on labour demand 
patterns, this impact is of a limited nature. Moreover, it seems that the predictions of the 
framework are rather more effectively borne out by the British data than the French. This 
may be linked to the fact that in Britain insider coalitions are in the small minority, whereas 
they appear to stand in the majority in France. Thus, while in Britain they are in some sense 
abnormal and stand out clearly from the mass of other organizations, in France they perhaps 
represent the norm from which other organizations must struggle to distinguish themselves. 
For this reason, the behaviour of insider-coalition firms will be that much more distinctive 
and identifiable in Britain than in France, with the outcome that the distinction between 
insider and class coalitions is more likely to produce identifiable results in the former 
location.
If there is limited evidence that organizational governance factors affect labour demand 
patterns -  especially in Britain -  what implications does this influence have for the debate 
about changes in the distribution of pay in recent years? As a first point, it was suggested 
above that the process imagined in hypothesis one -  of class coalitions’ relative inflation of 
managerial wages and employment -  might provide a possible contributory explanation for 
the recent trend in Britain and France for rising top-tier pay inequality. If this were to be true, 
one likely condition would be that the share of class coalitions among all organizations would 
also have to be rising over time -  i.e., more class coalitions leads to growing overall pay 
inequality. Table 12 reports relevant data on the trends in the distribution of governance types 
in the two countries. Certainly, it is apparent that both countries have shifted towards the 
greater predominance of class coalitions, and the rate and magnitude of change seem greater 
in Britain, which would be consistent with the observation of a more rapid expansion of top- 
tier pay inequality in that country. There are caveats, however: this conclusion is built on a 
limited foundation of data, as the ‘structural’ coalition variables cannot be calculated over 
time for either country owing to shifting survey formats over time; and ‘behavioural’ data are 
limited in their availability for France (none for 1992). All the same, the limited information 
available indicates that where class coalitions are associated with a bias in labour demand
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towards the managerial group (i.e., Britain), the apparently rising share of class coalitions 
among organizations may be contributing towards increasing top-tier pay inequality.
Further supporting evidence that this is the case emerges from the results presented in Table 
13, which summarizes the output of logit regressions of the different governance type 
variables on a set of establishment characteristics. It emerges from this exercise that insider 
coalitions are negatively and significantly associated with the sectors of financial services and 
business services in both Britain and France. This is an interesting result in that the preceding 
chapter found that these sectors were the primary source of increasing top-tier pay inequality 
in the two countries. Therefore, that class coalitions are most preponderant in these parts of 
the economy suggests further that governance type, through its (limited) impact on patterns of 
organizational labour demand, has a degree of contributory influence over pay inequality 
outcomes.25
As a final comment, there appear to be significant differences in strategic approach between 
insider and class coalition firms. Certainly, it is notable that insider-coalition firms are more 
likely in both countries to effect workplace change. The meaning of this observation is not 
entirely clear, but there are signs that the types of change implicated are those associated with 
economic dynamism (technological change and introduction of new products or services) 
and/or movement up the value chain (reorganization, flexibilization, and new pay systems).
In addition, it is striking that there is no significant association between financial performance 
and coalition type in either country, as one might expect that the priorities of a class coalition 
will make it more likely to achieve relatively high financial performance. However, in the 
light of the preceding comment this is not necessarily a counter-intuitive result. While insider 
coalitions may divert rents away from owners towards insiders, their more aggressive 
implementation of change and introduction of productivity-enhancing practices may also 
create bigger surpluses, ceteris paribus, from which to do so.
25 The finding that the financial services industry is an unfriendly environment for insider coalitions in both 
countries is perhaps proof that the doctrine of shareholder value is practiced by those who preach its benefits!
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Conclusions
This paper explores the question of the influence of organizational governance arrangements 
on organization-level patterns of labour demand. It does so as a means of testing whether 
such arrangements ultimately can affect pay inequality outcomes, and in particular whether 
this factor has contributed to the recent increase in top-tier pay inequality observed in Britain 
and France (see findings of preceding chapter). This concluding section of the chapter 
discusses these aims, summarizing the findings made and drawing connections with the 
conclusions of the preceding chapter, framing these findings in the context of wider debates, 
and outlining opportunities for further research.
As regards the subject of organizational governance arrangements, the paper operationalizes 
Aguilera and Jackson’s (2003) structural framework for the classification of these 
arrangements, and cross-checks the derived variable (which distinguishes insider from class 
coalitions) against variables that capture aspects of organizational behaviour that are thought 
a priori to correlate with the presence of each type of controlling coalition. Examining the 
governance data produced by this method, it is found that Britain and France differ in the 
distribution of governance types. Thus, while the British private sector is dominated by 
organizations characterized by class coalitions, in France this type of controlling coalition is 
slightly in the minority. Organizations controlled by this type of coalition conform rather 
closely in their stakeholder interrelations to the picture presented in the neoclassical model of 
the firm: there is little conflict of interest between managers and owners, as they are in 
alliance, and non-managerial employees are largely treated as an input in production rather 
than as parties to some collective endeavour. The majority of firms in France, though, feature 
insider coalitions, in which workers and managers align to pursue their own interests rather 
than those of owners. As a consequence, therefore, we might expect the decision-making 
behaviour of this type of organization to differ from the predictions of the neoclassical model 
of the firm.
On the subject of the influence of organizational governance arrangements on the profile of 
labour demand, the paper tests three main hypotheses. The first of these regards the question 
of whether patterns of change in the profile of organizational labour demand can be explained 
by a simple SBTC story (i.e., hypothesis three above). This test is effected by modelling the
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impact of previous organizational and technical change on labour demand outcomes. No 
evidence at all is found to support the hypothesis. This finding is consistent with the idea 
implicit in the organizational governance approach that technical change is not 
deterministically skill-biased, as its impact on labour demand and pay inequality is strongly 
influenced by the context in which it is implemented.
The other hypotheses tested by the model (i.e., hypotheses one and two above) relate to the 
influence of organizational governance arrangements on the organization-level profile of 
labour demand. These tests produce a complex set of results. Essentially, the British results 
tend to support the paper’s contention that such arrangements do have an impact on labour 
demand outcomes -  that is, that all else equal demand for managers is greater in cases of class 
coalitions, and that demand for non-managerial skills is greater in cases of insider coalitions. 
However, while the British evidence is broadly supportive of the hypotheses, it does not 
suggest a very strong connection between the two factors. In contrast, the results for France 
provide virtually no support for the hypotheses. Instead, they indicate that insider coalition 
and class coalition firms behave in largely similar ways in that country with regard to labour 
demand decisions. All the same, this finding is consistent with the observation that insider 
coalitions are in the majority in France, and therefore represent a kind of norm in the market. 
In Britain, however, where insider coalitions are a small minority (17%), it is likely that they 
stand out more clearly against the class coalition norm of that market.
From the conclusion that organizational governance issues have only a limited impact on the 
profile of organization-level labour demand, it follows that they have a similarly limited 
capacity to explain the recent trend towards rising top-tier pay inequality in the two countries. 
Indeed, in the case of France, it seems that organizational governance can explain little or 
none of this trend. In Britain, though, where it appears that the governance factor does exert 
some influence on labour demand outcomes, the evidence that the share of class coalitions has 
grown over time and that insider coalitions are relatively most scarce in high-inequality 
growth sectors of the economy is consistent with the idea that governance issues have 
contributed to growth of top-tier pay inequality. Even so, it seems that organizational 
governance issues are only a minor factor in the explanation either of this striking pay 
inequality trend in Britain, or of the differences in the form of the trend in Britain and France 
(which were noted in the preceding chapter).
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Ultimately, therefore, the variable of organizational governance arrangements cannot 
contribute a great deal to the explanation of rising top-tier pay inequality. In this respect, it 
can be struck from the list of possible explanations of this phenomenon. This finding opens 
the door to other hypotheses, in particular -  as noted in the conclusions to the preceding 
chapter -  one that suggests that the rise in top-tier pay inequality observed in Britain and 
France is related to a complementarity between top technical and managerial skills and new 
technologies that occurs in particular production environments. The following chapter 
explores the viability of this hypothesis with reference to a single country case: Britain. It 
does so by a historical analysis of the role of managers in the process of production and their 
position in the labour market, especially as it relates to the question of relative pay. It is to 
this issue that the following chapter turns.
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Tables
Table 1: Summary of survey samples
Raw samples Common samples
D ata source Scope N Scope N




Establishments with 10 or 
more employees in 
sectors NACE D -0
904
Private-sector 
establishments with 20 or 
more employees in 







Establishments in the 
traded sector with 20 or 




establishments with 20 or 








C o w l , -PLC . training info Turnover variabledensity committee °  .




focus -0 .22" 1.00
PLC -0 .22 " 0 . 17" 1.00
Union














-0 . 14* 0 . 11*
0 .31 '
-0.05
0 .20" 0 .28* 1.00
0.03 0 . 13* 0 . 15* 1.00
0 .17* 0 .26* 0 .28 * 0 .21* 1.00




-0.03 0 . 16" 0 . 13" 0.02 0.14 0.08 0 . 14* 0.00 1.00
Note: * denotes significance at 5% level at least 
Note: N = 425
Note: WERS 98-04 panel data
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PLC -0 .1 6 * 0 .0 3 1 .0 0
Union
density -0 .2 0 * 0 .0 3 0 .2 1 * 1 .0 0
Density
repr. -0 .2 8 * 0.01 0 .2 9 * 0 .6 6 * 1 .0 0
ins Is.
High
training -0 .2 8 * 0 .0 2 0 .2 6 * 0 .2 0 * 0 .1 9 * 1.0 0
intensity 
Degree o f  
info -0 .8 3 * -0 .0 4 0 .1 1 * 0 .0 6 0 .0 9 * 0 .2 7 * 1.0 0
sharing
Turnover 0 .0 7 * 0 .0 0 -0 .1 3 * -0 .2 7 * -0 .2 6 * -0 .1 5 * -0 .01 1 .0 0
Mgrl
variable -0 .1 3 * -0 .0 3 0 .2 2 * 0 .0 2 0 .0 7 * 0 .1 9 * 0 .1 5 * -0 .0 8 * 1 .0 0
pay
Note: * denotes significance at 5% level at least 
Note: N = 773
Note: REPONSE 98-04 panel data
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Table 4: Mean/proportions of constituent variables by structural governance type for
Britain
Class coalition Insider coalition Significance o f  difference
Means Quality focus (1-5) 3.1 3.6 *
Union density (%) 4 59 ***
Consult committee (%) ■ 40 91 **
High training intensity 5.9 6.8 *
Degree o f info sharing (1-5) 1.7 2.3 ***
Turnover (%) 16 12 *
Proportions PLC 0.39 0.64 **
Mgrl variable pay used 0.22 0.24 Not significant
Note: ***/*♦/* denote significance at l%/5%/10% levels respectively 
Note: N = 425
Note: WERS 98-04 panel data
Table 5: Mean/proportions of constituent variables by structural governance type for
France
Class coalition Insider coalition Significance o f  difference
Means Quality focus (1-5) 2.9 2.8 Not significant
Union density (%) 5 10 * * *
Density o f representative 
insts. 1.5 2.2
High training intensity (1-5) 2.5 3.1 ***
Degree o f info sharing 3.8 9.9 ***
Turnover (%) 15 14 Not significant
Proportions PLC 0.11 0.28 ***
Mgrl variable pay 0.01 0.04 **
Note: **♦/**/* denote significance at 1 %/5%/10% levels respectively 
Note: N = 773
Note: REPONSE 98-04 panel data
Table 6: Correlation matrix for governance variables in Britain
Worker control over Mgrs tend not to consult Class coalition (cf.
workplace change workers on decisions insider coalition)
Worker control over 1.00
-0.16*
workplace change 
Mgrs tend not to consult 
workers on decisions 1.00
Class coalition (cf. 
insider coalition) -0.20* 0.18 1.00
Note: * denotes significance at 1% level 
Note: N = 425
Note: WERS 98-04 panel data
Table 7: Correlation matrix for governance variables in France
Worker control over 
workplace change
Mgrs tend not to consult 
workers on decisions
Class coalition (cf. 
insider coalition)
Worker control over 
workplace change 
Mgrs tend not to consult 
workers on decisions
1.00
Class coalition (cf. -0.13* 1.00insider coalition)
Note: * denotes significance at 1% level 
Note: N = 773
Note: REPONSE 98-04 panel data
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Table 8: Establishment proportions by governance types
Proportion S.E.
BRITAIN:
Worker control over workplace 
change






Class coalition (cf. insider 
coalition) 0.83 0.03
FRANCE:
Worker control over workplace 
change






Note: N = 425 for Britain; N = 756 for France 
Note: weighted WERS and REPONSE 98-04 panel data
Table 9: Summary statistics for workforce and wage bill shares
Mean across 0 „  . . .. . . .  . . S.E. 95% confidence intervalestablishments
BRITAIN:
A log employment 0.038
A log managerial workforce share -0.093
A log skilled workforce share -0.018
A log l.n.m. workforce share -0.300
A log managerial wage bill share -0.077
A log skilled wage bill share -0.030
A log l.n.m. wage bill share -0.271
FRANCE:
A log employment 0.138
A log managerial workforce share -0.188
A log skilled workforce share 0.221
A log l.n.m. workforce share -0.299
A log managerial wage bill share -0.163
A log skilled wage bill share 0.111















Note: N = 425 for Britain; N = 756 for France 
Note: weighted WERS and REPONSE 98-04 panel data
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Table 10: Change in wage bill shares in Britain
OLS coefficients 
(standard errors) M anagers
Dependent variable -  change
. .  High-skill M anagers ,workers
in wage bill share o f group 

















-0.167 -0.152 -0.213** -0.212** -0.090 -0.080
GOVERNANCE: 
Lagged worker
(0.107) (0.100) (0.105) (0.101) (0.066) (0.066)
control over most 
important workplace 
change
0.036 0.062 0.359** 0.352** 0.029 0.035
Managers tend not
(0.123) (0.121) (0.164) (0.168) (0.105) (0.101)
to consult workers 
on workplace 
decisions
0.209** 0.196** 0.145 0.140 0.007 0.008
(0.093) (0.095) (0.101) (0.103) (0.070) (0.071)
Class coalition (cf. 
















Note: *♦*/**/* denote significance at l%/5%/10% levels respectively 
Note: N = 425
Note: weighted WERS 98-04 panel data
Table 11: Change in wage bill shares in France
OLS coefficients 
(standard errors) M anagers
Dependent variable — change
High-skill Managers .workers
in wage bill share o f group 

















0.084 0.074 -0.017 -0.024 0.007 0.018
GOVERNANCE: 
Lagged worker
(0.063) (0.061) (0.040) (0.041) (0.037) (0.035)
control over most 
important workplace 
change
0.105 0.091 0.001 0.013 -0.023 -0.013
(0.069) (0.068) (0.044) (0.044) (0.040) (0.040)
Class coalition (cf. 




(0.057) (0.057) (0. 042) (0.042) (0.035) (0.036)
control over most 
important workplace 
change
0.147* 0.117* 0.082 0.084 -0.052 -0.023
(0.077) (0.069) (0.054) (0.053) (0.056) (0.051)
Class coalition (cf. 
















Note: **♦/**/* denote significance at 1 %/5%/l0% levels respectively 
Note: N = 756 (344 for restricted sample)
Note: weighted REPONSE 98-04 panel data












Mgrs tend not to consult 
workers on decisions
FRANCE:







Note: differences between years are all significant at 1% level except those for Britain, 1998-2004, both of 
which are insignificant
Note: weighted WERS 1990-2004 and REPONSE 1992-2004 cross-sectional data
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Table 13: Governance types and economic variables in Britain and France
Worker control over Mgrs tend not to consult Class coalition (cf. 
____________________ workplace change_____________ workers on decisions_______ insider coalition)
BRITAIN:
Structural characteristics
Incidence of workplace 
change
Financial performance
+ve association with 
education; -ve with 
financial services
+ve association with 
change in degree of 
worker involvement and 
change in pay systems
No association




-ve association with 
construction and 
organizational size 
-ve association with 
change in working time 
arrangements, 
organizational change, 





Incidence of workplace 
change
Financial performance
-ve association with 
trade, financial services, 
and business services 
+ve association with 
change in pay systems, 
change in working time 
arrangements, 
organizational change, 
and introduction of new 
products or services 
No association
-ve association with 
organizational size
-ve association with 
change in pay systems, 
organizational change, 
technological change, 
and introduction of new 
products or services
No association
Note: significant associations (10% level or stronger) are derived from (ordered) logit regressions that control 
for organizational size, region of operation, and 1-digit industry 
Note: WERS 98-04 and REPONSE 98-04 panel data
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Chapter 4
Rising Demand for Managers and the Growth in Top-Tier Pay 
Inequality in Britain: the Role of Change in the Production 
Regime
Introduction
While Chapter two of this thesis floated two plausible lines of hypothesis in relation to 
the observed pattern of top-tier pay inequality growth in Britain, Chapter three concluded 
that one of these -  the non-market explanation based on organizational governance 
factors -  cannot account for much of the trend in question. As a consequence, this 
chapter considers the alternative plausible explanation, that is, a market-centred account 
that revolves around a refined version of the SBTC hypothesis.
As was noted in the conclusion to Chapter two, if we assume that the observed top pay 
bias in inequality growth has occurred in a more-or-less unfettered market context, it 
follows that it is likely that there has occurred a shift in relative labour demand towards 
the skills possessed by the incumbents of the jobs driving the change in the shape of the 
pay distribution.26 A convincing explanation for such a shift in relative labour demand is 
provided by a refinement of the SBTC thesis, which argues that new ICT technologies 
and associated organizational changes have rendered the managerial and analytical skills 
possessed by this type of employee relatively much more valuable to employers, with the 
consequence that relative pay for this group has increased (Bresnahan 1999; Bresnahan,
26 The inference of rising relative demand for managers is made because of the observation of simultaneous 
growth in the relative pay and employment share of this type of employee during a period in which -  owing 
to rising levels of general educational achievement -  it is unlikely that their potential supply was shrinking. 
For details of this inference, see Figure 1 in the appendix and its explanation in the next section of this 
chapter.
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Brynjolfsson et al. 2002). The prediction of rising relative pay for managers -  and for 
senior general and specialist managers in particular -  is consistent with the British results 
reported in the second chapter of this thesis.
However, not all of the findings of Chapter two clearly support a hypothesis of this kind. 
Notably, it was found that the trend towards rising top-tier pay inequality is not universal 
-  e.g., no evidence was found for a trend of this type in Germany. This discovery 
provides the key motivation for my investigation here, which aims to cast light on why 
the top-tier pay inequality impact of new technologies -  which are widely diffused in the 
world -  might be felt only in some countries and not in others. The first concern of the 
chapter, therefore, is to identify a theoretical framework that can generate a plausible 
answer to this question, i.e., of what mediating factor could produce an outcome in which 
the complementarity effect of new technologies with managerial skills occurs in one 
country but not in another. As its second point of focus, the chapter tests the explanatory 
ability of the mediating factor identified to explain the British experience since the 1970s 
of apparently rising relative demand for managers and concomitantly increasing top-tier 
pay inequality.
With regard to the first concern of the chapter, the explanatory framework adopted is that 
of the Aix Group (the ‘societal effects’ approach), which highlights the endogeneity (at 
the national level) of the form of managerial hierarchies with three factors: skills 
production systems, work organization, and industrial relations (Maurice, Sorge et al. 
1980; Maurice, Sellier et al. 1982; Maurice, Sellier et al. 1984). Within this framework, 
the extent to which managers predominate over other groups of employees in these three 
dimensions is taken as a measure of their ‘centrality’ to production -  and therefore of 
their relative worth to organizations. Managers are determined to be more central to the 
production model where there exists a systematic approach to managerial skills 
acquisition and development, where managerial decision making is substantially 
unfettered by industrial relations institutions, and where features of work organization 
point towards a prominent role for managers in production. As a consequence, I 
hypothesize that where managers are relatively central to production, the impact of ICT
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complementarities with managerial skills will be felt much more strongly than where they 
are not. Moreover, I hypothesize that manager-led growth in top-tier pay inequality -  as 
observed in the British results of Chapter two -  is only possible where managers play a 
central or predominant role in the approach to production.
With this prediction in mind, I turn to the chapter’s second concern and consider the 
development of die role and standing of managers within British organizations. I begin 
by looking at the historical literature in relation to the role of management in production 
in British organizations from the viewpoint of the societal effects framework. I find that 
the evidence suggests that -  in relative terms -  British managers were somewhat 
marginalized in the predominant approach(es) to production that prevailed prior to 1980. 
However, while the literature contains oblique evidence that this situation has changed in 
the years that have followed, there is no systematic study to confirm this fact. 
Consequently, I engage in a set of analyses to explore whether managers have become 
more central to production in British organizations since the 1970s. My findings support 
the notion that they have done so, and provide support the above hypothesis that a 
manager-led rise in pay inequality -  founded in technological change -  is dependent on 
managers’ taking of a central role in the organization of production.
The empirical strategy of the paper is founded on two bases. First, it aims to address the 
question of the distinctiveness of the British experience vis-a-vis changes in pay 
inequality and labour demand patterns by contextualizing them in the light of 
comparative (European) labour market data. Second, it probes the relationship between 
managerial centrality and demand for managers by engaging in a case study of change 
over time in these variables in a single country, i.e., Britain.
This twin-pronged approach is reflected in the structure of the empirical analyses, which 
comprise two main stages. The first of these starts from the findings of Chapter two to 
establish whether there has occurred a distinctive growth in relative demand for (senior 
general and specialist) managers in Britain since the 1970s. The second element, in turn, 
focuses on the centrality of managers to production in Britain, tracing the evolution of
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variables relating to this concept in order to paint a picture of change. Ultimately, the 
chapter assesses the evidence on whether managers have become more central to the 
typical British production model over time, and on whether a shift of this kind is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the complementarity of managers (or the skills they 
possess) with new technologies is contingent on the nature of the production 
environment.
The chapter is organized in the following manner. It opens with a review of the relevant 
literature. This section is broken down into two elements. The first of these addresses 
the issue of the definition of managers in relation to other types of employee, and 
introduces the ‘societal effects’ framework as a means defining the concept of the 
‘centrality’ of managers to production. The second element applies this framework to the 
examination of the historical literature on British management and its interaction with 
skills production, work organization, and industrial relations systems, seeking to establish 
the status quo ante of the decades prior to the emergence of a trend towards higher pay 
inequality, and searching for signs that this situation may have changed since the 1970s.
Following the literature review, a second section of the chapter lays out the empirical 
strategy underlying the analysis, including the application of the insights of the ‘societal 
effects’ framework to the data, the presentation of hypotheses and noting of how they are 
to be tested, and illustrating how these steps in the analysis contribute to the overall aim 
of the chapter. This section also discusses problems of measurement in relation to the 
concept of ‘managers’ and presents the case that this can in fact be accurately performed. 
A third section of the chapter describes the data sets used in the course of the analyses -  
which include NES, LFS, General Household Study (GHS), and WERS time series 
microdata.
In the chapter’s fourth section, I present the results of the empirical analyses and discuss 
their meaning in relation to the goals of the chapter. Broadly speaking, I find that the rise 
in relative demand for British managers inferred in Chapter two is a robust and 
comparatively distinctive finding; and that since 1980 or so British organizations have
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tended to adopt new approaches to skills production, industrial relations, and work 
organization that have rendered managers more central to their production model. The 
final section of the chapter summarizes and reflects on the conclusions emerging from the 
analyses, assesses the chapter’s success in relation to its aims, and sets out its 
contributions to the relevant research literatures.
Theoretical issues and literature review 
Inferring a technology-led demand shift for managers
Chapter two argues that the longstanding British trend towards greater top-tier pay 
inequality is most plausibly due to a shift in patterns of relative labour demand. This 
inference is not based solely on the relative pay trend, however, as pay outcomes are 
produced at the intersection of both demand and supply rather than the one or the other in 
isolation. Instead, it is the simultaneous combination of rising relative pay and relative 
employment (i.e., employment share) of managers -  and of senior general and specialist 
managers in particular -  with a rapid expansion of the production of high-level general 
skills by the educational system, all documented in Chapter two, that indicates that the 
cause of change can be found on the demand side of the labour market.
Let us consider Figure 1, which presents a set of hypothetical demand and supply curves 
for the employee group composed of managers. This schematic assumes conventional 
upward-sloping supply curves and downward-sloping demand curves. Let us take our 
starting point to be at B, the intersection of supply curve Si and demand curve Do, where 
the managerial wage is Wo and the number of managerial jobs is E]. We know from the 
results of Chapter two that the managerial wage has risen, as has managerial 
employment. Moreover, we know that the (relative) supply of potential managers in the 
labour market is likely to have risen owing to the increase in the relative number of 
individuals with advanced general education, i.e., individuals who possess the skills
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necessary to take on managerial roles (and especially those towards the top of the 
hierarchy). Jointly taken, these findings suggest that it is unlikely that the rise in relative 
managerial wages has been caused by a move to a point such as A (marked by reductions 
in supply and employment). Instead, it is much more likely that the observed trends in 
relative wages and employment for managers has resulted in a move to a point such as C 
or D, both of which presuppose a rise in relative demand for managers.
As discussed in Chapter two of this thesis, a refinement of the standard SBTC hypothesis 
provides a highly plausible explanation for a technology-led demand shift in favour of 
managers in general, and in favour of senior managers in particular. The refined version 
of the hypothesis argues that new ICT technologies and associated organizational 
changes have rendered the managerial and analytical skills possessed by this type of 
employee relatively much more valuable to employers, with the consequence that relative 
pay for this group has increased (Bresnahan 1999; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson et al. 2002).
The way in which this approach differs from the standard SBTC hypothesis -  and 
therefore the way in which it predicts higher relative pay specifically for managers rather 
than for highly skilled employees in general -  relates to the level of organization at which 
the complementarity between skills and technology is thought to occur. Thus, rather than 
perceiving the complementarity to operate at the level of the individual (i.e., a worker 
receives a new desktop PC, which improves his or her productivity -  see Kruger (1993) 
for the classic example), this refined approach understands it as an organization-level 
phenomenon. According to this perspective, new technology's influence on relative 
labour demand flows not from the direct use of computers by this or that group of 
employees, but from the subtle ways in which the information gathering and processing 
capacities of a wired organization act as a multiplier on the performance impact of 
managerial and professional skills (especially analytical, interpersonal, creative, and 
leadership skills).
For example, Bresnahan (1999) notes that new ICT technologies enable organizations to 
build up large databases of financial transactions, customer data, employee performance,
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etc., as an input to managerial decision making. Furthermore, the same technologies 
enable managers to analyse these databases quickly and cheaply to identify non-trivial 
ways in which organizational performance may be improved. Successful implementation 
of these improvements to the functioning of the organization requires managers to deploy 
effective leadership and interpersonal skills, both of which are further leveraged by the 
communication improvements afforded by the same bundle of new technologies. In 
these ways, the new technologies generate a significant complementarity with managerial 
roles and skills, which in turn leads the relative value of managers to the organization to 
grow and ultimately to be reflected in relative pay outcomes.
Moreover, it is argued that the performance multiplier effect of these new technologies is 
greater the more senior the position or individual in an organization (i.e., it is linked to its 
influence over outcomes for the organization as a whole), from which it follows that the 
relative pay impact of the new technologies will be rising in hierarchical seniority and 
thereby in pay. In a number of respects, therefore, this explanatory framework appears to 
predict the kind of rapid top-tier pay inequality growth identified in Britain in Chapter 
two, in which senior managerial jobs were found to be driving the trend of top-tier pay 
inequality growth. Indeed, a number of studies have already presented evidence in 
support of the top pay bias of new technologies in the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK 
(Bresnahan 1999; Caroli and Van Reenen 2001; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson et al. 2002; 
Autor, Levy et al. 2003; Lemieux 2007). Rather than retread this territory, however, this 
chapter uses the findings of these studies to buttress the assumption that there has taken 
place a technological shift that has rendered managers potentially relatively more 
productive -  and therefore relatively better remunerated -  than other groups of 
employees. Instead, the chapter’s analysis concentrates on the question of what kind of 
mediating factor could produce the outcome that the impact of this technological shift is 
felt in one country but not in another -  apparently similar -  one.
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Defining managers and their centrality to production
Given this chapter’s intention to trace the degree to which managers have been/are 
central to the typical approach to production among British firms, an initial challenge is 
that of defming what is meant by the labels ‘managers’ and ‘centrality in production’. 
While it is not a straightforward task to define these concepts for the purpose of empirical 
analysis, an attempt is essayed here. This section of the chapter draws on the relevant 
literature in order to arrive at empirically useful definitions of these two concepts, and 
introduces the insights of the ‘societal effects’ approach to organizational analysis in 
order to identify a set of key variables that permit the measurement of managers’ 
centrality in production. In doing so, this section provides the conceptual basis for the 
empirical analyses that follow.
In any given organization, managers are members of the wider group of employees, and 
making the distinction between managerial and non-managerial employees is not a self- 
evident process. Attempts to delineate the bounds of the managerial group typically draw 
on one (or both) of two logics: managers are different either because of what they do, or 
because of who they are (Grey 1999: p.563). By the first logic, managers differ from 
other types of employees because they perform a unique role or set of tasks within 
organizations. For instance, Lane (1989) enumerates these special functions as, policy 
formulation, work organization and coordination, and performance monitoring.
Similarly, a standard textbook defines management’s functions as planning, organizing, 
leading, and controlling (Robbins, Bergman et al. 2000). The second perspective 
emphasizes the special status and authority of the managerial group, as managers are not 
only employees, but also the proxy face of the employer. Thus, for example, Boumois 
and Livian (1997) argue that managers can only be separated from other employees -  in 
particular, from technical experts, professionals, and supervisors -  by their possession of 
the ‘power of command’ over other employees.
Managers, therefore, can initially be distinguished from non-managerial employees by 
their performance of certain specialized duties and the authority attaching to their
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position in the organizational hierarchy. However, while they retain these qualities in 
common, not all managers are alike, as there is considerable variation within the 
managerial group as regards the balance of functional tasks performed and the degree of 
authority possessed. At the simplest level, we may discern three subgroups within the 
managerial category: ‘first-line managers’ or supervisors, ‘middle managers’, and ‘top 
managers’ (Dopson, Neumann et al. 1997; Robbins, Bergman et al. 2000). The chief 
functional dimension of difference among these subgroups concerns their relation to 
planning activities: as one ascends the managerial hierarchy, one spends progressively 
more time on planning or strategic issues (Dopson, Neumann et al. 1997: p.23).
Similarly, movement in the same direction expands the scope of a manager’s authority to 
command others, which spreads from team to department to business unit or whole 
organization.
This systematic variation in the functional and command responsibilities of the job means 
that each managerial subgroup lays emphasis on its own skill set. Katz (1974) proposes 
that managerial skills may be classified into three broad sets -  technical, human 
(interpersonal), and conceptual -  and that these skills are demanded in differing 
quantities at different levels of the management hierarchy. At the supervisor level, the 
emphasis lies with technical skills, as a primary responsibility of first-line managers is to 
find solutions to day-to-day operational problems that cannot be solved by his or her 
staff. Middle managers, by contrast, are required to exercise all three sets of skills 
relatively intensively, as they must not only overcome technical obstacles, but also knit 
together and coordinate the work of multiple work groups and be able to do so with a 
clear eye to their contribution to the organization’s larger goals. At the top of the 
hierarchy, the overwhelming need is for the high-level conceptual skills that can see the 
broad canvas of the organization and plot its course in time and space.
Collectively, then, the dimensions of tasks, authority, and skills provide a useful means of 
defining managers in relation to non-managerial workers. Effectively, we might say that 
the managerial group in an organization is that set of workers which tends to conduct 
‘managerial’ tasks, is accorded the highest degree of formal authority, and possesses the
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greatest portion of the ‘managerial’ skills embedded in an organization. Indeed, this 
definition accords rather closely with the definition of managers in the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) framework, which distinguishes managers 
from other occupations by reference to their concentration on the performance of 
specialist managerial tasks and their possession of particular skills to that end. As a 
result, the empirical approach of this paper is to define managers by means of the ISCO 
and other similar systems of occupational classification.
The above definition of managers suggests that they contribute to the production process 
in an organization through three key channels. First, to some extent or other they provide 
a set of specialist skills (technical, human, and conceptual) that are necessary to the 
strategic and day-to-day functioning of the organization. Second, through their 
possession of authority within a command hierarchy they make decisions that permit an 
organization to continue to function in an ambiguous environment. Third, managers 
perform particular tasks related to leadership and the coordination and integration of the 
work of others. However, while managers in all contexts can be recognized by the fact 
that they tend to contribute these inputs to production to a greater extent than the other 
employee groups alongside which they work, there is a great deal of heterogeneity within 
the set of ‘managers’ as regards the extent to which these inputs are management’s 
preserve.
Indeed, apart perhaps from the question of planning, the duties performed by managers 
within an organization are not axiomatically the preserve of managers -  members of 
other employee groups may organize work, lead others, or monitor and control activity. 
Further, the skills exercised in the process of carrying out such functions -  technical, 
human, and conceptual -  may similarly be possessed to significant degrees by non- 
managerial employees. Similarly, managers may possess authority to a greater or lesser 
extent, but this owner-derived authority is not absolute, and must coexist with other 
expressions of power such as the law or the stipulations of a collective contract. As a 
consequence, while it is generally possible to distinguish between managers and non­
managers in a given context, there is no single dividing line between these groups which
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is valid irrespective of context. Rather, the distinction between managers and non- 
managerial workers will vary from one situation to another (be they different countries, 
industries, etc.).
These observations have significant implications for the concept of managers’ centrality 
to the process of production. Essentially, the notion of ‘centrality’ is meant to convey the 
extent to which a particular group of workers (e.g., managers) is essential to the process 
of production -  that is, the extent to which production cannot proceed in the absence of 
the group’s input. The preceding list suggests that managers are most essential to 
production where they monopolize specialist managerial skills, where they possess the 
right to make decisions on the part of the organization to the exclusion of other 
stakeholders, and where the coordination and integration of work in the organization is 
largely effected through managers’ performance of their particular tasks. Conversely, 
managers would appear to be least essential to production where managerial skills are 
possessed collectively by and spread among multiple groups of workers, where their 
rights of decision are shared with other stakeholders (e.g., external owners, unions, or 
other groups of employees), and where the work of the organization can be effectively 
coordinated and integrated without significant managerial task input.
To illustrate these types of variation, let us consider two organizations with different 
approaches to work organization: an organization that arranges its operations through 
self-directed work teams; and another -  perhaps even competing in the same markets -  
that coordinates and integrates collective activity through intensive managerial direction. 
Typically, the first kind of organization will assign a significant portion of organizing, 
leading, and controlling responsibilities to line workers, with the outcome that the 
employees constituting such teams will need to possess the requisite sets of technical, 
human, and conceptual skills. As a consequence, managerial skills and decision making 
rights are widely spread beyond the boundaries of the group of managerial employees, 
and the coordination of work takes place with a relatively low level of managerial task 
input. In the second organization, though, managers tend to monopolize managerial 
skills and decision making rights, and the coordination of work is effected through
136
managers’ direction of other workers. Given the greater demands placed on the 
managerial group in the second type of organization, it is likely that managers will 
constitute a larger share of the workforce there. In summary, the contrasts between these 
two types of organization indicated that the structure and activities of the managerial 
group -  and, thereby, the degree to which it is central to the production process -  in a 
given organization are intricately linked to features of the broader organizational 
environment.
That there is considerable variation across contexts -  e.g., across countries, across time, 
etc. -  vis-a-vis features of the organizational environment is expressed clearly in the body 
of work on ‘societal effects’ upon work organization (Maurice, Sorge et al. 1980; 
Maurice, Sellier et al. 1982; Maurice, Sellier et al. 1984). Arguing against the position 
that organizational structures are largely and deterministically the product of the features 
of size, economic activity, and the technology employed, these authors instead point to 
evidence that such structures vary greatly across similar countries even after controlling 
for size, activity, and technology. By an inductive method, it is shown that three 
dimensions of organizational structure covary from one country to the next: the 
‘configuration of the organization’, or the form of its occupational hierarchy; ‘work 
structuring and coordination’, or the distribution of tasks among jobs and the concomitant 
linking of jobs into coherent work groups; and the ‘qualification and career system’, or 
the means of initially acquiring and then developing relevant skills (Maurice, Sorge et al. 
1980: p.65). These dimensions speak in turn to the factors that underpin the concept of 
prominence. Regarding managers, the third dimension draws attention to the systems 
through which they and non-managerial workers acquire their respective sets of skills and 
qualifications before and after entering the labour market. The first two dimensions are 
concerned with the boundaries of the managerial group and the relative apportionment of 
(critical) functions or tasks between managerial and non-managerial workers.
In their study of the organization of manufacturing plants in France, West Germany, and 
Britain at the dawn of the 1980s, Maurice et al. (1980) arrive at a number of findings that 
illustrate differences along these dimensions. First, in relation to the occupational
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hierarchy, they note that while France has a large number of managerial, supervisory, and 
technical staff in relation to the body of line workers, Germany has a much lower number 
and Britain lies somewhere in between. Second, complex, technical tasks are often 
performed by German (teams of) line workers on an autonomous basis, whereas in 
France and Britain they are typically the preserve of managers or technical experts. The 
key difference between France and Britain in this regard is that French technical experts 
tend to be well integrated into lines of organizational hierarchy, while their British 
counterparts stand somewhat separately from the machinery of managerial decision 
making. Third, Germany is found to possess a high skill floor and a relatively narrow 
dispersion of skills based on the broad strength of the craft skills system. In France, too, 
skills and competence are relatively formalized, but through a combination of general 
education outside the labour market and training within the organization. This approach 
produces a stratified skill distribution in the workplace, with entrance to a given stratum 
regulated by prior achievement in the general educational system, and with little of the 
German possibility of progression from one skill group to another in the course of a 
career, especially across the important threshold separating line from technical or 
managerial workers. The British system is much less formalized than either of the others, 
being composed of a mish-mash of general-education, craft, and intra-organizational 
skills channels.
Summarizing these findings, German organizations are characterized by a relatively even 
spread of skills and competence, and authority/autonomy throughout the organization.
Of the three groups of ‘managerial’ skills, only the strategic, conceptual variety are truly 
monopolized by the management group, with the technical and 
interpersonal/organizational types being possessed to some degree or other by non­
managers. French organizations form a neat contrast with this picture, as they are marked 
by high degree of internal inequality of skills and competence, with post-hire training 
patterns reinforcing the sorting effect of the general education system, and authority is 
concentrated in the hands of management. All so-called managerial skills are therefore 
possessed by managerial employees (cadres), which is a relatively large group that 
effectively integrates the three skill sets in a single hierarchy.
138
The British case resembles both France and Germany in different respects -  most 
notably, Germany for its decentralization of authority/autonomy, France for the relatively 
high degree of internal inequality of skills and competence (although this feature is not as 
pronounced as in France). The set of managerial skills is as a consequence distributed 
among several occupational groups within the organization. The distribution of 
autonomy is endogenous with the distribution of technical skills, which are heavily 
invested in non-managerial specialists and, to some degree, skilled line workers. Unable 
to internalize technical skills in their ranks (as in France) or to delegate non-strategic 
responsibilities (as in Germany), and to some extent hampered by their unsystematic 
preparation, British managers are constrained also to share interpersonal/organizational 
and, to a lesser extent, strategic/conceptual skills and competence with other occupational 
groups.
Regarding the relative centrality of each country’s managers in the production process, 
the above observations suggest that a ranking is possible. Most prominent are French 
managers, who effectively monopolize ‘managerial’ skills, and who, through this 
possession of key skills and their concentration of formal authority, control decision 
making and the ability of the organization to coordinate its activities. In this respect, it 
would be very difficult for production to proceed without the input of managers. The 
next most central group of managers is comprised of those of Germany, although it is a 
much more limited group than its French equivalent -  partly because of the smaller 
managerial hierarchy common in German organizations, and partly because it is perhaps 
only senior, strategic managers who carry particular prominence in the German case. 
Moreover, this is a more limited degree of centrality than that of the French managers, as 
the ‘managerial’ skills and coordination capacity necessary to the day-to-day functioning 
of the organization are not (at all) the monopoly of managers; only in strategic decisions 
and tasks are German managers particularly central. Finally, perhaps the least central 
group of managers is the British one: many ‘managerial’ skills are spread widely beyond 
the boundaries of the management group, and the relatively low capacity of managerial
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hierarchies to integrate either strategic or day-to-day activities means that production is 
not totally reliant on managerial input.
This sketch of inter-country differences indicates that there is considerable variation 
across contexts in the scale of managerial hierarchies and in their centrality to production. 
Thus, while all managers share the quality of hierarchical authority, the performance of 
specialized organizational functions, and certain skills, the exact combination of these 
features observed in a given context appears to be closely linked to other underlying 
factors. What, then, are the key factors or contextual characteristics that matter for the 
definition of management and its centrality in production? Here, again, we might turn to 
Maurice et al., who, in a refinement of the international comparison discussed above 
(1984), present what they call a ‘societal approach’ to the parsing of variation in 
managerial form and activity. This theoretical framework points to three ‘macro-social’ 
elements -  or key contextual factors -  that interact with and influence intra- 
organizational (that is, managerial) outcomes: educational and training systems, 
organizational systems (vertical and horizontal), and industrial relations systems.
In defining the prominence of managers in production, therefore, this framework suggests 
that we should grant attention to variables corresponding to these three factors. First, 
skill production system functions differently in different contexts such that ‘managerial’ 
skills are distributed differently among managers and other occupational groups. Second, 
the division of labour and forms of work organization vary across contexts in ways that 
ensure that organizational integration and coordination -  or the ways in which an 
organization is directed in the day-to-day and strategic aspects of production -  is equally 
variable. Third, the form of the industrial relations system in a given context helps to 
delineate the boundaries of the managerial group and circumscribes the scope of its 
authority.
Broadly speaking, measured against this schema, managers are (more) central to the 
production model where there exists a systematic approach to managerial skills 
acquisition and development, where managerial decision making is substantially
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unfettered by industrial relations institutions, and where features of work organization 
point towards a prominent role for managers in the coordination of production. The 
following section draws on these insights to interpret the historical literature on the 
‘traditional’ postwar British approach to production, with a particular focus on its view of 
the role of managers within this model, i.e., looking for signs of change in the relative 
degree of centrality of managers in British organizations.
The historical development of British management and its interaction with systems 
of skills production, work organization, and industrial relations
The insights of the ‘societal effects’ approach provide a useful framework -  built from 
the variables of skills production, work organization, and industrial relations -  for 
tracking change in the centrality to production of British management over time. 
Certainly, there is reason to believe that, during the last twenty to thirty years, change has 
occurred in Britain along these dimensions. For instance, on the one hand, the picture of 
British manufacturing organizations at the turn of the 1980s -  and the role of managers 
within it -  presented by Maurice et al. (1980) appears representative of its time and place, 
being corroborated by other studies (e.g., Hannah 1980; Akrill 1988). On the other hand, 
though, recent assessment of British employment relations and managerial practice 
(Gallie, Felstead et al. 2004; Howell 2005; Pendleton and Gospel 2005; Kersley, Alpin et 
al. 2006) and the findings of Chapter two of this thesis regarding managerial employment 
share and relative pay trends paint a somewhat different portrait of organizational norms. 
Given the emergent picture of a more professionalized, more directive, and less 
externally constrained approach to management in Britain, it seems possible -  even likely 
-  that substantial change has occurred in matters relating to managers and their centrality 
in production -  that is, in the key factors of skills production systems, work organization, 
and industrial relations. As a foundation for the remainder of the chapter, I now discuss 
the historical development of these factors prior to 1980 in order better to understand the 
starting point for my subsequent empirical analysis of more recent change.
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As a backdrop to discussion of the state of British management in the later postwar 
period, it is helpful to understand the broad sweep of the development of the British 
economy prior to this time. In his analysis of the development of British industrial 
relations in the long run, Howell (2005) offers a resume of the evolution of dominant 
approaches to production in Britain in the 20th century and beyond. His approach is to 
examine the subject material using a ‘regulationist’ lens, through which he identifies 
three successive, qualitatively different ‘production regimes’: pre-Fordist, Fordist, and 
post-Fordist. In Howell’s view, the first of these regimes existed between the late- 
Victorian period and the outbreak of the Second World War. He characterizes it through 
the key features of a concentration of employment in the private manufacturing sector, 
fragmented ownership structures within this sector, a labour-intensive approach to 
production that invited fierce wage cost competition, and an industrial relations system 
orientated towards damping such cost competition and thus stifling labour unrest through 
encompassing industry collective bargaining.
Labour management under this production regime took the form of an approach to craft 
production which was characterized by a reliance on skilled, autonomous, and mobile 
workers to enable a type of highly cost-conscious flexible specialization (Tolliday and 
Zeitlin 1991). As a consequence of this approach, firms tended not to develop 
bureaucratic managerial hierarchies, and rarely attempted to remove skills from the shop 
floor by the introduction of new production technology and/or the separation of 
conception and execution. Equally, rather than systematically acquiring graduate labour 
and developing it within the managerial cadre of the enterprise -  as was seen in the same 
period, say, among large corporations in the US (Chandler 1977) -  British firms tended to 
obtain key skills through the apprenticeship system or through training on the job.
It is claimed that much of this approach can be explained with reference to four principal 
factors (Tolliday and Zeitlin 1991). First, British firms typically faced domestic and 
overseas -  often imperial -  product markets that were highly differentiated and unstable, 
and thus not amenable to strategies built around economies of scale. Second, the British 
skills base comprised a limited supply of university graduates, but a plentiful supply of
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relatively cheap skilled (craft) labour. Third, the industrial relations environment was sui 
generis, with strong craft unions constraining managerial prerogative in the organization 
of production, although it can be argued that the unions’ policies assisted managers by 
reducing uncertainty about skill quality and consistency. Fourth, they argue that family 
ownership limited the capital base of firms, with the result that they tended towards 
small-scale and specialized production, and so provided little opportunity for 
internalization strategies in relation to issues such as skill formation, the provision of 
career incentives, and so on, restricting the development in much of the economy of 
distinct and large-scale managerial functions of the kind that emerged in the US in this 
period.
In Howell’s estimation (2005), the pre-Fordist regime did not survive the economic 
upheaval of the Second World War. Instead, it was supplanted by a different regime -  
estimated to run from approximately 1940 until the end of the 1970s -  that was 
qualitatively different from that preceding it in a number of respects. First, 
manufacturing now took place under conditions of more concentrated ownership and 
greater capital intensity, with the result that productivity replaced costs as the primary 
driver of competitiveness. Second, the accelerating rate of international market 
integration -  especially within Europe -  weakened the utility of wage competition- 
damping industry bargaining. And third, workers and unions gained a durably stronger 
bargaining position through the greater state support implicit in policies such as the 
commitment to full employment and the influence or threat of Labour governments. An 
outcome of these shifts was the trend towards the ‘internalization’ of industrial relations 
from the industry to the firm, with managers and owners tending no longer to treat 
workers as an input to production like any other, but attempting to engage them and their 
unions directly in processes of (productivity-enhancing) economic restructuring.
It has been argued that a key factor driving the transition to the Fordist production regime 
was the growing tendency for firms to make the strategic choice to emulate the 
perceivedly superior American example of mass production and bureaucratic 
management (Tolliday and Zeitlin 1991). From this perspective, the shift in the typical
143
scale of production brought a limited growth of managerial structures, direct managerial 
control over production, and policies aimed at internalizing key production skills in 
managerial ranks -  as had been observed in the interwar US (Jacoby 1985; Jacoby 1991). 
However, there is evidence that imported US practice was often implemented in ways 
that retained longstanding features of the British model. For instance, firms often made 
no clear distinction made between strategic and operational management functions 
(Tolliday and Zeitlin 1991).
Despite the many changes taking place after 1945, it appears that there remained strong 
elements of continuity between the pre- and postwar models of work organization and 
management. In particular, Zeitlin (1991) views the ongoing strife caused by inter-firm 
competition for skilled labour in the postwar as proof that firms did not rationalize 
production and take control over key skills in the American manner -  i.e., absorb them 
into ‘management’, or embed them in capital equipment or processes -  when they had the 
chance. According to this argument, this chance had come during the interwar slump that 
enabled management briefly to force the unions to recognize management prerogative. 
However, as employers never institutionalized this recognition, they ensured that 
managerial control would be challenged again once economic and political conditions 
changed, as they did from the 1930s rearmament period onwards. Consequently, 
management across much of the economy remained -  well into the postwar -  heavily 
reliant on the discretion and skills of non-managerial skilled workers and their unions in 
order to be able to compete in the market.
The heartland of this model of management and organization was to be found in 
manufacturing industry. It should be remembered that this sector carried enormous 
weight in the economy until relatively recently. Indeed, in the early-1960s, it accounted 
for approximately half of employment, and more than a third even a decade later (Coates 
2002; Rowthom and Coutts 2004). Further, manufacturing was not only important for 
issues of management because of its large share of British economic activity, but also 
because it, and the metalworking industries in particular, constituted the arena in which a 
pattern-setting framework of relationships connecting skills, occupations, and hierarchies
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had been established in the years around the Second Industrial Revolution (Thelen 2004). 
Thus, arrangements relating to skills, organization, and industrial relations that arose in 
the manufacturing sector exerted substantial influence on developments in other areas of 
the economy.
During the period spanned by Howell’s Fordist production regime, British managers 
themselves appeared quite distinctive in comparative perspective. Crockett and Elias 
(1984) explore data drawn from 1975-76 National Training Survey to arrive at a number 
of conclusions in relation to the preparation, careers, and earnings of British managers at 
the tail end of Howell’s Fordist period. First, managers in mid-1970s Britain typically 
had low levels of education and training in comparison with their counterparts in other 
industrialized countries. In fact, the data show that British managers were as a group 
only marginally better qualified than the general population. Second, the authors find 
that managers’ low level of formal qualifications was rarely compensated for by 
systematic managerial development within firms. Instead, they mostly entered 
management from another, non-managerial occupation, and only infrequently did so 
directly from education. Furthermore, the management occupation appeared relatively 
unstable in that individuals regularly moved in and out of it over time -  in contrast to, 
say, professional or technical occupations -  which must further have militated against 
attempts at management development. Third, the data indicate no significant connection 
between managerial vocational training and reward, which finding further suggests that 
firms placed little value on developing the capacity of the organization’s managerial 
hierarchy as a whole. All of these findings suggest that British management during this 
period contrasted markedly with the ideal-type managerial cadre of the (US) ‘modem 
business enterprise’ (Chandler 1977; Jacoby 1985; Jacoby 1991).
Analysing this picture of typical production practice and management’s role in it in the 
later postwar period, it is helpful to reintroduce the ‘societal effects’ approach’s key 
dimensions of industrial relations, work organization, and skills production (Maurice, 
Sellier et al. 1984). As regards work organization, it seems that the prevalence of niche 
markets and ‘lumpy’ demand steered the majority of firms in the dominant sector of the
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economy to compete by means of strategies that owed at least as much to craft production 
or ‘flexible specialization’ as to Fordist mass production. Embedded in traditions 
reaching back into the previous century, the former strategic type appeared even to inflect 
conscious attempts to realize the latter. In the matter of industrial relations, these 
apparently remained largely collectivized, with powerful craft and occupational unions in 
particular constraining management prerogative, even with regard to long-term and 
strategic decision making. As for the skills critical to production, while the balance of 
their production was slowly shifting away from the skill communities defined by 
apprenticeships and unions towards the general education system and intra-organizational 
learning under the aegis of the managerial hierarchy, firms often remained hugely reliant 
on traditional craft skills, with the result that craft workers were able substantially to 
defend their traditional partial autonomy vis-a-vis the management hierarchy. Work 
organization commonly reflected this fact, with large numbers of technical specialists and 
skilled workers sitting outside the direct line of managerial hierarchy, and consequently 
working under conditions of limited monitoring and substantial autonomy.
Ultimately, the picture of the ‘typical’ organizational form of the day that emerges is one 
in which managerial prerogative is heavily circumscribed, critical skills and their (re­
production are not internalized to the organizational hierarchy, and the dominant form of 
work coordination and integration relies more on workers’ discretion and self­
organization than on managerial capacity to organize, direct, and monitor production. 
Judged against the definition of ‘centrality’ in terms of key ‘societal effects’ criteria, this 
summary indicates that management was not particularly central to the production 
process in the typical British organization in the pre-1980 period.
As is well known, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed radical changes in the British political 
economy. Indeed, Howell (2005) interprets these changes as marking the transition to a 
new production regime -  ‘post-Fordist’ -  in which we still find ourselves. According to 
this argument, a capital-intensive rump of manufacturing activity remains in the new 
regime, but the rapid and massive tertiarization of the economy has effected a reversion 
to the old norm of labour intensive production, although now concentrated in services
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rather than industry. Domestic government policy and ongoing European integration 
have increased levels of product market competition even further in both tradables and 
non-tradables (Card and Freeman 2002). At the same time, in the aftermath of the 
Thatcher and Major governments’ attempts to reduce trade union influence, collectively 
bargained regulation of employment has become much less widespread, especially in the 
private sector, and tends increasingly to bring fewer advantages to workers still covered 
by it (Bryson 2002; Blanchflower and Bryson 2004; Visser 2005). It may be contended, 
therefore, that the dominant form of industrial relations in contemporary Britain is one in 
which employers possess much greater freedom, or flexibility, unilaterally to set the 
terms and conditions of employment than in even the recent past. The primary 
constraints on this flexibility are now more commonly constituted by a limited set of 
state-guaranteed rights for the individual worker, than by systems of negotiated 
employment regulation. In the area of skills production, this period has seen huge growth 
in the higher education sector (Chevalier, Conlon et al. 2002), a mild improvement in 
standards of attainment in intermediate general education (Machin and Vignoles 2006), 
and the demise of the traditional apprenticeship system for imparting craft skills along 
with the (manufacturing) industries in which it was embedded (Finegold and Soskice 
1988).
All of these shifts point to change along the dimensions of (managerial) skills production, 
industrial relations, and work organization. Moreover, the trends noted in Chapter two of 
this thesis that indicate a rapid and ongoing rise in employers’ demand for managerial 
skills since the end of the 1970s imply that the formerly somewhat embattled and 
secondary status of managers in British organizations may not have survived much 
beyond the end of that decade. These inferences, then, suggest that managers have 
perhaps become increasingly central to the typical production model of British firms.
The following empirical study is intended to test this idea, using the framework of the 
‘societal effects’ approach to structure the analysis of the data. It is to this matter that the 
chapter proceeds, as it now presents the empirical strategy, the data sets, and the results 
of the analysis in turn.
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Empirical strategy and research questions
The primary hypothesis of this study is that an apparently rapidly rising demand for 
managers -  and senior managers in particular -  in Britain since the 1970s is linked to a 
shift in the typical approach to production (and management’s place in it) -  defined in 
terms of the ‘societal effects’ variables of skills production, industrial relations systems, 
and work organization -  adopted by British firms. Consequently, the analyses conducted 
as part of this chapter can be broken down into two main elements. The first of these is 
intended to explore the question of relative demand for managers in Britain in the last 
two decades or so, building on the findings of the second chapter of this thesis, in order to 
establish whether there has occurred a distinctive growth in such demand. The second 
element of the analysis focuses on the centrality of managers to production, tracing the 
evolution of variables relating to this concept over the period in question. Each element 
addresses a set of key questions -  set out below -  that underpin the primary hypothesis of 
the chapter. Once I have set out these questions and delineated their role in the overall 
structure of the paper, I turn to consider issues of operationalization. In particular, I 
address the potential problems raised by attempting to identify ‘managers’ in quantitative 
data in a manner that is consistent across time. In doing so, I find that the means of 
definition of managers within the standard systems of occupational classification is 
highly robust, and can be relied upon to produce time-consistent data series in relation to 
the occupational composition of the workforce.
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In the first element of the empirical enquiry, I begin by recapping my previous findings 
regarding the development of relative demand for managers in Britain, as reported in 
Chapter two. I then expand upon this basis of knowledge by addressing two key 
questions:
Question 1 -  how does the change in the dimensions o f the occupational group o f British 
managers appear in a comparative perspective?
Question 2 - t o  what extent is change in the managerial share o f the British worlforce a 
function o f macro-level industrial restructuring?
My response to the first of these questions situates the British results within the broader 
comparative context of developments elsewhere in Europe, its intention being to gauge 
the extent to which Britain is or is not representative of the broader European experience, 
and by doing so, to understand whether the scale of change in Britain is significant or not. 
In addressing the second question, I supplement the comparative perspective of my 
response to the first with a longitudinal analysis relating change in the managerial share 
of the British workforce to the variables of industrial activity and organizational size.
This exercise is motivated by the possibility that -  given the rapid pace of industrial 
restructuring in Britain since the 1970s -  change in the size of the managerial share of the 
workforce might be related to general shifts in employment from one form of economic 
activity to another. By testing this proposition, I intend to determine whether apparent 
change in demand for managers is the product of broad macro-level trends in the 
economy, or whether it might be linked to micro-level change such as the adoption by 
firms of new production models.
The second element of my study focuses on change in the centrality of managers to the 
production model, and is structured around measurement of the key ‘societal effects’ 
variables of skills production, industrial relations systems, and work organization that 
underlie this concept. My intention is to understand to what extent there now exists a 
systematic approach to managerial skills production, relatively unfettered managerial
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decision making, and features of work organization which point towards a prominent role 
for managers in production. The questions I address relate in turn to each of these 
variables:
Question 3 — have the means o f skills acquisition o f British managers changed over time?
Question 4 — in what ways have industrial relations changed within British firms?
Question 5 -  in what ways has work organization changed within British firms?
My response to Question 3 examines change over time in the qualifications and skills 
development of British managers, and conducts its analyses with reference to a 
complementary set of individual-level employment data sets. In addition, it is able to 
draw on Crockett and Elias’s (1984) sketch of the characteristics of British managers in 
the mid-1970s as an useful point of reference for its analysis of change. In assessing 
Question 4 ,1 use longitudinal organization-level data on a number of aspects of industrial 
relations arrangements in order to trace how these have changed within British firms, and 
to understand the implications of any change for processes of managerial decision 
making within organizations. Consideration of Question 5 also draws on longitudinal 
organization-level data, and examines developments in the area of work organization that 
relate to the occupational composition of workforces at the level of the productive unit 
(establishment), processes of communication within organizations, and relationship 
between the managerial share of the establishment workforce and a number of key 
establishment characteristics.
Regarding the operationalization of these analyses in the context of quantitative, large- 
scale survey data sources, the investigation confronts potential measurement difficulties 
with regard to the central concept of the ‘manager’. As previously noted, this is a 
difficult concept to define, particularly in the cases of longitudinal or comparative 
analyses (Vernon 2003). In particular, there is more than one interpretation to the 
statistical finding that the occupational employment share of managers is rising over time
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in a given country or location. Certainly, one possibility is the straightforward one that 
managers are becoming more numerous, and that as a result organizational hierarchies 
are becoming more encompassing. Alternatively, however, it may be that the numbers 
reflect a trend towards ‘title inflation’, with the managerial share being bolstered merely 
by the relabelling of jobs with the suffix ‘manager’, e.g., ‘train manager’ for ‘train 
conductor’, without any accompanying substantive change in the job to incorporate 
managerial duties. As this type of measurement error could strongly undermine attempts 
to measure change in the managerial share of employment, it is necessary to consider the 
ability of the occupational classification systems used in the data to avoid this type of 
error.
A helpful introduction to the subject is provided by Elias and McKnight (2001), who, in a 
paper examining the adequacy of occupational classifications as a proxy for skill, offer a 
concise history and assessment of the UK’s own recent Standard Occupational 
Classifications (SOC 1990 and 2000) and their relations to the international standard in 
this area, the International Standard Occupational Classification (ISCO-88, and the EU- 
specific variant, ISCO-88 [COM]). They explain that all these systems of classification 
share the logic of ISCO-88, which classifies jobs into occupations according to two key 
conceptual dimensions: the task composition of work in the job; and the skill 
requirements for the competent performance of the job. The notion of skill requirements 
is defined initially by the relevant ‘skill level’, which derives from the length of study or 
training necessary to perform the job, and subsequently by the appropriate ‘skill 
specialization’, or field of knowledge underpinning the job. The classifications outline 
four levels of skill across all occupations, with subgroups within each occupation-skill 
level cell being further disaggregated by their different skill specializations.
Within this framework of classification, managers are identified principally by their 
concentration on the performance of ‘managerial tasks’, that is, the ‘direction and 
coordination of the functioning of organisations and businesses, including internal 
departments and sections, often with the help of subordinate managers and supervisors’ 
(p.43, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys 1990). This approach assumes that a
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special class of skills is required for the competent performance of such tasks, and the 
baseline level of skill is defined in such a way that first-level supervisors and foremen are 
excluded from the managerial category, being instead coded with the occupations of 
those they oversee (or work alongside). Conceptually, therefore, these classifications 
only label as ‘managers’ those individuals whose work is largely composed of managerial 
tasks, and who demonstrate a level of skill in their performance that exceeds a not- 
insubstantial threshold.
In order fully to realize this type of occupational classification, surveys that include an 
occupational variable typically collect information on job titles, grades, and constituent 
tasks. Thus, for example, in the case of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) a trained 
interviewer will gather these data from the interviewee, or in the case of the New 
Earnings Survey (NES) the employer must give a brief written job description alongside 
the details of a job’s title and grade. The means of translating this information into the 
categories of the occupational classification is a coding index, which represents a kind of 
job dictionary mapping job titles, grades, and constituent tasks to particular occupational 
categories. These tools are designed in such a way as to screen for misleading job titles 
such as ‘train manager’ and ‘executive assistant’, and to ensure that they are assigned to 
the correct category (i.e., not management) (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys 
1990; Office for National Statistics 2000). In this regard, they are consciously intended 
to protect the data collection process from the potential problem of title inflation.
Persuasive evidence that the design of occupational classifications succeeds in this intent 
is offered by Elias (1995), who points to two pieces of supporting data. First, 
examination of the job titles and descriptions collected as part of the 1981 and 1991 
British censuses shows in both time periods that individuals who are identified as 
‘managers’ according to the principal occupational classification used also 
overwhelmingly described their main job tasks to be of a managerial nature, i.e., they 
were largely concerned with the direction and coordination of others’ work. Second, 
with reference to the 1981 and 1991 LFS, Elias finds that in both years about three- 
quarters of those respondents classified as managers answered in the affirmative to a
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separate question about the performance of managerial duties.27 Elias concludes that, 
despite the greater managerial share of the labour force in the later period, respondents 
classified as managers in that year are no less likely to be engaged in managerial tasks 
than before. The weight of these items of evidence, therefore, indicates that the observed 
growth in the ranks of British management reflects genuine change in the occupational 
composition of employment rather than a trend towards title inflation.
All the same, Elias’s data only apply to the 1980s, and occupational data series show that 
the British managerial share of employment has grown even further since then. 
Consequently, we cannot be certain that title inflation has not occurred in the post-1990 
period unless we revisit the data. For this reason, I update Elias’s analysis of the extent 
to which managerial status -  as defined by an occupational classification -  and the 
performance of managerial duties intersect, using LFS data for a number of years 
between 1981 and 2004. In my version, the occupational classification used is SOC 
2000, which is more conservative in its attribution of managerial status to employees than 
the KOS classification used by Elias (Office for National Statistics 2000).28 In addition, 
my data series relate to the population of all employees in each year, rather than the 
population of all workers to which Elias’s analysis refers. Nevertheless, the results I 
obtain (see Table 1) are highly consistent with those of the earlier study in the years of 
overlap (1981 and 1991). Moreover, it consistently emerges over time that around 90% 
of those classed as managers according to the SOC 2000 schema report that they perform 
managerial duties or supervise others in their job. This finding suggests that the notion of 
‘title inflation’ is no more supported by the evidence after 1991 than before. If anything, 
the results suggest that the occupational-classification perspective of the SOC system 
may understate the growth of the manageriat, as there appears to be a durable rise of 
around ten percentage points in the share of non-managers (as defined by SOC 2000) 
who report that they perform managerial or supervisory functions in their job.
27 The other quarter of the individuals classified as ‘managers’ were largely self-employed farmers and 
managers/proprietors of small businesses (often without employees) (p.7, Elias 1995).
28 This is to say that, if a single data set were coded to both KOS and SOC 2000, a greater share of 
individuals would be classified as managers at the most basic level of occupational disaggregation under 
KOS than under SOC 2000.
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There is little evidence, therefore, that processes of title inflation have been driving the 
observed long-term increase in the managerial share of employment in Britain. 
Accordingly, this chapter takes the approach that the relevant systems of occupational 
classification -  when applied to survey data -  are capable of reliably identifying 
managerial workers, and thereby of tracking real trends in the occupational composition 
of employment. Having set out my empirical strategy and the key questions I wish to 
address through it, I now present the data used in the course of my analyses.
Data description
The data used in this chapter are drawn from a number of different sources. Broadly 
speaking, however, these sources are of two types: individual-level microdata which 
provide information on occupation, earnings, qualifications, industrial activity, and other 
characteristics of the individual and their job; and establishment-level microdata which 
describe the activity, size, internal organization, and policies of employing organizations. 
The data from both sources have the common attribute that they pertain to long time 
series, generally in the range from 1980 or before through to the early years of this 
decade. Regarding the two main elements of the empirical analysis, the part that relates 
to demand for managers draws on individual-level data alone, whereas the part that 
explores the issue of manager centrality in production draws jointly on individual-level 
and establishment-level data.
Of the individual-level data sets employed, the first is the New Earnings Survey (NES). 
This is an annual survey of the earnings of employees in employment in Great Britain, 
conducted every April from the late-1960s until 2001 (although the version of the data set 
used here runs from 1975 to 2001 inclusive). As it is extensively used and described 
Chapter two of this thesis, I will not go into detail again here. For the purposes of this 
chapter, perhaps its important feature is its large sample -  which amounts to around 0.5% 
of total employment in Britain in any given year -  as this ensures that the data are highly
154
representative of the broader population of employees. In addition, its data collection 
methodology -  it is derived from employer records and employers are legally required to 
respond if they are surveyed -  is recognized as providing information on occupation, 
earnings, and other variables that is relatively more accurate and less prone to response 
error than many other data sets that deal in these variables.
In order not to rely on any single source of British individual-level microdata, I 
supplement my use of the NES with analysis of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and 
General Household Survey (GHS) series. I discuss the set-up of LFS data in detail in 
Chapter 2. My approach to setting up the GHS data closely resembles that used for LFS, 
as the surveys are in many respects rather similar. All the same, I draw extensively on 
the advice offered by Schmitt (1992) to ensure that the GHS variables relating to earnings 
and employee and employer characteristics are consistently defined throughout the length 
of the time series. As both LFS and GHS have a different survey methodology to that of 
the NES -  both are based on direct interviews with individual workers rather than 
employer records -  these data provide a valuable cross-check on the trends observed in 
the NES data, enabling me to assess the robustness of my results more effectively. While 
LFS and GHS sample sizes are smaller than that of the NES, both surveys offer 
nationally representative and longitudinally consistent data series -  the LFS for the period 
1993-2004, and the GHS for 1974-2004.
As part of my study of demand for managers compares British trends in the occupational 
composition of employment with those observed in comparator countries, I also refer to 
the French Enquete Emploi (EE) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 
which, like LFS and GHS, use a household survey approach to provide representative 
annual cross-sections of each nation’s employment for the period 1984-2002. (In the 
case of Germany, I limit the sample to the former West Germany in order to enable 
consistent measurement before and after unification.) As a further cross-check on the 
results I derive from national-level microdata, I compare them to Eurostat’s official 
harmonized European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) tabular data, which can be accessed 
through the New Cronos portal on the Eurostat website.
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When working with these individual-level microdata, I sometimes encounter the issue of 
intermittent changes in the form of the occupational classification. This is not a 
challenge that occurs with the EE and GSOEP data, as the relevant data-collecting 
institution has retrospectively recoded the data series to ISCO-88(COM) for the few years 
in which they were not originally coded using that system of classification. However, the 
British data series do pose this problem, as they classify occupation according to a 
number of different systems of occupational classification, with the identity of the one 
used largely depending on the year in which the data were collected. Thus I encounter 
the Key Occupations for Statistical Purposes (KOS) system prior to 1991, the Standard 
Occupational Classification 1990 (SOC 1990) in 1991-2000 (1991-2001 in the case of 
NES), and SOC 2000 in 2001 and beyond. Of these classificatory systems, only SOC 
2000 can be straightforwardly translated into the ISCO-88(COM) schema.29
In order to generate consistent time series of occupational data that use a single system of 
classification, therefore, I recode the occupational variable where necessary. Where the 
existing classification is SOC 1990, this operation is easily performed through a set of 
if/then conditions that translate the variable into SOC 2000 (for guidance on this process, 
see Elias and Purcell 2004). However, where the initial classification of occupation is 
reported in terms of KOS, it is necessary to recode the variable to SOC 2000 or ISCO- 
88(COM) by means of program called Mapper98 (Gregory, Jukes et al. 1998). This tool 
uses a mapping algorithm to convert data coded in one classification into another on the 
basis of a single cross section of dual-coded data, that is, a year of the given survey in 
which the data are coded simultaneously to the old and new classifications. The mapping 
procedure is performed with reference to the observed frequencies between old and new 
codes in this dual-coded data. Where an entire category on one classification is repeated 
in the other classification, this one-to-one mapping is applied directly. Where a fractional 
allocation is required, a random allocation procedure is used to achieve the proportions 
observed in the dual-coded data. The product of this procedure is a longitudinally
29 In fact, one of the key reasons for the 2000 revision of SOC was to improve comparability with the 
European standard of ISCO-88(COM) (Elias and McKnight 2001).
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consistent occupational classification that provides an accurate picture of changes in the 
distribution of occupations over time.
The establishment-level data set I employ is composed of a time series of Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) management respondent data for the period 
1980-2004.30 The WERS (WIRS) surveys were originally conducted as cross sections in 
each of the years 1980, 1984,1990, 1998, and 2004, with each wave providing a snapshot 
of a rich variety of employer characteristics, policies, and practices through a nationally 
representative sample of establishments that clear a given employment-size threshold. 
Following the 1998 survey, the WERS98 Data Dissemination Service constructed and 
made available a time-series data set composed of a set of variables that remain invariant 
from one survey wave to another. This data set enables the evolution of these variables 
to be accurately measured between one wave and another. It should be noted that there is 
no panel aspect to the data set, as no establishment appears in more than one wave. 
However, the representative nature of each cross section permits the accurate assessment 
of change in the distribution of a given variable over time. For the purposes of my 
analyses, I have matched data drawn from the newly available 2004 wave of the survey to 
this existing time-series data set, having defined the sample and relevant variables in a 
consistent manner. The consistent sample is representative in each period of the 
population of all British establishments with 25 or more employees.
As a further modification of the ‘official’ WERS time-series data set, I have matched in 
information on the establishment-level occupational distribution of employment for each 
of the five waves of data. This information was drawn from the original cross sections 
for each wave, which contain a broader range of variables than their time-series 
counterpart. This variable is used to calculate the managerial share of employment at the 
establishment level. There is an issue in that the classification employed changes form 
between the 1990 and 1998 waves -  from one based on the logic of KOS to one based on 
the one-digit version of SOC 1990/2000. At first glance, this transition would seem to
30 In their stand-alone versions for the years 1980, 1984, and 1990, these data sources are entitled 
‘Workplace Industrial Relations Survey’ (WIRS).
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militate against the comparison of managerial workforce shares in the before and after 
periods. Certainly, the different logics of the two classification systems would suggest 
so, and, there not being a dual-coded year as per the GHS or NES, it is not possible to 
solve this problem by use of the mapping software.
However, closer inspection of the definitions of the occupational groups in the two 
classifications indicates that there is considerable comparability between them. This 
outcome obtains chiefly because the occupations are defined in both frameworks at the 
one-digit (i.e., a relatively aggregated) level, and so the definition provided to survey 
respondents for the purpose of coding their response is similarly crude in both cases. 
Thus, the ‘middle/senior managers’ category of the first system is very similar to the 
‘managers and senior administrative occupations’ category of the second.31 Importantly, 
both definitions explicitly exclude foremen and first-level supervisors from these 
categories. Thus, while there may be measurement error in the management share 
variable under both classifications -  owing to the high-level nature of the definitions -  
this error is not likely to be systematically biased across the divide between them. As a 
result, I believe it is possible meaningfully to interpret the evolution of this variable over 
the duration covered by the data.
Having introduced the data I employ, and discussed the means by which I have 
operationalized key variables, I now move on to the presentation of the results of my 
analyses.
31 Compare the respective definitions provided on the 1990 and 1998 management questionnaires:
- 1990: Separate categories are provided for ‘supervisors/foremen’ and ‘middle/senior managers’; and 
‘administrative staff should only be included with clerical/secretarial staff when they have no supervisory 
or managerial responsibility’.
- 1998: ‘Managers and senior administrators head government, industrial, commercial and other 
establishments, organisations or departments within such organisations. They determine policy, direct and 
co-ordinate functions, often through a hierarchy of subordinate managers and supervisors. Occupations 
included are: general managers, works managers, production managers, marketing or sales managers, 
directors of nursing, catering managers and bank managers. This group does not include supervisors or 
foremen. These employees should be grouped within their skill base e.g. an office manager supervising 
clerical workers would be grouped with them. A fitter and turner acting as a supervisor or foreman would 
be classified as a craft or skilled worker.’
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Results
The structure of this section of the chapter is organized around the two stages of 
empirical enquiry outlined above. Initially, therefore, I seek to establish whether there 
has taken place any distinctive growth in demand for managers in Britain in the years 
since 1980. This analysis begins from the findings of Chapter two regarding this subject, 
and then looks for corroborating evidence in a number of comparative data sources. In 
addition, I present results that clarify the precise form of the trend (i.e., for which types of 
managers is demand rising). Having confirmed the robustness of the evidence for rising 
demand for managers in Britain, I probe the relationship between this trend and macro­
level change over time in the form of economic activity (e.g., the industrial make-up of 
employment, the distribution of organizations by size, etc.). This step in the analysis is 
intended to test whether the pattern of demand growth is merely the side effect of change 
in the composition of economic activity (i.e., processes such as tertiarization), or whether 
there is evidence that it is more strongly associated with change within organizations.
As it emerges that the evidence tends to support the latter proposition, I proceed to the 
second element of the empirical study, which is concerned specifically with change in the 
role of managers in production. The three components that make up this part of the 
analysis are structured around the three key variables identified by the ‘societal effects’ 
approach: (managerial) skills production; industrial relations systems; and work 
organization. In each of these areas, I look for evidence of change that would indicate 
that managers have become more central to the process of production in the typical 
British organization over the last two decades or so. In the first case, this involves the 
examination of change in managers’ observable skills (qualification and experience), and 
in the returns that they generate. In addition, I look at change in the distribution of 
channels of entry into management. The motive for these analyses is to understand 
which kinds of skills managers own and are rewarded for in different time periods, and 
the extent to which managerial skills are monopolized by managers or shared with other 
occupational groups within organizations. In the case of industrial relations systems, I 
examine change in institutional features that enable non-managerial input into
159
organizational decision making. This step is intended to probe change in the extent of 
managerial control of decision making within organizations. In the final case of work 
organization, I examine developments in the occupational composition of intra­
establishment employment, in processes of communication within organizations, and 
other aspects of work organization. The goal of these tests is to understand whether work 
organization in the typical British organization has changed in ways that make production 
more contingent on managers’ input.
The first set of results for consideration, therefore, relate to the question of demand for 
managers in Britain. Chapter two found broadly that, since 1990, the occupational group 
experiencing the highest rate of demand growth -  as measured using the ‘job analysis’ of 
wage bill shares -  was that of ‘corporate managers’ (ISCO 12). This shift in demand 
towards managers was found to be stronger in the service sector than elsewhere, and 
especially strong in the sectors of financial services and business services. In contrast to 
the British experience, French and German data showed no evidence that a similar 
demand shift towards managers had taken place in those countries during this period. 
Overall, these findings suggest the following conclusions. First, the demand shift 
towards managers in Britain is an economically significant and durable trend -  some of 
the evidence presented in Chapter two suggests that it dates back to at least a decade 
before 1990. Second, as no similar trend can be observed in France and Germany, it 
seems possible that it is of origins specific to Britain.
This apparent growth in demand can be thought of as making itself apparent in two 
dimensions: change in relative quantities; and change in relative prices. The first of 
these dimensions can be measured with reference to the managerial share of employment, 
and the second with reference to the average compensation cost of managers relative to 
other occupational groups. The comparative results presented here relate only to the 
employment share dimension of demand. However, as it is employers who design jobs 
and their array within an organization, this metric may be taken as an effective indicator 
of the profile of demand. Table 2 presents the evolution of the occupational composition 
of employment in Britain and in two similar comparator countries -  France and
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Germany.32 These results are derived from a number of microdata sets that capture 
information on the subject of occupation via differing survey methodologies and 
occupational classifications. However, irrespective of the methodology or classification, 
two observations consistently stand out. First, the employment share of those performing 
managerial jobs appears to have grown substantially in Britain in the last two decades or 
so. And second, this share is much greater in all time periods for Britain than for the 
other countries.
At the most conservative estimate, therefore, Britain’s managerial share rises from 6.5% 
in the mid-1970s to 13% by 2002.33 Comparison among the various series for Britain 
reveals that, while all point to a rise in the managerial employment share of 70%-100% 
over its initial level during the last quarter of the 20th century, the combination of NES 
data and the SOC 1990 classification records higher levels at all points in time than do 
the other data sets and classifications. This observation is consistent with two facts.
First, the NES tends to undersample low-paid employees, thus relatively boosting the 
shares of more highly paid occupations (Stuttard 2002). And second, for any given data 
set the SOC 1990 classification is recognized to assess the managerial share of 
employment at a higher level than ISCO-88 and its close derivatives (SOC 2000 
included), as it deploys a slightly broader definition of managerial jobs, e.g., it includes 
senior clerical roles in the managerial category whereas ISCO and SOC 2000 do not 
(Beerten, Rainford et al. 2001).
In contrast to the British results, while France and Germany also exhibit growth in their 
managerial shares of employment, they do so from rather lower initial levels (4.2% and 
3% respectively according to ISCO-88). These comparative results, derived from similar 
data sets set up in identical formats, are broadly corroborated by ELFS results for the 
period since 1993 (Table 3). These data also show that Britain has a much higher 
employment share in managerial occupations than France or Germany (here, all of
32 ‘Germany’ is defined in the same way as in Chapter two -  i.e., I refer to the former FRG or current 
western Lander only.
33 This estimate is drawn from GHS data expressed in terms of SOC2000, which is the classification that is 
most precise about which types of worker are managers and which are not.
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unified Germany), and indeed is something of an outlier in this respect compared to the 
rest of the EU-15, Republic of Ireland excepted. In some ways, this is a surprising 
finding. In particular, the idea that Britain has possessed outlier status in this dimension 
over a period of decades does not chime with previous conclusions that placed Britain in 
a middling position in the mid-1970s, with relatively fewer managers than France, and 
relatively more than West Germany (Maurice, Sorge et al. 1980). What may explain this 
discrepancy, however, is that those conclusions derived from a much narrower sample (a 
small number of manufacturing plants only) and a very different methodology (the 
researchers’ own survey design and classification of occupations). Thus, it is certainly 
possible that both sets of results may be accurate reflections of reality as it stood.
In order to clarify the precise form of the demand shift towards managers, Figures 2 and
3 use NES data to illustrate the evolution of the internal composition of the occupational 
group of British managers, defined at the 2-digit level of SOC 1990. Figure 2 shows that 
the bulk of the relative growth of the managerial share of employment is accounted for by 
the rapid and massive expansion of the categories of ‘financial managers’ and -  
especially -  ‘specialist managers’. Figure 3 introduces the second aspect of demand 
growth, showing that the wage bill shares of these categories of managers grow even 
more rapidly than their shares of employment. This result indicates that these groups 
experience relatively high wage growth over time. A further measure of detail can be 
gained by probing trends at the 3-digit level of SOC 1990, which is the most 
disaggregated level of occupational classification available in the data used here. Figure
4 shows the changes in wage bill shares of the subcategories that make up the ‘specialist’ 
manager group in this system of classification. As can be seen, most of the subcategories 
grow at a similar rate to the group as a whole, although the case could be made that the 
group of ‘ICT managers’ expands even more quickly than the others. In absolute terms, 
though, by far the greatest weight is incurred in all periods by the groups of ‘treasury and 
finance’ and ‘marketing and sales’ managers, suggesting that a continuous and 
widespread rise in demand for these varieties of employees drives much of the headline 
result over the long term.
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In light of these results, it appears that the managerial share of British employment has 
grown steadily and at a non-negligible rate since the mid-1980s, and maybe since even 
earlier. Furthermore, this pattern of growth is shown by results drawn from a number of 
different data sets to be something of an outlier within the context of Western Europe. 
Certainly, only the Republic of Ireland appears to have undergone any comparable 
process of change. Consequently, these employment share results provide strong 
evidence that in Britain the pattern of labour demand has shifted towards managers in 
recent years, and they are supported by the results of Chapter two’s job analysis. 
Examination of the precise form of the demand shift towards managers indicates that it is 
largely driven by specialist managerial groups in the functional areas of finance and 
marketing/sales.
If demand for managers in Britain has been increasing, then, the question arises as to 
whether this outcome is merely the product of change in the composition of economic 
activity. As a first means of exploring this idea, I perform a set of logistic regressions of 
‘specialist manager’ status (i.e., membership of SOC 1990 minor group 12, the group for 
which demand appears to have grown most rapidly) on a set of industry and sector 
dummies in a number of time periods between 1975 and 2001. Were the results of these 
regressions to show that industry coefficients were unstable over time, it would suggest 
that the headline growth in the managerial share of employment was the product of 
across-industry variation over time in shares of overall employment -  that is, industries 
which began the period with high managerial shares of employment were the ones that 
exhibited the greatest gains in shares of overall employment over time. Table 4 presents 
the results of these regressions. For the most part, the structure of these coefficients 
remains stable -  industries in which employees are relatively more likely (or less likely) 
to be members of this managerial group remain so. While there are some signs of change 
-  extraction, business services, and possibly manufacturing become relatively more 
manager-intensive, whereas utilities and transport and communication shift in the 
opposite direction -  these are relatively muted. Consequently, these results tend to 
suggest that the growth of the managerial share of employment has been an intra-industry
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phenomenon rather than one driven by change in the inter-industry composition of 
overall employment.
I seek to corroborate this finding by performing a form of shift-share analysis of changes 
in the managerial share of employment by broad industry group (see Table 5). This 
exercise explores the relative contributions of change in intra-industry occupational 
employment structure and change in across-industry occupational employment structure 
to change in the occupational composition of overall employment. It does so by 
comparing the actually observed managerial employment shares in 2004 to 
counterfactuals generated by applying 1974’s intra-industry managerial shares to 2004’s 
overall distribution of employment. As a result of this analysis, I find that only 7% of 
growth in the headline managerial share of employment across the economy can be 
attributed to inter-industry effects. A similar exercise conducted around the dimension of 
employer size (by employment) finds that an even smaller share of the growth in the 
managerial share of employment can be explained by shifts in employment among 
employer size classes. Thus, the longstanding trend for employment to shift towards 
smaller establishments and enterprises (Kersley, Alpin et al. 2006) does not appear to 
contribute to the outcome of interest. Collectively, these results indicate that the 
observed rise in managerial employment intensity is not due to composition effects (i.e., 
relative growth in the overall employment share of industrial or size-class categories that 
initially exhibited a high level of managerial employment intensity). As a consequence, 
the growth of the overall managerial share of employment appears to be chiefly an intra­
category (industry or size class) phenomenon, and perhaps even an intra-organizational 
one.
In summarizing the results of the first element of this chapter’s empirical enquiry, 
therefore, we might first say that Britain is (and has long been) an outlier within Europe 
as regards its managerial share of employment, and in relation to the growth in demand 
for managers over time. Second, the overall growth in demand for British managers is 
driven in particular by increased demand for highly skilled managers specialized in 
particular matters of finance, commerce, technology, and organization. Third, the
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observed employment share and underlying demand shifts do not appear to be related to 
change in the overall composition of employment that relates to macro-level change in 
the structure of British economic activity, e.g., tertiarization. Indeed, although there are 
some significant but slight changes in managerial intensity across industries, sectors, and 
organizational size classes, the lion’s share of change has occurred within categories of 
economic activity. It seems very plausible, therefore, that these changes are rooted in 
processes of evolution taking place within organizations -  a theme to which I will return 
shortly.
This brings me to the second element of the empirical enquiry. I begin by examining the 
evidence for change in skills production systems for managers. Initially, this involves 
measuring change in the observable skills (qualification and experience) of managers, 
and in the returns that they generate. My intention is to understand which kinds of skills 
managers own and are rewarded for in different time periods, and the extent to which 
these skills are monopolized by managers. A useful point of reference for this 
component of the analysis is Crockett and Elias’s (1984) study of British managers in the 
mid-1970s, which draws on data from the 1975-1976 National Training Survey (NTS) to 
find that managers in Britain in this period typically had low levels of education and 
training in comparison with their peers in other industrialized countries. In fact, the 
authors conclude, British managers at this time were on average only marginally better 
educated than the average in the general population.
I address the issue of observable skills with reference to the GHS data series, which 
provides consistently defined information on occupation, human capital characteristics, 
and, to a lesser extent, job/employer characteristics for the period from 1974 to 2004. In 
its descriptive aspects, the trends in the GHS data in such variables as occupational and 
gender shares of employment, the distributions of age, tenure, and qualifications of 
employees, and so on, are in the main very similar to equivalent results derived from 
NES and LFS data. This suggests that the GHS will provide results vis-a-vis managers 
that are consistent with the results already noted. In contrast to Crockett and Elias’s 
results, I find that managers are on average considerably more highly qualified than the
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general population in all time periods. However, this result is consistent with the fact that 
the definition of ‘managers’ used for the GHS data is more exclusive than the CODOT- 
based equivalent used in the earlier study. Like Crockett and Elias, I fmd that more than 
50% of managers in the mid-1970s declare they have no formal qualifications. By 2004, 
though, this share drops to around 8%. This general over-time pattern is reinforced by 
the observation in all time periods that younger cohorts of managers are on average 
progressively better educated than their older peers.
In order to explore further the observation of rising qualifications among managers, I 
conduct logit regressions of ISCO 1-digit managerial status on a familiar set of individual 
(i.e., human capital) and employer characteristics for a number of years between 1975 
and 2004. This analysis permits me to identify change in the likelihood with which 
managerial status is associated with observable skills (qualifications and experience) 
while controlling for other individual characteristics -  Table 6 presents the results. While 
some features of the results remain consistent over time -  e.g., the tendency for managers 
to be older and to have longer tenure than their non-manager counterparts -  there are also 
important shifts that take place. Most pertinently, educational qualifications 
progressively become much more systematically related to managerial status over the 
duration examined.
At the outset, in 1975, managers are not significantly more likely to hold higher levels of 
qualifications than non-managers -  apart from in the initial step from no qualifications to 
some kind of qualification. Yet, by the turn of the century, managers are significantly 
more likely than non-managers to hold a particular level of qualification in a way that is 
strongly and positively associated with the level of qualification. Thus, the greatest 
difference between managers and non-managers occurs at the degree level. This shift 
begins in the 1980s with an emergent stratification by level of qualification, and becomes 
more pronounced over time, suggesting a process of increasing sorting of potential 
managers by education or qualification level that would be consistent with a notion of a 
credential-led ‘professionalization’ of British management. The rising tendency for 
managers to be selected by their qualifications is suggestive evidence of a greater
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distinction between managers and other types of employee -  at least, as defined by 
recruitment pools -  and an indicator, perhaps, of the end of the tendency for British 
managers largely to graduate from the ranks of non-managerial employees. Such a 
process would echo that observed in the US in the first half of the 20th century (Jacoby 
1985; Jacoby 1991).
If it appears that, over time, employers progressively place greater emphasis on formal 
qualifications as a means of distinguishing between managers and non-managers, we 
might expect that this occurs because these qualifications -  or the skills associated with 
them -  become increasingly valuable to firms if deployed in managerial roles. A means 
of testing this supposition is to examine the relationship between earnings and 
qualifications among managers, and the ways in which it changes over time. I perform 
this test by conducting earnings regressions of the wages of full-time managers on a set 
of individual and employer characteristics for a number of years between 1975 and 2004 
(see Table 7 for the results). The important observations that emerge from these results 
are that, while returns to age remain relatively stable (and inconsequential, beyond the 
age of 30) over time, returns to tenure drop significantly after 1990. At the same time, 
returns to education -  and to a university degree in particular -  rise notably over the same 
period. Indeed, similar regressions conducted for non-managerial employees show that 
the rise in returns to education among managers is far more rapid than among non­
managers. Indeed, among the latter group the structure of returns is quite stable over 
time for those holding A-levels or better qualifications. These observations reinforce the 
impression that a general transition has taken place in which employers decreasingly 
value skills acquired through general experience in managerial roles, and increasingly 
value skills associated with high qualifications. It appears, therefore, that British 
managers -  as a group -  have not only become increasingly detached from other types of 
employees,34 but that high skills (represented by degree-level qualifications or above) 
have also tended to become concentrated among their ranks. Moreover, employers, for
34 This conclusion implies that British firms increasingly fill managerial vacancies by two means only: for 
lower grade managerial roles they recruit recent graduates directly into the management track; and for more 
senior roles they recruit individuals with prior managerial experience. Over time, therefore, these processes 
would create a managerial group impermeable to those who had not originally entered it through the first 
means.
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their part, seem to have valued -  and therefore rewarded -  this combination of high skills 
and managerial roles ever more highly.
From the perspective of the ‘societal effects’ approach, therefore, there is evidence that 
the British skills production system -  principally as it relates to managerial skills, but 
with implications for the overall distribution of skills -  has changed substantially over the 
last two or three decades. As this approach predicts that skills systems will covary on the 
one hand with industrial relations systems and on the other with systems of hierarchy and 
work organization, one might expect change in the first dimension to be accompanied by 
change in the others. Turning to the question of industrial relations systems, my intention 
is to investigate whether there is evidence that these have changed in ways that grant 
managers greater control over organizational decision making at the level of the 
individual organization. I draw on WERS time-series data in order to address this issue.
That British industrial relations arrangements have undergone a great deal of change in 
the years since 1980 is well known, with substantial reductions in rates of union 
membership and collective contract coverage having occurred (Howell 1999; Brown, 
Marginson et al. 2001). These headline shifts are reflected in establishment-level trends 
observable in the WERS data series. Table 8 presents the evolution of a number of key 
measures of industrial relations arrangements between 1980 and 2004. It can readily be 
seen that the spread and weight of union influence as captured by local membership 
density shrinks greatly over time. Thus, for example, the share of establishments with no 
union members rises from 27% to over 50%, while the share of heavily unionized 
establishments (75% density or more) sinks from over 30% to 13%. Beyond this 
hollowing out of unions as membership organizations within workplaces, the institutions 
of collectively bargained regulation of employment also wither. For instance, the share 
of establishments in which one or more unions are recognized for collective bargaining 
purposes declines from a comfortable majority (64%) to less than 40%. In addition, even 
where unions retain collective bargaining rights, the share of the establishment workforce 
for which they are able to bargain steadily contracts over time. Consequently, the share
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of establishments in which almost all employees (80% or more) are covered by collective 
bargaining arrangements dips from an initial half to around a third.
However, the contraction of institutions that enable non-managerial workers to influence 
processes of organizational decision making is not limited to those relating to unions and 
collective bargaining. In a related trend, the share of establishments with some kind of 
joint consultative committee -  an institution through which non-managerial employees 
may discuss their concerns with management, even in the absence of union organization 
-  shrinks from 34% to 24%. At the level of the establishment, therefore, we may 
conclude that the dominant trend in industrial relations systems (broadly understood) is 
one of a steady reduction in the scope of mechanisms of organization and voice through 
which employees can present and enforce consideration of their interests in the 
organizational decision making. Owing to the retrenchment of these institutions, it 
appears that unilateral managerial control of organizational decision making has become 
a viable reality in an increasing share of British organizations.
This finding propels the enquiry forward to consider the issue of change in the role of 
managers in the typical approach to work organization in Britain. My main aim in this 
component of the analysis is to assess the evidence for signs that managers have become 
more prominent in this approach -  i.e., evidence that the system of work organization 
adopted makes the production process more reliant on managerial input. As a first step, I 
look at the evolution of the occupational composition of the workforce as a means of 
understanding whether the managerial intensity of production has changed within 
workplaces over time. I would expect a rising share of managerial employment to signal 
a greater role for managers in the process of production. Examination of trends in 
relation to the occupational composition of the establishment-level workforce shows that 
the weight of management in the workforce increases over time and is a widespread 
phenomenon.
Table 9 presents the mean establishment-level employment shares of the different 
occupational groups that can be discerned in the WERS time-series data. It is apparent
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that -  as observed at the level of the whole labour market -  the managerial share of 
employment has risen over time at the level of individual establishments. Notably, this 
trend is true on both sides of the divide between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ occupational 
classifications (i.e., on the one hand 1980-1990, and on the other 1998-2004), which 
suggests that this result is no mere function of the transition from one classification to 
another. Other trends familiar from the study of macro-employment trends -  the rise in 
the employment shares of other non-manual groups, the steep decline in that of skilled 
manual workers, and the rise of female and part-time employment -  are also visible at the 
establishment level. The consistency of these results with those obtained from surveys 
with very different units of observation and collection methodologies is reassuring for the 
interpretation of the WERS data. As regards the distribution of establishment-level 
employment shares of management, much of the rise in the mean over time seems to be 
driven by a 20 percentage point drop in the share of workplaces with less than 5% of 
employment represented by managers, and a corresponding rise in the share of 
establishments with a 10% or greater managerial share of employment.
A primary concern in this regard, however, stems from the fact that the profile of 
economic activity in Britain has changed greatly over the period in question.35 The 
question is whether it may be the case that any observed trend towards a greater role for 
management in the typical approach to work organization simply reflects underlying 
change in the composition of the population of workplaces. Effectively, this is to argue 
that the types of workplaces in which managers are prominent in production at the 
beginning of the period may be those that become comparatively more common during 
the process of industrial change, but that they do so for reasons unrelated to their chosen 
system of work organization. To summarize the WERS trends regarding industrial
35 The WERS time series data provide evidence of considerable change in the form of economic activity in 
Britain between 1980 and 2004 (among organizations with 25 employees or more). During this period, 
patterns of ownership and control shift, with the share of establishments belonging to the public sector 
declines from more than 30% to around 25%. The sectoral distribution of establishments changes such that 
the share of manufacturing establishments nearly halves from an initial level of 25%. Large establishments 
become significantly less common, with the share of establishments with 500 or more employees dropping 
from around 35% to 23%. In addition, the share of establishments belonging to very large organizations 
(with 10,000 employees or more) declines from over 30% to 23%. In the course of this reshaping of 
production, the share of the oldest establishments (aged 25 years or more) falls from 53% to 47% as the 
share of the youngest (aged 10 or less) rises.
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change over the period 1980-2004, the median establishment becomes smaller -  and, if it 
belongs to a multi-establishment organization, so does its parent -  younger, and much 
more likely to be privately owned and to operate in the service sector.
The impact of changes in the distribution of economic activity appears to contribute little 
to the overall trends the composition of workplace employment. Notably, there has been 
growth in the managerial share of employment of a similar order in both manufacturing 
and service establishments, although the initial level is lower in manufacturing.
Similarly, the decline of the skilled manual share of employment is almost identical in 
both sectors. Where they do differ in occupational employment trends is that the 
manufacturing sector appears to have become considerably more intensive in its 
employment of professional and technical workers, although this may be a function of 
employment retrenchment on the shop floor as much as a sign of a different trajectory of 
organizational development. Comparison of the public and private sectors reveals that 
public-sector establishments are less managerial employment-intensive in all time 
periods, even though both sectors exhibit the same rising trend in this area. In addition, 
public-sector workplaces consistently employ a greater share of professional and 
technical workers than their private-sector counterparts. This observation is particularly 
interesting in the light of the fact that the managerial share of establishment employment 
is higher -  and the professional/technical and skilled manual shares lower -  in all time 
periods in workplaces without union recognition than in those where unions are 
recognized. Given the comparatively greater strength of unions in the public sector, these 
results would appear to be interlinked in a manner consistent with the expectations of the 
‘societal approach’.
In quantitative terms, therefore, managers have become considerably more important to 
the approach to production adopted by British organizations across the manufacturing 
and service sectors, and across the public and private sectors. Another aspect of work 
organization through which the importance of managerial input may be assessed regards 
the issue of intra-organizational communication. The relevance of this variable is due to 
the importance of this type of communication to the integration and coordination of
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complex production. The WERS time series contains a number of variables on this 
subject, and they shed light on the extent to which organizational activity is steered by 
centralized, rationalized means. Table 10 shows that the scope of information provision 
by management has tended to rise over time, especially in its most intensive form, 
suggesting that managerial hierarchies are becoming more adept over time at 
communicating information down through the ranks and controlling activity from the top. 
Consistent with this observation are the findings that the systematic use of the 
management chain has become more common over time, and that the usage rate for 
briefing groups has grown massively. Collectively, these trends are indicative of the 
spread of a more systematic, top-down approach to management -  which privileges 
managerial input to the production process -  in British workplaces during the period 
1980-2004.
From the perspective of the ‘societal effects’ approach, therefore, the evidence so far 
presented for the period between the late-1970s and the early-2000s indicates that: 
managerial skills formation has taken a distinctive form relative to that of other 
employees; industrial relations institutions have evolved in ways that open the way in 
many organizations for more-or-less unilateral management control of organizational 
decision making; and the typical approach to work organization has developed so as to 
raise the importance of managerial input to the production process. Thus it would appear 
that these variables have covaried in the manner predicted by the theoretical framework. 
In order to test this apparent covariation in a systematic manner, I perform regressions -  
for each year available and also in pooled form -  of the establishment-level managerial 
share of employment on a set of indicators of industrial relations and work organization 
and a set of control variables. This method acts as a robustness check on the preceding 
‘societal effects’ analyses, as it enables me further to probe the contribution of 
composition effects (in relation to establishment characteristics) upon the variables of 
interest, and to understand if the covariation so far observed stands up to the 
simultaneous inclusion of the three key groups of variables in the model.
172
Tables 11 and 12 report the results of these regressions. Because the time series can only 
offer a limited number of variables for the full period between 1980 and 2004, the 
regressions featured in Table 11 take a reduced, or simple, form that cannot explicitly 
address the issue of work organization. However, the regressions reported in Table 12, 
which relate only to the years 1984, 1998, and 2004, exploit a richer set of variables in 
order to plug this gap in the analysis. The control variables used in both sets of 
regressions comprise indicators for industrial activity, establishment size by employment, 
whether the establishment belongs to a single- or multi-establishment organization, 
public- or private-sector status, head office status, and measures of the establishment 
employment shares of female and part-time workers. The ‘rich’ regressions featured in 
Table 12 also control for the establishment employment shares of key non-managerial 
(occupational) skill groups: professional/technical workers, and skilled manual workers. 
In order that the tables remain manageable in size, the coefficients are not for the most 
part reported for these control variables. However, the coefficients for the industry 
indicators are reported in the table to enable the exploration of industry-type effects.
Despite the differing forms of the models used in the two sets of regressions, their results 
are largely consistent with one another where their variables overlap. The evidence for 
industry effects is rather limited, with only perhaps the transport and communication 
industry showing signs of being particularly distinctive (with a lower typical workplace 
managerial share of employment). This observation reinforces the conclusion made 
above that changes in respect of other variables -  dependent and independent -  are of a 
within- rather than an across-industry nature, that is, that establishments in different 
industries are evolving in similar ways.
Of the other variables appearing in both sets of regressions, the most important are those 
representing union density rates at the establishment level and the time dummies in the 
pooled regressions. In both simple and rich iterations, the pattern of time dummies in the 
pooled regressions suggests that the overall rise in the mean managerial share of 
establishment-level employment is a significant fact over and above the changes in the 
composition of the British population of establishments during the period in question.
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However, this is not to say that all establishments are evolving in the same way. Notably, 
union density becomes significantly and quantitatively more negatively associated with 
the managerial share of employment. The variable for the existence of a joint 
consultative committee tells no consistent story. These results indicate that unionized 
and non-unionized establishments become steadily more different over time regarding 
their approach to work organization and hierarchy.
This inference is further reinforced by the pattern of coefficients for the additional 
variables reported in Table 12. Here, the scope of information provision by management 
becomes positively and significantly associated with the managerial share of employment 
over time, suggesting that more manager-intensive organizations also engage in more 
systematic managerial behaviour around the coordination and control of production. In 
addition, the age of the establishment becomes significantly and quantitatively more 
negatively associated with the managerial share of employment in the course of time.
This last finding is consistent with the conclusions of Machin (2000), who also uses 
WERS data to identify a strong negative correlation between establishment age and local 
union strength in the private sector. He further finds that workplaces set up after 1980 
are significantly less likely to be unionized than those created prior to this date. The 
sharpest impact of this effect is found in the manufacturing sector, although the lower 
rate of change among the service industries is partly explained by the lower initial 
unionization rate found in that sector. No similar relationship can be observed for public- 
sector workplaces. If one takes the perspective that the growth of the managerial share is 
an indicator of new forms of work organization and hierarchy, there are good grounds for 
expecting a significant relationship between this variable and workplace age owing to the 




This chapter addresses the question of whether change in the centrality of managers to the 
production model adopted by British organizations might have contributed to rising 
demand for managers, and thereby to the growth of top-tier pay inequality. It is 
motivated in doing so by three factors: First, Chapter two of this thesis could not find 
evidence that the rise in relative demand specifically for managers observed in Britain 
since the late-1970s had also occurred in either France or Germany. This finding implied 
that the causes of the rise in demand were not of a universal type in the manner 
envisioned by, say, the simple form of the SBTC hypothesis. Second, as this thesis had 
already ruled out said version of the SBTC hypothesis (see Chapter two) and 
organizational governance arrangements (see Chapter three) as explanations for the 
British rise in demand for managers, another possible explanation appeared to be a 
version of the skill-technology complementarity hypothesis that accounted for interaction 
between this complementarity and the degree of centrality of managers in production in a 
given location. Third, as the research consensus had historically been that British 
managers were not particularly central to production -  certainly not to the extent that, 
say, French and US managers were thought to be -  a reappraisal of the role of British 
managers in production over the last two decades or so was necessary. If it could be 
shown that British managers had become much more central to the production process 
during this time, it would validate the case for the modified skill-technology 
complementarity hypothesis, and thereby open a promising new path of enquiry for the 
study -  currently somewhat at a standstill -  of international differences in pay inequality 
trends.
The approach of the paper is to apply the insights of the ‘societal effects’ framework to 
suitable data in order to assess the degree of change in the centrality of managers to 
production in British organizations. This is combined with an empirical clarification and 
confirmation of the existence and dimensions of the demand shift towards managers that 
has occurred in recent years. This conclusion revisits the aims of the chapter,
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summarizes the findings of the empirical analyses, and discusses their meaning in the 
wider context of the thesis.
The first element of empirical study relates to the issue of demand for managers in 
Britain. Here, the evidence leads me to infer that there has been a notable shift in relative 
labour demand in Britain towards managers, and that this demand shift has strongly 
contributed to the rise in overall British pay inequality observed at the top of distribution. 
In comparative terms, Britain appears to have experienced higher rates of growth in 
demand for managers than many other European countries. Indeed, Britain appears to be 
an outlier in that most other countries in Europe have experienced little or no growth in 
this aspect of labour demand. Further, I conclude that this demand growth is linked 
particularly closely to highly skilled managers specialized in particular matters of 
finance, commerce, technology, and organizational functioning. These results are robust 
to the contention that the apparent growth in the employment share of managers is due to 
superficial processes of change such as ‘title inflation’. Perhaps most importantly, it 
appears that the growth in demand is largely an intra-organizational phenomenon rather 
than a trend driven by compositional change over time in the profile of economic activity 
(by sector, firm size, etc.).
This last finding supports the idea that the growth in demand for managers is linked to 
changes in their role in production within organizations. The chapter’s second set of 
empirical analyses tests this idea directly, examining in turn changes in relation to the key 
variables of skills production systems, industrial relations systems, and work 
organization. In this section, it is first of all found that in respect of skills the 
occupational group of British managers has progressively absorbed a greater share of 
high skills, detached its career ladders from those of other occupational groups to become 
increasingly self-sufficient, and for doing so has been ever better rewarded by employers. 
Second, industrial relations systems have changed in ways such that managers 
increasingly control organizational decision making on a unilateral basis. Third, 
organizations’ approach to work organization has typically shifted so as to increase the 
importance of managers’ contribution to the production process. Moreover, these trends
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are robust to a modelling approach that accounts for change in the composition of 
economic activity over time, and enables the simultaneous modelling of the three key 
variables. Viewing the evidence in light of the ‘societal effects’ framework, therefore, I 
contend that, since around 1980, managers have become significantly more central to the 
production process in the typical British organization.
Summarizing my argument, I note that the manager-led growth in top-tier pay inequality 
has coincided in Britain with the rise in the centrality of managers to production, all at the 
same time that high-skill-complementary ICT innovations have been increasingly widely 
implemented by employers. Furthermore, I find that no comparable growth of pay 
inequality has occurred in a number of similar countries in Europe. While there is only 
limited evidence on the trajectory of the role of managers in production in those countries 
-  and I do not measure any such change here -  the British outcomes suggest that the 
production context is important in influencing the impact of exogenous variables such as 
technological development on the distribution of pay. More broadly, this finding argues 
against the idea that variables such as technology exert a deterministic and predictable 
effect on pay inequality. In this way, my study points to a way out of the impasse faced 
by researchers who seek to explain growing pay inequality with reference to SBTC or 
variants upon it (for discussion of this, see Card and DiNardo 2002; Howell 2002; 
Lemieux 2007), i.e., that while technological factors cannot plausibly account for across- 
country difference of pay inequality trends, many developed countries have not 
experienced growth in pay inequality of the type observed in the UK, US, and other 
Anglophone countries. In addition, the findings of this chapter support those who 
emphasize the importance of the underlying historical and institutional context in the 
determination of economic outcomes (e.g., Marsden 1986; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; 
Marsden 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001b; Thelen 2004).
A key contribution of the chapter, therefore, is its finding that skill-technology 
complementarity effects appear contingent upon the context in which they take place. As 
a result, it argues plausibly for a renewed approach to the study of pay inequality trends 
that will interpret results derived using the economic model in conjunction with rich
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contextual data on organizations and the political economy in which they are embedded. 
The study of the institutional and historical context in which economic change takes 
place -  and its incorporation into the kinds of rigorous approaches to hypothesis 
generation and modelling typically applied in the field of economics -  promises rich 
results for future researchers who choose this path.
In an additional -  but subsidiary -  contribution, the chapter broadens our understanding 
of the role of management in British organizations. Its conclusions challenge the 
(somewhat dated) consensus that management was, in comparative terms, a rather 
amateurish and sidelined factor in the functioning of British organizations. The recent 
data used to generate the results presented here indicate that this picture has altered 
radically, and that British management is now a much more structured, controlling, 
professional, and -  ultimately -  prominent element of the production model of British 
organizations.
Overall, this chapter supports the idea that the market-based explanation of rising top-tier 
pay inequality in Britain is much more convincing than the non-market explanation tested 
in the preceding chapter -  on the condition that particular aspects of the historical and 
institutional context of the labour market is taken into account. Ultimately, it seems that 
British organizations appear to value managers relatively much more highly now than 
they did in the past, and have been reorganizing themselves in ways that have strongly 
reinforced this trend. From the perspective of this thesis, the key outcome of these 
changes is that top-tier pay inequality has risen largely on the back of the shift in relative 
labour demand towards managers.
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Tables
Table 1: Occupation and managerial duties in Britain, 1981-2004









Note: weighted LFS data
Note: ‘managers’ are defined by 1-digit SOC 2000=1; all other occupations are 2<=SOC 2000<=9 
Note: LFS question asks respondent whether he or she performs managerial duties or supervises other 
employees in their job
Note: standard errors on point estimates are negligible (<0.005 in every case)
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Table 2: Occupational composition of employment, 1976-2002
Country/year Milit MgrI Prof
ISCO-88 major group (% employment)
Ass»c Clerk Svc ^  < prof fish Craft Oper Elem
Britain (NES)
1976 8.1 11.7 6.5 21.4 9.4 0.6 17.7 13.8 10.9
1984 - 8.8 13.5 7.8 22.3 10.3 0.6 15.1 11.3 10.5
1993 - 11.4 15.0 8.2 23.6 11.7 0.4 11.3 9.6 8.9
2001 - 14.0 16.0 8.2 21.6 15.3 0.4 8.9 8.1 7.5
France
1976 - - - - - - - - - -
1984 1.2 4.2 8.2 15.7 16.0 10.5 4.6 14.3 15.4 8.8
1993 1.8 5.6 9.3 17.8 15.7 12.3 2.8 13.2 12.0 8.5
2002 1.5 5.7 10.8 18.9 15.6 13.6 2.0 12.2 11.2 8.5
Western
Germany
1976 - - - - - - - - - -
1984 1.0 3.0 11.5 19.0 12.9 11.8 0.7 22.3 9.7 7.9
1993 0.8 3.4 12.7 20.5 14.7 12.0 0.5 19.0 8.9 7.3
2002 0.8 5.1 17.2 22.1 14.9 11.0 0.7 12.5 7.5 8.2
Note: table continues overleaf.
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Country/year Mgrl
UK SOC 2000 major group (% employment)
Prof Clerk C raft Svc Sales prof Oper Elem
Britain (LFS)
1976
1984 - - - - - - - - -
1993 11.8 11.8 10.8 17.5 10.9 6.3 7.4 9.8 13.6
2002 13.7 11.5 13.5 14.6 9.3 7.6 8.7 8.2 13.1
Britain (GHS)
1976 6.5 7.4 7.6 16.7 16.1 7.2 7.4 15.1 16.1
1984 8.6 9.7 9.5 17.3 13.9 7.2 7.1 11.9 14.8
1993 10.9 12.1 10.7 18.4 10.5 6.3 7.6 9.6 14.1




1984 3.3 11.7 17.9 12.7 22.2 4.3 1.4 12.8 13.8
1993 3.9 12.9 20.1 14.4 18.8 5.5 1.4 11.2 12.0
2002 6.0 17.8 21.2 14.3 13.1 4.6 1.0 9.1 13.6
UK SOC1990 major group (% employment)
Country/year Mgrl Prof Assocprof Clerk Craft Svc Sales Oper Elem
Britain (NES)
1976 9.2 7.7 7.2 20.0 17.7 6.4 5.5 15.9 10.4
1984 9.9 8.2 9.0 20.8 15.1 7.7 6.2 13.1 9.9
1993 12.5 9.0 10.2 22.0 11.3 8.4 7.0 11.1 8.6
2001 15.1 10.3 10.0 20.0 8.9 10.3 8.6 9.5 7.3
Note: LFS, NES, GHS, Enquete emploi, and GSOEP data
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Table 3: Occupational composition of employment in selected EU comparator
countries, 1993-2005
Country/
year Milit Mgrl Prof
ISCO-88 major group (% employment)
ASS0.C Clerk Svc Ag/* Craft prof fish Oper Elem NK
EU-15
1993 - - - - - - - - - - -
1996 0.7 7.9 11.8 13.4 13.0 12.5 3.8 15.4 8.4 8.3 4.7
1999 0.7 8.3 12.9 14.4 13.1 13.4 3.5 15.3 8.7 8.7 1.0
2002 0.7 8.1 12.7 15.7 12.8 14.0 3.2 14.4 8.4 9.5 0.7
2005 0.7 8.9 13.6 16.6 12.0 13.5 2.9 13.6 8.0 9.9 0.4
France
1993 - - - - - - - - - - -
1996 - - - - - - - - - - -
1999 - - - - - - - - - - -
2002 - - - - - - - - - - -
2005 1.3 7.8 12.9 17.6 12.2 12.5 4.1 12.3 9.6 9.6 0.2
Germany (all)
1993 0.8 6.0 11.2 18.8 13.4 10.6 2.4 20.0 8.3 8.6
1996 0.6 5.8 12.1 19.7 12.9 11.3 2.1 18.9 7.8 7.3 1.4
1999 0.6 5.8 12.9 19.8 12.7 11.4 2.2 17.9 7.4 8.0 1.3
2002 0.6 5.8 13.3 20.8 12.7 11.7 2.0 16.6 7.3 7.9 1.4
2005 0.6 5.4 14.6 21.4 12.3 12.1 1.9 15.2 7.1 7.9 1.4
Ireland
1993 2.2 8.7 15.1 4.1 14.2 17.0 9.8 12.1 8.3 8.5 -
1996 0.8 8.9 17.4 4.1 14.1 16.7 8.6 12.2 8.5 8.6 -
1999 0.5 17.8 15.2 5.5 13.4 14.9 1.0 13.4 9.3 9.1 -
2002 0.4 17.3 16.3 5.6 13.4 15.4 0.9 12.6 9.6 8.4 -
2005 0.4 15.8 16.9 6.2 12.9 16.1 0.7 14.2 7.9 9.0 -
Italy
1993 0.9 2.8 8.9 13.7 13.1 15.5 4.7 21.6 9.0 9.9 -
1996 0.9 3.0 9.8 14.6 13.5 15.9 3.9 19.7 9.4 9.3 -
1999 1.0 3.3 10.2 14.5 13.1 15.1 3.4 18.4 9.4 8.3 3.3
2002 1.0 3.3 10.7 17.2 13.9 15.9 3.0 17.6 8.9 8.5 -
2005 1.1 9.2 9.9 19.5 11.5 10.6 2.4 16.9 9.3 9.7 -
Netherlands
1993 - - - - - - - - - - -
1996 0.5 12.0 16.0 16.9 11.8 12.0 1.7 10.9 7.1 7.0 4.1
1999 0.6 11.7 17.7 17.3 11.9 12.0 1.6 10.4 6.5 7.6 2.6
2002 0.5 11.9 16.9 17.0 11.6 12.0 1.4 9.1 5.7 8.5 5.4 .
2005 0.4 9.7 19.1 18.3 12.8 13.5 1.6 9.1 5.8 8.9 0.7
Note: table continues overleaf.
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ISCO-88 major group (% employment)
Country/




fish Craft Oper Elem NK
Spain
1993 0.4 7.8 9.5 6.0 12.0 13.0 8.2 18.3 10.9 14.0 -
1996 0.5 8.5 11.4 8.1 10.2 13.8 6.3 16.9 10.5 13.8 -
1999 0.5 8.1 11.6 9.1 9.7 14.0 4.9 17.1 10.6 14.4 -
2002 0.5 7.5 12.1 10.1 9.2 14.7 3.8 17.4 9.9 14.5 -
2005 0.5 6.8 12.6 11.4 9.2 15.3 3.1 16.9 9.2 15.0 -
Sweden
1993 - - - - - - - - - - -
1996 - - - - - - - - - - -
1999 0.3 4.9 15.7 20.1 10.5 18.4 2.8 11.2 10.8 5.2 0.1
2002 0.2 4.8 17.9 19.8 10.2 18.4 2.4 9.9 10.2 5.9 0.3
2005 0.2 4.7 19.2 19.8 9.0 18.8 2.3 9.6 10.2 5.9 0.1
UK
1993 0.5 14.4 15.0 8.2 16.8 13.3 1.2 13.3 8.3 9.0 -
1996 0.5 14.6 15.5 8.2 16.2 14.4 1.1 12.3 8.3 8.3 0.5
1999 0.4 14.8 16.0 8.7 16.6 15.0 1.0 11.7 7.9 7.6 0.2
2002 0.3 14.0 12.7 12.2 14.7 16.2 1.1 9.8 7.5 11.4 0.2
2005 0.3 14.7 13.7 12.4 14.1 16.6 1.1 9.5 6.8 10.6 0.2
Note: ELFS data accessed through Eurostat New Cronos
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Extraction -0.43 -0.68 -0.39 -0.35 0.01 -0.19
Manufacturing -0.18 -0.22 -0.07 -0.15 -0.17 -0.04
Utilities 0.53 0.42 0.21 0.12 -0.32 -0.27
Construction -0.42 -0.48 -0.34 -0.29 -0.41 -0.41
Hospitality -0.55 -1.26 -1.09 -0.86 -1.68 -1.29
Transport & 0.13 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.17 -0.14communication
Financial services 0.59 0.47 0.45 0.37 0.26 0.43
Business services 0.20 0.13 0.34 0.37 0.43 0.44
Public administration 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.31 -0.42 -0.56
Education -0.72 -1.06 -1.09 -0.81 -1.40 -0.99
Health -1.00 -0.67 -0.96 -0.65 -1.04 -1.03
Personal services -0.15 -0.23 -0.43 -0.19 -0.33 0.01
Sector
Public sector -0.72 -0.76 -0.77 -1.13 -1.37 -1.24
Note: NES data
Note: dependent variable is dummy for membership of SOC 1990=12 (‘specialist managers’)
Note: industry classification is SIC 1992 1-digit level; omitted category is wholesale, retail, and repair 
Note: organization size variable is only available for 1996 and 2001; its inclusion in the model barely 
disturbs industry and sector coefficients 
Note: bold indicates significance at 10% level or better
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Table 5: Shift-share analysis of occupation and industry, 1974-2004
Within-industry employment share (%)
Managers Professional and technical
Industry 1974 2004 A 1974 2004 A
Energy & extraction 0.03 0.16 3.65 0.09 0.29 2.30
Engineering & 
vehicles 0.05 0.19 2.61 0.09 0.20 1.22
Other mfg 0.05 0.17 2.45 0.06 0.17 1.96
Construction 0.05 0.19 2.56 0.08 0.14 0.77
Svcs 0.08 0.13 0.71 0.22 0.31 0.43
Transport & comms 0.05 0.13 1.41 0.08 0.13 0.59
Share o f change 
explained by inter­
industry shifts in 
employment
Note: GHS data
Note: change in employment share is recorded as proportion of initial value
Note: change in distribution of establishment size explains 2% growth of overall managerial share in 
employment in period 1983-2004
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Table 6: Logistic regressions of managerial status on individual and employer
characteristics among full-time employees, 1975-2004
Variable 1975 1980 1985
Year
1991 1995 2001 2004
Gender
Female -1.03 -0.83 -0.61 -0.66 -0.60 -0.66 -0.33
Age category
16 to 19 
20 to 24 
25 to 29 
40 to 49 
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GCSE A-C or 
equivalent 
















































































Constant -1.49 -1.77 -1.18 -1.25 -1.18 -1.25 -1.45
Note: GHS data
Note: bold indicates significance at 10% level or better
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Table 7: Earnings regressions for full-time managers, 1975-2004
Year
Variable 1975 1980 1985 1991 1995 2001 2004
Gender
Female -0.42 -0.43 -0.36 -0.34 -0.29 -0.17 -0.30
Age category
16 to 19 -0.71 -0.39 -0.93 -0.68 -0.51 -0.74 -
20 to 24 -0.54 -0.56 -0.27 -0.34 -0.46 -0.43 -0.59
25 to 29 -0.14 -0.20 -0.04 -0.14 -0.25 -0.35 -0.31
40 to 49 0.05 0.06 0.17 0.09 0.01 -0.05 0.09
50 to 59 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.03
60 or more 0.03 0.20 -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.03
Job tenure
1 to 4 years 0.07 0.11 -0.06 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.07
5 or more years 0.20 0.34 0.11 0.28 0.13 0.11 0.12
Highest qualification
Higher education, 
below degree -0.09 -0.22 -0.13 -0.26 -0.28 -0.19 -0.33
A level or equivalent -0.22 -0.29 -0.23 -0.31 -0.32 -0.35 -0.31
GCSE A-C or 
equivalent -0.24 -0.40 -0.32 -0.44 -0.48 -0.46 -0.42
CSE below grade 1 or 
equivalent -0.31 -0.54 -0.44 -0.54 -0.47 -0.44 -0.65
Other Mo qualification -0.53 -0.83 -0.53 -0.62 -0.54 -0.70 -0.60
Industry
Extraction 0.06 0.32 0.15 0.00 0. 15 0.23 0.11
Engineering & 
vehicles 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.19 0.02
Other mfg 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.20 0.15
Construction 0.05 -0.18 0.08 -0.08 -0.03 0.23 0.17
Transport & comms -0.14 0.14 0.22 0.07 0.16 0.24 0.13
Constant 6.04 6.62 6.13 6.32 6.37 6.47 6.53
Note: GHS data
Note: bold indicates significance at 10% level or better
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Table 8: Establishment-level industrial relations arrangements, 1980-2004
Establishment percentages
Year
Variable 1980 1984 1990 1998 2004
Union density
100% 16 11 7 2 2
90%-99% 11 11 9 5 4
75%o-89% 13 13 10 7 7
50%-74% 13 16 18 14 11
25%-49% 8 11 10 11 11
l%o-24%> 9 11 10 15 14
Zero 27 27 36 46 50
Recognition for collective bargaining 64 66 53 42 38
Collective bargaining coverage
100% - 36 18 17 27
80%-99% - 13 13 7 7
60%-79% - 9 8 6 3
40%-59% - 3 4 5 2
20%-39% - 3 4 3 1
1%-19% - 1 4 3 1
Zero - 34 48 59 60
Joint consultative committee 34 34 28 29 24
Note: WERS data
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Table 9: Composition of establishment-level workforces, 1980-2004






Managers 6.7 6.9 7.3 9.0 10.1
Professional and technical employees 17.9 20.7 20.1 20.0 20.6
Other non-manual employees 22.0 24.3 23.9 25.8 26.7
Skilled manual employees 16.3 14.1 14.6 10.0 7.2
Other manual employees 36.5 33.5 33.5 35.0 35.1
Other dimensions
Female employees 44.3 45.1 47.3 51.2 50.2
Part-time employees 20.2 19.5 21.4 28.4 28.6
Note: WERS data
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Scope o f information provision
No information provided 17 19 16 16
Low - 29 23 19 20
Medium - 35 29 29 31
High - 20 28 36 33
Systematic use o f management chain - 62 60 60 74
Use o f briefing groups - 36 48 53 86
Note: WERS data
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Table 11: Regressions of establishment-level managerial share of employment on
establishment characteristics, 1980-2004 -  simple form
Variable 1980 1984
Year





-0.025 0.006 -0.016 -0.012
Construction 0.010 -0.027 -0.013 -0.005 0.003 -0.005
Commerce and leisure 0.011 0.002 0.015 0.037 -0.004 0.013
Transport and 0.011 -0.017 -0.015 0.023 -0.031 -0.007communications 
Financial and business 0.014 0.014 0.021 0.016 0.005 0.015services 





0.004 0.000 0.006 0.000
25%-49% 0.000 -0.001 0.008 -0.001 -0.018 -0.004
50%-74% 0.000 -0.006 -0.002 -0.010 -0.017 -0.010
75%-89% -0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.011 -0.023 -0.008
90%-99% -0.007 -0.009 -0.004 -0.034 -0.025 -0.150






0.009 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.012 0.009
Omitted category
-0.004
1990 - - - - - 0.000
1998 - - - - - 0.018
2004 - - - - - 0.027
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.041 0.0844 0.073 0.071 0.095 0.065
N 1865 1841 1757 1889 1626 8978
R-squared 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.21
F-statistic 11.21 37.57 7.93 8.31 6.69 23.77
Note: WERS data
Note: controls include establishment size (employment), single/multi-establishment organization, 
public/private sector, head office status, and female and part-time establishment employment shares 
Note: bold indicates significance at 10% level or better
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Table 12: Regressions of establishment-level managerial share of employment on 
establishment characteristics, 1984-2004 -  rich form
Year





Commerce and leisure 
Transport and 
communications 























































committee 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010

















Systematic use o f  
management chain 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.004
Establishment age
Less than 5 years 
5-9 years 
10-24 years 



















Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.107 0.084 0.135 0.105
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N  1707 1622 1608 4937
R-squared 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.25
F-statistic 33.65 6.68 5.62 11.16
Note: WERS data
Note: controls include establishment size (employment), single/multi-establishment organization, 
public/private sector, head office status, and female, part-time, professional/technical, and skilled manual 
establishment employment shares 
Note: bold indicates significance at 10% level or better
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Figure 2: Employment shares of British managers, 1975-2000
Employment share and composition of 
managerial corps in Britain, 1975-2000
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Figure 3: Wage bill shares of British managers, 1975-2000
Wage bill share and composition of 
managerial corps in Britain, 1975-2000







4: Wage bill shares of British specialist managers, 1975-2000
Wage bill share and composition of 
specialist managers in Britain, 1975-2000
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The principal subject of this thesis is the issue of rising top-tier pay inequality in Britain 
in recent years. This issue is noteworthy because its expansion during a time of relatively 
strong and consistent economic growth in Britain -  i.e., from the mid-1990s into the new 
millennium -  marks a qualitative break with similar periods in the postwar past, during 
which pay inequality tended to remain unchanged or to narrow. Furthermore, the issue is 
important because it contributes strongly to a number of other questions of inequality 
growth or stratification (e.g., wealth, income, life chances) that are currently the subject 
of intense academic and public debate with regard to the direction in which the country is 
developing.
The thesis has explored the issue in question from a number of perspectives: through a 
comparative lens in relation to France and Germany; from a micro-political point of view 
that focuses on the influence of organizational governance arrangements; and historically, 
with reference to theoretical ideas about ‘production regimes’ and societal effects upon 
them. Theoretically and methodologically, therefore, the thesis has covered a broad 
expanse of ground. In this section I wish to reiterate the structure that underpins my 
wide-ranging approach to the subject matter, and bring to the fore the key findings of the 
thesis. I begin by presenting the argument of the thesis in resume, and then discussing 
the findings of each constituent chapter in greater detail, along the way clarifying their 
contributions to the relevant research literature and dealing with a number of likely lines 
of contention. Having completed this discussion, I bring the thesis to a close by 
reflecting upon some of the wider themes emerging from my analyses, including avenues 
for future research.
In relation to the question of rising top-tier pay inequality in Britain, the thesis initially 
finds that the top pay trend is clearly visible in the data and is of a sizeable magnitude,
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and that the prevailing explanations (SBTC and certain labour market institutions) for the 
growth of broad-based pay inequality previously observed in Britain can do little to 
explain the top pay trend. As a result, I look at the data from the viewpoint of a ‘job’ 
analysis, and discover that the trend is in large part driven by the evolution of pay for 
senior managerial jobs across the economy. I use this finding as input to my choice of 
alternative explanations for the trend that I may test. Chapters Three and Four 
respectively analyse non-market-based and market-based explanations for the evolution 
of British top-tier pay inequality. The first of these examines the influence of corporate 
or organizational governance factors on relative labour demand patterns as a means of 
probing top-tier pay inequality outcomes. It concludes that factors of this kind are of 
limited importance in explaining the trend in Britain (and France). The second approach, 
however, supports the contention that British organizations have in recent decades 
reorganized in ways that have led to increased relative demand for managers, and that 
this shift in relative demand is the key to understanding the observed top-tier pay 
inequality trend.
Chapter two’s contribution to the overall argument of the thesis lies principally in 
establishing the facts, assessing the existing explanations of pay inequality growth, and 
identifying plausible alternative directions of research. In doing so, it lays the foundation 
for the chapters that follow. The chapter focuses on the apparent top pay bias in the 
growth of British pay inequality that was noted in a number of contributions to the 
literature that used data relating to the 1990s. It approaches this subject from two main 
directions, first clarifying and confirming the existence of such a trend, and then testing 
the ability of a number of conceptual frameworks to explain it. These frameworks 
include the prevailing explanations in the literature for broad-based pay inequality growth 
-  i.e., SBTC and change in labour market institutions -  and my preferred alternative 
approach of ‘job’ analysis.
In relation to the first research angle, the chapter’s main finding is that there has been a 
clear and non-negligible top pay bias in British pay inequality growth that is visible not 
only in the data for the 1990s and 2000s, but also in the data for the decade and a half
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before 1990. Therefore, it may be concluded that the top-tier trend is as old as the overall 
trend towards greater pay inequality in the British labour market. In comparative 
perspective, the British top pay trend is not typical. Indeed, examination of French and 
German data shows that there is no common trend with regard to top pay across 
countries. France developed something of a top-tier pay inequality bias in the 1990s, but 
there is no evidence of any similar trend in Germany up to the end of the data series 
examined here (i.e., till 2002). These findings imply that country-specific factors 
contribute strongly to the determination of top pay distributional outcomes, and provide 
support for the analyses conducted in Chapters three and four of the thesis.
Turning to possible explanations of the British trend, I find that the prevailing 
explanations for the broad-based growth in pay inequality -  i.e., standard SBTC and 
change in certain labour market institutions -  cannot explain differences in top-tier pay 
inequality developments in the three countries. Consequently, I apply a job analysis 
framework to the data to discover that, in Britain, top-tier pay inequality growth is closely 
linked to managerial jobs. To a lesser extent, this is also true of France. The evidence, 
therefore, supports the inference that there has occurred in Britain a consistent shift in 
relative labour demand towards the managerial skills and characteristics associated with 
the incumbents of senior general and specialist managerial roles. Furthermore, the 
economy-wide nature of the trend implies that it is closely linked to changes within 
organizations, e.g., the restructuring of productions systems, in response to some 
stimulus.
Chapter three takes on the task of exploring the plausible non-market explanation for the 
growth of top-tier pay inequality that is identified in Chapter two, i.e., that of 
organizational governance factors. In doing so, it draws on ideas developed in the 
research literature on ‘comparative capitalism’ -  chiefly by political scientists and 
industrial relations scholars -  to examine the impact of organizational governance 
arrangements upon relative demand patterns (across managerial and non-managerial 
employee groups), and thereby upon the top end of the distribution of pay.
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The chapter initially presents evidence that Britain and France differ in relation to the 
distribution of governance types among companies operating in each country. This 
finding supports the possibility that the ‘typical’ organization in each country will 
respond differently to a given set of external conditions, and that these different responses 
may include decisions that affect the profile of relative labour demand at the level of the 
organization. However, direct modelling of the impact of the array of organizational 
governance on labour demand patterns finds only limited evidence to support the idea 
that governance factors can ultimately influence (top) pay inequality outcomes, either in 
Britain or in France. Moreover, even in Britain, where the influence of governance 
factors on the profile of organization-level labour demand can at least be discerned, the 
peripheral evidence indicates clearly that the magnitude of the impact of this relationship 
on top-tier pay inequality is small. Ultimately, therefore, organizational governance 
factors contribute little to the explanation of the target issue of the thesis. In this way, the 
chapter rules out one possible explanation of top-tier pay inequality growth and opens the 
way for the examination of another in Chapter four.
Chapter four seeks to explain the rise in British top-tier pay inequality with reference to a 
market-based approach. It begins from the hypothesis that new technologies have acted 
as complements with managerial skills, but examines the possibility that this 
complementarity effect only occurs where managers occupy a particular role with regard 
to the organization of production. This approach is used as it provides a means of 
reconciling the ‘universal’ technology-led hypothesis with the observation that many 
countries have not experienced a top-tier growth in pay inequality of the type observed in 
Britain. Building on the ‘societal effects’ insights of the Aix Group, I argue that the key 
variable with regard to the role of management is the degree of its ‘centrality’ to the 
production process, with this concept being defined in terms of skills, industrial relations, 
and work organization systems. The chapter, therefore, seeks evidence that British 
managers have become more central to production during the period in which their 
relative pay has increased.
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In its initial findings, the chapter presents strong evidence to support the inference that 
Britain has experienced a shift in relative labour demand towards managers, and that this 
demand shift has produced a manager-led rise in overall pay inequality at the top of the 
distribution. Subsequently, it demonstrates that, in the last three decades, managers have 
become much more central to production in British-based organizations along the 
dimensions highlighted by the societal effects approach. In the light of the expansion of 
ICT technologies into the workplace and Bresnahan’s (1999) hypothesis about the impact 
of these on managerial skills, I interpret these results to mean that British organizations 
now value managers much more highly in relative terms than they did in the past, and 
that they have reorganized in ways that have contributed strongly to this trend. I 
conclude, therefore, that the observed rise in British top-tier pay inequality has occurred 
largely on back of this shift in relative labour demand towards managers.
A number of possible lines of contention exist in response to these conclusions. For 
instance, the question arises as to the possible influence of globalization -  defined in 
terms of increased trade -  on the distribution of pay in developed countries. Could it not 
be the case that the integration of China and other large developing economies into the 
world economy over the last two decades has created a labour supply shock capable of 
changing the distribution of pay in the countries with which they trade intensively,
Britain included? Certainly, this is a possibility, but there are three good reasons for 
arguing that this development has had little impact on top pay in countries like Britain. 
First, the research conducted on this subject tends to conclude that the impact of 
increased trade on developed country pay distributions is minimal (for surveys of the 
literature, see Burtless 1995; Freeman 1995).36 Second, the supply shock of greater trade 
with developing countries is unlikely to impact top pay in the developed world, as high- 
skill jobs have largely not yet been affected by developing world competition. Third, 
although I do not test for it directly in this thesis, it seems very unlikely that the impact of
36 Much of the extant literature on this issue uses data for the 1980s and 1990s. It remains possible that 
conclusions based on data from this period are no longer valid in the new century, given the rapidity of 
ongoing economic change -  see, for example, the shift in Richard Freeman’s opinion on the subject 
between 1995 and 2005 as he moves from concluding that your wages are not ‘set in Beijing’ (Freeman 
1995) to arguing that developed country workers face considerable challenges as a result of the ‘doubling 
of the global workforce’ (Freeman 2005).
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rising global trade should affect any of the three countries studied in Chapter two to 
greater extent than the others, as all are relatively open economies operating under 
common trade regime. However, top pay trends are highly differentiated from one 
country to the next, suggesting that a common factor such as trade is not strongly at work. 
Notably, Germany is, of the three countries, perhaps the most exposed to trade 
competition -  having a relatively large manufacturing sector and being the world’s 
largest exporter -  yet it is the least impacted by top-tier pay inequality growth.
Observers who take a historical perspective might contend that the growth of top-tier pay 
inequality in Britain -  and perhaps even of broad-based pay inequality -  is due to the 
reflexive ‘unwinding’ of forces built up by the policies of pay compression pursued there 
in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the evidence for the building up any such forces is 
relatively weak. First, the degree of pay compression that took place during those 
decades was small in magnitude compared to the scale of dispersion that followed in the 
1980s and 1990s (Schmitt 1995). In fact, the distribution of pay in Britain was relatively 
stable during the period between mid-century and the mid-1970s. Second, the 
institutional mechanisms of collective pay setting, through which attempts to compress 
pay were made, have never had a direct impact on top pay in Britain. Hence, it is not 
plausible that the movement towards pay compression in earlier decades could have 
created forces to be unwound in the area of top pay.
A more political counter-argument in relation to the conclusions of this thesis would be 
that the relatively high growth of managerial pay might be due to crude self-dealing -  
quis custodiet ipsos custodesl There is strong evidence, however, that this kind of 
process is not a key factor in determining management pay, and that managers are 
fundamentally paid in relation to their performance (see, e.g., Ogden and Watson 2004; 
Tzioumis 2005). Furthermore, research of this kind tends to focus on the most senior 
executives, whom it might plausibly be argued have the greatest opportunity for self- 
dealing. This finding is perhaps not surprising, though, as, even in the most senior ranks, 
the processes and institutions (especially the Remuneration Committee of the Board)
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through which pay is determined provide no overt means by which individuals may 
influence their own pay other than through (market) negotiation.
Turning towards closing remarks, I would note that this thesis has ranged along a number 
of themes in the course of its exploration, of which two in particular stand out -  one 
empirical, and one theoretical or methodological. First, the thesis has repeatedly 
encountered evidence that the development of the British labour market has been 
distinctive when compared with the experience of similar European countries. In this 
respect, the pay inequality outcomes noted here stand as a particular case within a 
broader general whole. Second, the findings of the thesis are supportive of the idea that a 
broad social science approach to the investigation of ‘economic’ phenomena can yield 
interesting and informative conclusions. By this I mean that the combination of the 
econometric approach to empirical measurement, the fundamental insights of the 
theoretical framework of economics, and the insights of fields of the social sciences 
beyond economics (e.g., industrial relations, political science) can yield more informative 
conclusions than any one can reach alone. This is especially true in relation to the 
question of the importance of institutional and other nationally or otherwise locally 
specific factors in the determination of economic outcomes.
In taking this tack, this thesis has opened several pathways for further investigation in the 
future, and has indicated that interdisciplinary approaches such as the one taken here may 
provide a fruitful source of innovative ideas and analyses to study of labour market 
phenomena. In this last respect, I hope that it is at least consistent with the traditions of 
research established by the Industrial Relations scholars who have gone before me.
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